Dissent in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (1986) (1986) · Supreme Court of the United States
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, part of the summary judgment trilogy, established that the substantive evidentiary standard of proof applicable to the claim (such as clear and convincing evidence) applies at the summary judgment stage. It clarified that a dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.
What was the dissent in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.?
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall and Chief Justice Rehnquist, arguing that importing the substantive standard of proof into the summary judgment analysis improperly transforms the judge's role and risks deciding factual disputes that should be reserved for the jury.
Source: Read Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. on Google Scholar
Case Overview
Facts
Liberty Lobby, a political organization, and its founder Willis Carto sued Jack Anderson, a syndicated columnist, and others for defamation, alleging that Anderson published articles accusing Liberty Lobby and Carto of neo-Nazi, anti-Semitic, racist, and fascist activities. Because Liberty Lobby was a public figure, it was required under New York Times v. Sullivan to prove actual malice — knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth — by clear and convincing evidence. Anderson moved for summary judgment.
Majority Holding
The Supreme Court held that the substantive evidentiary standard of proof — here, clear and convincing evidence — must be taken into account at the summary judgment stage. A court ruling on summary judgment must ask whether a fair-minded jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff under the governing evidentiary standard. The dispute about a material fact is 'genuine' only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party under the applicable standard of proof.
Majority Reasoning
Justice White's majority opinion reasoned that the summary judgment inquiry mirrors the directed verdict standard: the question is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury, or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. The Court emphasized that summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' meaning the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant. In applying this standard, the court must consider the evidentiary burden that the plaintiff must meet at trial. If the plaintiff must prove his case by clear and convincing evidence, the court must determine whether a reasonable jury could find clear and convincing evidence of the claim. The judge does not weigh the evidence or determine the truth but assesses whether there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall and Chief Justice Rehnquist, arguing that importing the substantive standard of proof into the summary judgment analysis improperly transforms the judge's role and risks deciding factual disputes that should be reserved for the jury.
Key Quotes
“The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”
“If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.”
“The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”
Impact and Legacy
Anderson clarified the relationship between summary judgment and the trial standard of proof, ensuring consistency between the two stages. The decision, combined with Celotex and Matsushita, emboldened courts to grant summary judgment more frequently, particularly in cases requiring heightened evidentiary standards. The case also established the general principle that a court evaluating summary judgment must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party while considering whether a reasonable jury could find in the nonmovant's favor.
Exam Relevance
Anderson is tested as part of the summary judgment trilogy. Students must understand that the 'genuine dispute of material fact' standard incorporates the applicable burden of proof. Exam questions may present a summary judgment motion in a case with a heightened standard of proof and ask students to assess whether the nonmovant's evidence is sufficient. Students should be prepared to apply all three trilogy cases together.
Study Tips
- Remember the key standard: a genuine dispute exists only if a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party under the applicable evidentiary standard.
- Understand that the court views evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant but does not weigh the evidence or assess credibility.
- Know how Anderson interacts with Celotex (who bears the initial burden) and Matsushita (what inferences are permissible).
- Be able to distinguish the summary judgment standard from the motion to dismiss standard — summary judgment looks at evidence, not just pleadings.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
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