Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson
163 U.S. 537 (1896) (1896) · Supreme Court of the United States
Plessy v. Ferguson established the separate but equal doctrine, holding that racial segregation in public facilities did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment as long as the separate facilities were equal. The decision provided the constitutional framework for Jim Crow laws that persisted for nearly sixty years until Brown v. Board of Education overruled it in the context of public education.
What was the dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson?
Justice Harlan wrote one of the most famous dissents in Supreme Court history, declaring that the Constitution is color-blind and that the law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights are guaranteed by the supreme law of the land. Harlan presciently warned that the decision would prove as pernicious as the Dred Scott case.
Case Overview
Facts
Homer Plessy, who was seven-eighths white and one-eighth Black, purchased a first-class ticket on the East Louisiana Railway and sat in a whites-only car. Under Louisiana's Separate Car Act of 1890, which required separate railway accommodations for white and Black passengers, Plessy was asked to move to the car designated for Black passengers. He refused and was arrested and charged with violating the Separate Car Act.
Majority Holding
The Court held 7-1 that the Louisiana Separate Car Act did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Brown's majority opinion held that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to enforce political equality, not social equality, and that laws requiring racial separation did not imply the inferiority of either race. As long as the separate facilities were equal, the segregation was constitutionally permissible.
Majority Reasoning
Justice Brown reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to abolish social distinctions based on race or to enforce a commingling of the two races. The Court held that racial segregation was a reasonable exercise of the state's police power and that the assumption that separation stamped Black persons with a badge of inferiority was a product of the colored race's own interpretation, not the law's meaning. The majority distinguished between political rights (protected) and social rights (not constitutionally guaranteed), concluding that legislation could not overcome racial instincts or abolish distinctions based on physical differences.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Harlan wrote one of the most famous dissents in Supreme Court history, declaring that the Constitution is color-blind and that the law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights are guaranteed by the supreme law of the land. Harlan presciently warned that the decision would prove as pernicious as the Dred Scott case.
Key Quotes
“We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority.”
“Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. -- Justice Harlan, dissenting”
“The thin disguise of 'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong this day done. -- Justice Harlan, dissenting”
Impact and Legacy
Plessy's separate but equal doctrine provided the constitutional foundation for racial segregation throughout the American South and beyond for nearly sixty years. Jim Crow laws mandating separation in schools, transportation, restaurants, and virtually all public facilities were upheld under this framework. The doctrine was not overruled until Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, though Justice Harlan's dissent has since been vindicated as reflecting the true meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Exam Relevance
Plessy is tested primarily in historical context as the case Brown overruled. Professors use it to explore the evolution of Equal Protection Clause doctrine and the dangers of judicial deference to discriminatory legislation. Students should be prepared to compare Harlan's dissent with the majority's reasoning and to evaluate the separate but equal doctrine's internal logic.
Study Tips
- Read Justice Harlan's dissent carefully -- it is one of the most important dissents in constitutional history and its 'color-blind Constitution' language continues to be invoked in modern equal protection debates.
- Understand the distinction the majority drew between political and social equality and why that distinction has been rejected.
- Consider how Plessy illustrates the limitations of judicial review when courts defer to majoritarian racism.
- Be able to trace the doctrinal arc from Plessy through Brown to modern equal protection strict scrutiny.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Plessy v. Ferguson including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
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