Dissent in Texas v. Johnson
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (1989) · Supreme Court of the United States
Texas v. Johnson held that flag burning is constitutionally protected symbolic speech under the First Amendment. The decision established that the government cannot prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds it disagreeable or offensive, and it remains the leading case on the protection of symbolic political protest.
What was the dissent in Texas v. Johnson?
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and O'Connor, dissented, arguing that the American flag's unique status as a national symbol justified special protection and that flag burning is not essential to any exposition of ideas. Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing that the government's interest in preserving the flag's symbolic value was sufficient to support the prosecution.
Case Overview
Facts
During the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas, Gregory Lee Johnson participated in a political demonstration protesting the policies of the Reagan administration and certain Dallas-based corporations. At the conclusion of the march, Johnson burned an American flag while protesters chanted. No one was physically injured or threatened with injury, though several witnesses testified that they were seriously offended. Johnson was convicted under a Texas statute that prohibited the intentional desecration of a venerated object, including the American flag.
Majority Holding
The Court held 5-4 that Johnson's flag burning was expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The Texas statute was unconstitutional because it was content-based, targeting the expressive element of the conduct -- desecration was defined by its communicative impact. The government's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity did not justify restricting political expression.
Majority Reasoning
Justice Brennan's majority opinion first determined that Johnson's flag burning was sufficiently imbued with communicative elements to be considered expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The Court then applied the O'Brien test for regulations of symbolic speech, finding that the Texas statute was related to the suppression of expression because it targeted the communicative impact of the flag burning, not any nonspeech element. Under strict scrutiny, the government's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol did not justify criminal punishment for political expression. The Court held that the principle underlying the First Amendment is that the government may not prohibit expression simply because it disagrees with its message.
The Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White and O'Connor, dissented, arguing that the American flag's unique status as a national symbol justified special protection and that flag burning is not essential to any exposition of ideas. Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing that the government's interest in preserving the flag's symbolic value was sufficient to support the prosecution.
Key Quotes
“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself disagreeable or offensive.”
“We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.”
“The way to preserve the flag's special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that they are wrong.”
Impact and Legacy
Texas v. Johnson affirmed the robust protection of symbolic speech under the First Amendment, even when that speech is deeply offensive to many. Congress responded by passing the Flag Protection Act of 1989, which the Court struck down in United States v. Eichman the following year. Multiple attempts to amend the Constitution to permit flag desecration statutes have failed. The case remains the definitive statement on the protection of political protest through symbolic expression.
Exam Relevance
Texas v. Johnson is tested in symbolic speech and content-based regulation questions. Professors ask students to apply the O'Brien test for symbolic speech and to determine whether a regulation targets the communicative or noncommunicative element of conduct. Students should understand the distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations and when each standard of review applies.
Study Tips
- Understand the analytical framework: first determine if the conduct is sufficiently communicative, then apply the appropriate test (O'Brien for content-neutral, strict scrutiny for content-based).
- Know why the Texas statute was considered content-based: it targeted desecration, which was defined by the communicative impact on observers.
- Be prepared to apply the bedrock principle that the government cannot suppress expression merely because it is offensive or disagreeable.
- Compare with United States v. O'Brien, where the regulation of draft card burning was upheld because it targeted a nonspeech element.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Texas v. Johnson including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
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