Vosburg v. Putney vs. Garratt v. Dailey
A side-by-side comparison of two landmark torts cases
Vosburg v. Putney
80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891) (1891)
Holding
The court held that because the kick occurred in a classroom where such conduct was unlawful (not impliedly consented to as it might be on a playground), the intent to make contact was sufficient to establish battery. The defendant was liable for all injuries flowing from the unlawful act, regardless of whether those injuries were foreseeable.
Doctrine Established
Intent to Contact (Not Harm) Suffices for Battery / Eggshell Plaintiff Rule
Garratt v. Dailey
46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955) (1955)
Holding
The court held that intent for battery is established if the defendant either desired to cause a harmful or offensive contact or knew with substantial certainty that such contact would result from his actions. The case was remanded to determine whether the five-year-old had such knowledge.
Doctrine Established
Substantial Certainty Test for Intent
Comparison Analysis
Vosburg v. Putney (1891) and Garratt v. Dailey (1955) are both foundational intentional tort cases that explore the minimal intent required for battery, but they present the issue in different factual contexts that illuminate different aspects of the intent doctrine. Vosburg held that a schoolboy who kicked a classmate's leg during class committed a battery even though he did not intend to cause serious injury, because the kick was unlawful (it occurred during class, not during recess) and the defendant intended the physical contact. Garratt held that a five-year-old boy who pulled a chair out from under an elderly woman could be liable for battery if he knew with 'substantial certainty' that she would attempt to sit down where the chair had been.
These cases together establish the minimum intent threshold for battery. Vosburg demonstrates that the defendant need not intend the specific harm that results -- intent to make the physical contact is sufficient, and the defendant is liable for all consequences that flow from the unlawful touching, even unforeseen ones (the eggshell plaintiff rule). Garratt refines the intent element further by establishing the 'substantial certainty' test: intent for battery purposes is satisfied either by a desire to cause the contact or by knowledge to a substantial certainty that the contact will occur as a result of one's actions.
The combined teaching of these cases is that battery has a very low intent threshold. The defendant need not be hostile, need not desire to cause harm, and need not even be an adult capable of full moral reasoning. If the defendant either desired the contact or knew with substantial certainty it would occur, and the contact was harmful or offensive, the intent element is satisfied. This stands in sharp contrast to criminal law's generally higher intent requirements and to negligence's reasonable-person standard.
Similarities
- Both address the intent element of battery and establish that a relatively low threshold of intent suffices for intentional tort liability
- Both involve child defendants whose capacity to form intent is at issue, illustrating that even minors can commit intentional torts
- Both involve harmful physical contact that caused injury to the plaintiff, satisfying the contact element of battery
- Both are universally taught as the foundational intentional tort cases in first-year Torts courses
Differences
- Vosburg involved a direct intentional contact (a kick) where the defendant clearly intended the touching but not the severity of harm, while Garratt involved an indirect contact (pulling a chair) where the question was whether the defendant knew contact with the ground was substantially certain to occur
- Vosburg focuses on the principle that intent to cause harm is not required -- intent to make contact suffices, while Garratt focuses on the 'substantial certainty' alternative to purpose-based intent
- In Vosburg, the defendant undeniably intended the physical act (kicking); the question was whether he intended it as 'unlawful.' In Garratt, the question was whether the young child had sufficient cognitive capacity to know the consequences of his act
- Vosburg is a Wisconsin case from 1891 involving the eggshell plaintiff rule as applied to intentional torts, while Garratt is a Washington case from 1955 that refined the definition of intent under the Restatement framework
Why This Comparison Matters
Intentional tort questions require students to analyze intent carefully. The key from Vosburg is that the defendant need not intend the harm -- only the contact. The key from Garratt is that intent is satisfied either by purpose (desire to cause contact) or by knowledge (substantial certainty contact will result). Exam patterns typically present ambiguous facts about the defendant's state of mind and ask students to determine whether battery intent exists. Students should also note the transferred intent doctrine and the distinction between intent for torts (Vosburg/Garratt standard) and intent for crimes (generally requiring a higher mens rea).
More Torts Comparisons
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. vs. United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad (1928) and United States v. Carroll Towing (1947) are the two most important negligence cases in American tort law, each addressing a different element of the negligence analysis. Palsgraf, through the famous Cardozo-Andrews debate, addresses the duty and proximate cause elements, holding that a defendant owes a duty of care only to foreseeable plaintiffs -- those within the zone of danger created by the defendant's conduct. Carroll Towing, through Judge Learned Hand's algebraic formula (B < PL), addresses the breach element, providing a framework for determining whether a defendant's conduct fell below the standard of reasonable care by comparing the burden of precaution (B) against the probability of harm (P) multiplied by the gravity of the resulting injury (L).
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. vs. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products (1963) represent the two great revolutions in products liability law. MacPherson, authored by Judge Cardozo, eliminated the privity requirement in negligence, holding that a manufacturer owes a duty of care not just to the immediate buyer but to all foreseeable users of the product. Greenman, authored by Justice Traynor, went further by establishing strict products liability, holding that a manufacturer is strictly liable when a defective product causes injury, regardless of negligence or contractual privity.
Rylands v. Fletcher vs. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) and Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. (1910) both involve liability imposed without fault for damage to another's property, but they rest on different theoretical foundations. Rylands established the principle that one who brings onto their land something likely to do mischief if it escapes is strictly liable for damage caused by its escape, regardless of the landowner's care or fault. This created the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. Vincent held that a ship owner who kept his vessel moored to a dock during a storm to save the ship from destruction was privileged to do so (necessity) but was still liable for the resulting damage to the dock.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California vs. Dillon v. Legg
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976) and Dillon v. Legg (1968) are both California Supreme Court cases that expanded the scope of tort duty beyond traditional limits, but in different directions. Tarasoff established the duty of mental health professionals to warn or protect identifiable third parties when a patient makes a credible threat of violence, overriding the traditional rule that there is no duty to control the conduct of another. Dillon established that a bystander who witnesses a close relative being negligently injured may recover for the emotional distress of witnessing the event, even though the bystander was not physically endangered.