What do you answer before you reach the merits?
Start with the actor. Constitutional rights run against government, so ask whether the defendant is federal, state, local, or private. If private, you need state action: a traditional public function (Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)), significant entwinement (Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001)), or judicial enforcement of a private discriminatory arrangement (Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)). Mere regulation or public funding is not enough (Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)). Also fix which amendment applies: the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause constrains the federal government, the Fourteenth constrains states.
Then run justiciability, but only where the facts invite it. Standing needs injury in fact, causation, and redressability (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)); watch for taxpayer plaintiffs, generalized grievances, and third-party standing. Consider ripeness where enforcement is only threatened, mootness where the plaintiff has graduated or the statute was repealed, the political question doctrine (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable under Rucho v. Common Cause (2019)), and state sovereign immunity with the Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), workaround for prospective relief against officers.
Do not write a page on standing when the plaintiff was actually prosecuted. Flag it in a sentence and move on.
Does the government have power to act at all?
Congress needs an enumerated power; states have general police power and need no authorization. If Congress acted, name the power and test it. Commerce Clause: channels, instrumentalities, or activities substantially affecting interstate commerce, aggregated if economic (Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)), but no regulation of noneconomic intrastate conduct on an attenuated chain (United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)), and no compelling entry into commerce (NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)). Taxing and spending: conditions must be unambiguous, related to the federal interest, and not coercive (South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)). Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches only congruent and proportional remedies for judicially recognized violations (City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
If a state acted, the question flips to limits. Consider preemption, the dormant Commerce Clause (facial or purposeful discrimination against out-of-staters is virtually per se invalid absent no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternative; evenhanded laws get Pike balancing, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)), the market-participant exception, and Article IV Privileges and Immunities for laws burdening out-of-state citizens' fundamental economic or civil rights. If Congress commanded a state legislature or state officers to act, raise anticommandeering (New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Murphy v. NCAA (2018)).
Which rights clause actually governs?
Pick the clause from the government's reason for treating people differently or the interest burdened, not from vague fairness. A law that classifies is equal protection. A law that burdens everyone's exercise of a liberty is substantive due process. A deprivation of an existing life, liberty, or property interest through defective procedure is procedural due process, analyzed under the private interest, risk of error, and government burden factors of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Be specific inside each clause. For substantive due process, identify whether the asserted right is deeply rooted in history and tradition and carefully described (Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)), the framework Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022) reaffirmed for unenumerated rights. For equal protection, name the classification: race, national origin, and alienage by states get strict scrutiny; sex gets intermediate scrutiny with an exceedingly persuasive justification (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)); age, disability, wealth, and most economic classifications get rational basis. If the statute is facially neutral, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory purpose plus effect (Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)), using the Arlington Heights factors (Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
Property hypos have their own tests: per se taking for permanent physical occupation (Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)), Penn Central factors for regulatory diminution, and nexus plus rough proportionality for exactions (Nollan; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994)).
How do you run a tier of scrutiny without hand-waving?
State the standard with its burden. Strict scrutiny: the government must show a compelling interest and narrow tailoring, meaning no less restrictive alternative and no substantial over- or underinclusiveness. Intermediate: the government must show an important interest and means substantially related to it. Rational basis: the challenger must negate any conceivable legitimate purpose, and the legislature need not have articulated it.
Then use the facts. Tailoring is where exam points live. Underinclusiveness (the ordinance bans one kind of sign but not the identical one next door) undercuts the claimed interest and suggests pretext. Overinclusiveness shows the government swept in conduct that causes no harm. Point to the specific exemptions, the availability of a permitting or case-by-case scheme, and any admission in the facts about legislative motive. Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (2023) illustrates the modern demand for measurable objectives and a logical endpoint even where the interest is asserted to be compelling.
Say who wins and why, in that language. "The city's interest in traffic safety is important but its exemption for real estate signs shows the restriction is not narrowly tailored" is worth more than three paragraphs of doctrine with no conclusion.
What is the First Amendment decision tree?
For speech, ask in order: (1) Is it speech or expressive conduct (symbolic conduct gets O'Brien intermediate review)? (2) Is it in an unprotected category, narrowly defined: incitement to imminent lawless action likely to occur (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)), true threats, obscenity under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), fighting words, defamation, or speech integral to criminal conduct? (3) Is the regulation content based, including subject-matter and speaker distinctions, which triggers strict scrutiny (Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015))? (4) If content neutral, apply time, place, and manner review: significant government interest, narrow tailoring, ample alternative channels (Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)). (5) Where does the speech occur? Traditional and designated public forums get the content-based/neutral framework; nonpublic forums require only reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality (Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)). Add prior restraint, overbreadth, and vagueness as separate facial attacks, and use Central Hudson for commercial speech.
For religion, separate the clauses. Free exercise: a neutral and generally applicable law gets rational basis (Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)), but strict scrutiny applies if the law targets religion (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)) or contains individualized exemptions or secular comparators treated better (Fulton v. City of Philadelphia (2021)). Establishment Clause analysis now turns on historical practice and understanding and on coercion (Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022)) rather than the Lemon test.
How do you analyze separation of powers?
For executive action, use Justice Jackson's Youngstown framework (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)): the President acts with congressional authorization (maximum power), in congressional silence (the twilight zone), or against a congressional prohibition (lowest ebb, sustainable only on exclusive Article II authority). Identify the statute in the facts and place the action in a category before arguing.
For congressional action, ask whether Congress tried to exercise legislative power without bicameralism and presentment (INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)), reserved an appointment or removal role for itself, or insulated an officer from presidential control. For officers, distinguish principal from inferior under the Appointments Clause, and note that removal restrictions on a single head of an executive agency are unconstitutional (Seila Law LLC v. CFPB (2020)) while multimember adjudicatory bodies and inferior officers retain more protection. Nondelegation arguments should be raised as intelligible-principle claims and acknowledged as historically weak.
How should the written answer be organized?
Write one IRAC block per claim per plaintiff, headed with the clause and the party. Allocate time by point value, not by how much you know. Lead each block with the rule as an operative test, then apply the facts the professor planted, then argue the other side in a sentence or two, then conclude. Argue in the alternative when the doctrine forks: if the classification is not race based, then rational basis, and here is why the law survives.
Two framing choices you should make explicitly. First, facial versus as-applied: a facial challenge asks whether the statute is invalid in all or a substantial number of applications, and overbreadth is available in First Amendment cases; an as-applied challenge only requires that this enforcement be unconstitutional. Second, remedy and severability: say what relief follows, whether an injunction, damages against an officer, or invalidation of one subsection.
Do not conflate clauses. A wealth-based classification is equal protection, not substantive due process. A law that burdens a fundamental right for everyone is due process, not equal protection, unless the government draws lines in who may exercise it. And do not spend paragraphs reciting a case's facts; cite it for the rule and get back to the hypo.