Hansberry v. Lee vs. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
A side-by-side comparison of two landmark civil procedure cases
Hansberry v. Lee
311 U.S. 32 (1940) (1940)
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the prior class judgment could not bind Hansberry because his interests were not adequately represented in the earlier action. Due process requires that absent class members' interests be adequately represented before they can be bound by a class judgment. Because the parties in Burke v. Kleiman had interests opposed to those of Hansberry — they sought to enforce the covenant while Hansberry sought to invalidate it — there was no adequate representation.
Doctrine Established
Adequate Representation Requirement for Class Action Preclusion
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
564 U.S. 338 (2011) (2011)
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish commonality under Rule 23(a)(2). Commonality requires that class members' claims depend upon a common contention that is capable of classwide resolution, meaning that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each claim in one stroke. The mere allegation of discretionary decision-making by thousands of individual managers was insufficient to demonstrate a common policy of discrimination. The Court also held that individualized monetary claims for back pay could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).
Doctrine Established
Common Answers Requirement for Class Certification (Heightened Commonality)
Comparison Analysis
Hansberry v. Lee (1940) and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011) both address the requirements for binding absent class members in class action litigation, but they approach the issue from different constitutional and procedural perspectives. Hansberry, decided on due process grounds, held that a prior class action judgment could not bind parties who were not adequately represented in the earlier litigation. The case involved racially restrictive covenants in Chicago, and the Court held that allowing a prior judgment to bind the Hansberry family (who were Black homeowners) when the class in the original suit had interests adverse to theirs would violate due process. Wal-Mart interpreted Rule 23 to decertify what would have been the largest employment discrimination class action in history, holding that 1.5 million female Wal-Mart employees lacked the commonality required under Rule 23(a)(2).
Hansberry establishes the constitutional floor: due process requires that class members be adequately represented and that the class representatives' interests align with those of absent members. Without adequate representation, a class judgment cannot constitutionally bind absent parties. Wal-Mart raises the bar higher by interpreting the commonality requirement to demand that class members share a common contention whose truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. General allegations of company-wide discrimination were insufficient without evidence of a common policy or practice that connected all 1.5 million claims.
The practical impact of Wal-Mart has been to make large-scale employment discrimination class actions significantly harder to certify. By requiring a common question capable of classwide resolution rather than merely common issues, the Court raised the threshold for class certification and gave defendants a powerful tool to challenge large classes. Students should understand that Hansberry provides the constitutional framework (due process requires adequate representation), while Wal-Mart provides the procedural framework (Rule 23 requires genuine commonality and typicality that permits classwide resolution).
Similarities
- Both address when a class action may bind absent class members who did not individually participate in the litigation
- Both involve the tension between efficient resolution of mass claims and the rights of individual class members
- Both resulted in limitations on the scope of class action judgments, protecting absent members from being bound by proceedings that did not adequately protect their interests
- Both are landmark cases that define the requirements for class action certification
Differences
- Hansberry is grounded in the Due Process Clause (constitutional requirement of adequate representation), while Wal-Mart is grounded in Rule 23(a)(2) (statutory requirement of commonality)
- Hansberry involved a relatively small class with clearly adverse interests (Black homeowners vs. white homeowners in a covenant case), while Wal-Mart involved a massive class of 1.5 million employees alleged to have suffered from a common discriminatory practice
- Hansberry asked whether the original class representatives adequately represented the absent members' interests, while Wal-Mart asked whether the class members' claims shared sufficient commonality to permit classwide resolution
- Wal-Mart imposed a heightened commonality standard requiring a 'common contention capable of classwide resolution,' which was not part of the Hansberry analysis
- Hansberry is a civil rights case from the era of racially restrictive covenants, while Wal-Mart is a modern employment discrimination case raising questions about statistical evidence and corporate discretion
Why This Comparison Matters
Class action questions are common on Civil Procedure exams. Students must analyze the Rule 23(a) requirements: numerosity, commonality (Wal-Mart's heightened standard), typicality, and adequacy of representation (Hansberry's constitutional floor). A typical exam question will present a proposed class and ask whether it satisfies these requirements. The critical move is applying Wal-Mart's commonality standard -- students must identify whether there is a common question capable of classwide resolution, not merely common issues. Students should also note that Hansberry's due process requirement applies separately from Rule 23 and can invalidate a class judgment even if the procedural requirements were technically satisfied.
More Civil Procedure Comparisons
Pennoyer v. Neff vs. International Shoe Co. v. Washington
Pennoyer v. Neff (1878) and International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) represent the most important paradigm shift in personal jurisdiction doctrine. Pennoyer established the territorial model: a court's jurisdiction over a defendant required either physical presence within the state's borders or voluntary appearance. This framework treated jurisdiction as a question of sovereignty -- each state's power ended at its borders, and due process required that the defendant be physically present or have property within the jurisdiction. International Shoe replaced this rigid territorial approach with a flexible contacts-based test: due process requires only that the defendant have 'minimum contacts' with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson vs. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson (1980) and Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) both address specific personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants in product liability cases, but they reach different results that illustrate the evolution of the doctrine. World-Wide Volkswagen held that an Oklahoma court lacked jurisdiction over a New York car dealer and regional distributor in a product liability suit, because the defendants had no contacts with Oklahoma -- the plaintiffs had unilaterally driven the car there. Ford Motor held that Montana and Minnesota courts had jurisdiction over Ford in product liability cases involving accidents in those states, even though the specific vehicles involved were not sold or originally delivered in those states.
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins vs. Hanna v. Plumer
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) and Hanna v. Plumer (1965) together form the analytical framework for the Erie doctrine -- the rules governing when federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state law and when they may apply federal law. Erie held that there is no federal general common law and that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases, overruling the century-old precedent of Swift v. Tyson. Hanna refined the Erie analysis by establishing two separate tracks: when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or federal statute directly conflicts with state law, the federal rule applies if it is valid under the Rules Enabling Act (Hanna's holding); when there is no directly applicable federal rule, courts apply the Erie/Guaranty Trust 'outcome-determinative' test to determine whether the issue is substantive or procedural.
Conley v. Gibson vs. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
Conley v. Gibson (1957) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) represent the before and after of modern federal pleading standards. Conley established the liberal 'no set of facts' standard, holding that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle relief. This approach was extremely permissive and allowed virtually any claim to survive a motion to dismiss so long as it gave the defendant fair notice of the claim. Twombly retired the 'no set of facts' language and replaced it with the 'plausibility' standard, requiring that a complaint contain factual allegations that, taken as true, state a claim that is plausible on its face.