What order should you run the checklist in?
Federal Courts fact patterns are almost always structured as a sequence of gates a plaintiff must pass. Grade-maximizing answers walk the gates in order and say explicitly why each one opens or closes. Do not jump to the interesting doctrine your professor spent two weeks on; the easy points are in the boring gates you can dispose of in a sentence each.
The standard sequence: (1) Is there a case or controversy — standing, ripeness, mootness, political question, no advisory opinion? (2) Is there statutory subject matter jurisdiction — § 1331, § 1332, § 1367, removal under § 1441? (3) Has Congress validly given or withdrawn that jurisdiction, or assigned the case to a non-Article III adjudicator? (4) Is the defendant immune — sovereign immunity, absolute or qualified immunity? (5) Does the plaintiff have a cause of action — § 1983, Bivens, an implied right, federal common law? (6) Even with jurisdiction and a claim, must the court abstain or defer? (7) Merits and remedy.
When a call is close, decide it and then argue in the alternative. Write "even if standing fails as to the damages claim, the injunctive claim is independently barred by Younger" — that sentence collects points on both doctrines.
How do you work the justiciability gate?
Standing is the highest-yield doctrine on almost every exam. Run the three Lujan elements separately for each plaintiff, each claim, and each form of relief. Injury must be concrete and particularized and actual or imminent; after Spokeo v. Robins and TransUnion v. Ramirez, a bare statutory violation is not enough unless the harm bears a close relationship to one traditionally recognized at common law. Clapper v. Amnesty International rejects standing built on a speculative chain of independent third-party choices. Redressability is where organizational and taxpayer plaintiffs usually die — Allen v. Wright, DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, and the narrow Flast v. Cohen exception cabined by Hein and Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn.
Then check the prudential and derivative rules: third-party standing under Singleton v. Wulff, associational standing under the Hunt factors, and the rule that a plaintiff seeking an injunction must show a likelihood of future injury, not just past harm. For mootness, name the voluntary-cessation rule from Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception, the class-action exceptions from Sosna and Geraghty, and Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski on nominal damages preserving a live controversy. For ripeness, use Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner's fitness-and-hardship framework and Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus for pre-enforcement challenges.
Political question requires the Baker v. Carr factors, but modern exams want Nixon v. United States (textual commitment), Zivotofsky v. Clinton (a legal question is not a political question), and Rucho v. Common Cause (no judicially manageable standards for partisan gerrymandering). Do not confuse it with standing; they fail for different reasons and both may apply.
How do you handle jurisdiction and congressional control?
For arising-under jurisdiction, start with the well-pleaded complaint rule from Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley: federal defenses and anticipated defenses do not count, and Franchise Tax Board extends that to declaratory judgment actions by looking to the coercive suit. Then run the Holmes creation test — federal law creates the cause of action — and, if not, the Grable/Gunn v. Minton four-part test: a federal issue necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial to the federal system as a whole, and resolvable without disturbing the federal-state balance. Note the difference between ordinary preemption (a defense, no jurisdiction) and complete preemption (Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson), which converts the claim.
For supplemental jurisdiction, cite § 1367 by subsection: (a) common nucleus of operative fact from Gibbs, (b) the diversity carve-out that codifies Kroger and was read narrowly in Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah, (c) discretionary declination. For removal, check the forum-defendant rule in § 1441(b)(2), the one-year limit and unanimity rules in § 1446, and Home Depot v. Jackson barring removal by a counterclaim defendant.
Congressional control questions turn on whether the statute strips jurisdiction or dictates a result. Ex parte McCardle and Sheldon v. Sill support broad power over lower-court and appellate jurisdiction; United States v. Klein limits Congress's ability to prescribe rules of decision, though Bank Markazi v. Peterson and Patchak show how narrow Klein is. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm bars reopening final judgments. Boumediene v. Bush and INS v. St. Cyr supply the Suspension Clause and constitutional-avoidance floors. For non-Article III adjudication, sequence Northern Pipeline, CFTC v. Schor, Stern v. Marshall, and Wellness International v. Sharif on consent.
How do you analyze suits against governments and officials?
Identify the defendant precisely. A state or state agency is immune in federal court under Hans v. Louisiana and, per Alden v. Maine, in its own courts too; a state is not a "person" under § 1983 (Will v. Michigan Department of State Police). Municipalities have no Eleventh Amendment immunity and are suable under Monell only for a policy or custom, with no respondeat superior and no qualified immunity (Owen v. City of Independence).
Work the three routes around state sovereign immunity in order: Ex parte Young (prospective relief against a state officer with some connection to enforcement; Verizon Maryland's straightforward inquiry; blocked by Edelman v. Jordan for retroactive money and by Pennhurst for state-law claims); valid abrogation (Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer under § 5, tested by the Boerne congruence-and-proportionality standard as applied in Garrett, Hibbs, and Tennessee v. Lane; Seminole Tribe forecloses Article I abrogation, with the structural exceptions of Katz, PennEast, and Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety); and waiver.
For individual-capacity claims, run absolute immunity first (Imbler for prosecutorial advocacy, Stump v. Sparkman for judges, legislative immunity), then qualified immunity under Harlow: no liability unless the right was clearly established at a level of particularity such that every reasonable officer would know. Pearson v. Callahan makes the order of the two prongs discretionary, al-Kidd and Wesby demand specificity, and Taylor v. Riojas shows the obviousness escape hatch. Mention that denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable under Mitchell v. Forsyth.
For the cause of action itself: § 1983 requires state action and a deprivation of a federal right, and Gonzaga University v. Doe plus Talevski govern whether a Spending Clause statute is enforceable. For federal officers, treat Bivens as effectively closed outside its three original contexts after Ziglar v. Abbasi, Hernandez v. Mesa, and Egbert v. Boule.
Which deference doctrines do you check even after jurisdiction is clear?
This is where students lose the most points, because these doctrines apply only after jurisdiction exists and students stop analyzing too early.
Run Younger v. Harris whenever there is a pending state proceeding: Sprint Communications v. Jacobs limits it to state criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal, and orders uniquely in aid of state courts' judicial function, subject to the bad-faith and flagrant-unconstitutionality exceptions. Pullman abstention needs an unsettled state-law question that could avoid the constitutional issue. Burford targets complex state administrative schemes. Colorado River requires exceptional circumstances and parallel litigation, narrowed by Moses H. Cone.
Also check the Anti-Injunction Act, § 2283, and remember Mitchum v. Foster holds § 1983 is an expressly authorized exception; the Tax Injunction Act, § 1341; Rooker-Feldman, confined by Exxon Mobil v. Saudi Basic Industries to state-court losers inviting review of the judgment itself; and the domestic relations and probate exceptions as narrowed by Ankenbrandt v. Richards and Marshall v. Marshall.
How do you handle the habeas and state-court review portion?
For Supreme Court review of a state judgment, first ask whether an adequate and independent state ground supports it (Fox Film v. Muller), and apply the Michigan v. Long presumption that an ambiguous state opinion rests on federal law absent a plain statement. Murdock v. City of Memphis explains why the Court cannot reach state-law questions.
For § 2254 petitions, run this order: custody and the correct statute (§ 2241, § 2254, § 2255, with Jones v. Hendrix on the savings clause); exhaustion; procedural default under Wainwright v. Sykes and Coleman v. Thompson, with the Martinez v. Ryan narrow exception and Shinn v. Ramirez limiting evidentiary development; the one-year limit and the successive-petition bar in § 2244; retroactivity under Teague v. Lane, with Edwards v. Vannoy holding that no new procedural rule will apply retroactively; and finally § 2254(d)'s contrary-to/unreasonable-application standard as construed by Williams v. Taylor, Harrington v. Richter, and Cullen v. Pinholster's record limitation. Add Stone v. Powell for Fourth Amendment claims and Brecht v. Abrahamson for harmless error.
What varies by professor, and how should you adjust?
Coverage varies more in Federal Courts than in almost any other upper-level course, and that variation drives what your checklist should emphasize. Some courses are Hart and Wechsler-style and spend half the semester on congressional control, non-Article III tribunals, and federal common law (Clearfield Trust, Lincoln Mills, Boyle v. United Technologies). Others are essentially civil rights litigation courses centered on § 1983, immunities, and Younger. A few include Erie and vertical choice of law; many do not.
Read the syllabus allocation, not the casebook table of contents. Count class sessions per topic and weight your outline accordingly. If your professor released past exams, reverse-engineer the fact-pattern archetypes: the state-official injunction problem, the removal-plus-Grable problem, and the habeas timeline problem recur constantly. Also learn your professor's pet distinctions — many care intensely about the difference between a jurisdictional bar and a merits ruling, or between Ex parte Young and abrogation as independent routes.
On timing: budget roughly the first fifth of your writing time to outlining the gate sequence for each party. Then write short, labeled paragraphs, one per gate. Header-driven answers grade better than narrative ones because they let the grader find each issue.