Dissent in Korematsu v. United States
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (1944) · Supreme Court of the United States
Korematsu upheld the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, applying strict scrutiny to a racial classification for the first time but finding the classification justified by military necessity. The case is widely regarded as one of the Supreme Court's worst decisions and was formally repudiated by the Court in Trump v. Hawaii (2018), though it was never technically overruled.
What was the dissent in Korematsu v. United States?
Justice Murphy dissented, calling the exclusion order a legalization of racism and arguing that it fell into the ugly abyss of racism. Justice Jackson also dissented, warning that the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure validated by the Court lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Justice Roberts dissented as well, arguing Korematsu was convicted for being present in the state where he was born.
Case Overview
Facts
Following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 authorizing military commanders to designate exclusion zones from which any persons could be excluded. General DeWitt issued orders excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast military area and establishing internment camps. Fred Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese descent born in Oakland, California, refused to comply with the exclusion order and was arrested and convicted.
Majority Holding
The Court upheld the exclusion order in a 6-3 decision. Justice Black's majority opinion acknowledged that all legal restrictions curtailing the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect and subject to the most rigid scrutiny, but held that pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions. The military's assessment that Japanese Americans on the West Coast posed a potential security threat was found to be a sufficient justification.
Majority Reasoning
Justice Black stated that racial antagonism could never justify such restrictions, but that the exclusion order was justified by the exigencies of war and the military's judgment that it was impossible to quickly separate disloyal from loyal Japanese Americans. The Court deferred heavily to the military's assessment of the security threat and refused to second-guess the judgment that exclusion was a military necessity. The majority framed the case narrowly as involving only an exclusion order, not the internment camps themselves, though in practice they were inseparable.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Murphy dissented, calling the exclusion order a legalization of racism and arguing that it fell into the ugly abyss of racism. Justice Jackson also dissented, warning that the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure validated by the Court lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Justice Roberts dissented as well, arguing Korematsu was convicted for being present in the state where he was born.
Key Quotes
“All legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect... courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.”
“Such exclusion goes over 'the very brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism. -- Justice Murphy, dissenting”
“A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency... But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order... the principle then lies about like a loaded weapon. -- Justice Jackson, dissenting”
Impact and Legacy
Korematsu stands as a powerful cautionary tale about the dangers of judicial deference to the executive during wartime and the use of racial classifications under the guise of national security. While the case established strict scrutiny for racial classifications as a formal matter, its application of that scrutiny was widely criticized as toothless. In 2018, Chief Justice Roberts stated in Trump v. Hawaii that Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, though the Court did not formally overrule it.
Exam Relevance
Korematsu is frequently tested in equal protection and national security contexts. Professors use it to explore the tension between strict scrutiny doctrine and its application, asking students to evaluate whether the Court genuinely applied rigorous review or merely rubber-stamped military judgment. It also appears in separation of powers questions about judicial deference to the executive during emergencies.
Study Tips
- Focus on the disconnect between announcing strict scrutiny and actually applying it deferentially.
- Read Justice Jackson's dissent carefully -- the 'loaded weapon' metaphor is among the most famous in constitutional law.
- Understand the difference between formal repudiation (Trump v. Hawaii) and formal overruling.
- Be prepared to discuss Korematsu in the context of modern national security challenges and civil liberties.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Korematsu v. United States including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
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