Master Supreme Court held that Title VII sex-based wage claims are not limited to the Equal Pay Act's "equal work" standard; the Bennett Amendment incorporates only the Equal Pay Act's defenses, not its equal-work requirement. with this comprehensive case brief.
County of Washington v. Gunther is a seminal Supreme Court decision delineating the relationship between Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) in sex-based compensation claims. Before Gunther, many lower courts treated Title VII wage claims as effectively coextensive with the EPA's strict "equal work" requirement, foreclosing suits where men and women held different jobs. Gunther rejected that conflation, holding that Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination in compensation is broader than the EPA's equal-work standard and that the Bennett Amendment incorporates only the EPA's affirmative defenses, not its threshold of equal work.
The decision is pivotal for understanding modern pay discrimination litigation. It preserves the EPA's structure and defenses while confirming that plaintiffs may pursue Title VII claims alleging intentional sex-based pay discrimination even when their jobs are not substantially equal to those of higher-paid men. At the same time, the Court declined to adopt a generalized "comparable worth" doctrine, leaving for another day whether Title VII recognizes claims based solely on the relative worth of different jobs in the absence of proof of discriminatory intent.
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981)
Four female correctional counselors employed by Washington County, Oregon, worked at the county jail and were paid substantially less than male correctional officers (guards). A county job-evaluation study concluded that the women's positions were worth approximately 95% of the men's positions, yet the County set the women's pay at a level that capped their wages at roughly 70% of the men's pay. The women alleged that county officials intentionally set their wages lower because of sex, pointing to the study and to statements and actions suggesting discriminatory motive. They filed charges and then a lawsuit under Title VII, claiming sex-based discrimination in compensation. The district court granted summary judgment to the County, reasoning that because the women's jobs were not equal to the men's jobs under the EPA's "equal work" standard, their claim failed. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Title VII wage discrimination claims are not limited by the EPA's equal-work requirement. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Title VII's Bennett Amendment restricts Title VII wage claims to those meeting the EPA's equal-work standard.
Does the Bennett Amendment to Title VII limit sex-based wage discrimination claims to the Equal Pay Act's equal-work requirement, thereby barring Title VII claims alleging intentional sex discrimination in compensation for different (not equal) jobs?
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate "because of" sex with respect to compensation. The Bennett Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice for an employer to differentiate on the basis of sex in determining wages if such differentiation is authorized by the Equal Pay Act of 1963. The Supreme Court interprets the Bennett Amendment to incorporate the EPA's four affirmative defenses (seniority, merit, a system measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production, or any factor other than sex), but not the EPA's threshold "equal work" requirement. Thus, a Title VII plaintiff may pursue a sex-based wage discrimination claim without proving equal work, provided she can show intentional discrimination (subject to the EPA defenses).
No. The Bennett Amendment does not limit Title VII wage discrimination claims to those satisfying the Equal Pay Act's equal-work standard. Plaintiffs who allege intentional sex discrimination in compensation may proceed under Title VII even when their jobs are not equal to those of higher-paid men. The Court affirmed the judgment allowing the plaintiffs' Title VII claim to go forward, while expressly declining to decide whether Title VII recognizes a generalized "comparable worth" theory absent evidence of discriminatory intent.
Text and Structure: The Bennett Amendment states that it is not an unlawful employment practice under Title VII to differentiate on the basis of sex in wages "if such differentiation is authorized by" the EPA. The Court read "authorized by" as incorporating the EPA's exceptions—its four affirmative defenses—rather than importing the EPA's equal-work limitation into Title VII. This interpretation preserves Title VII's broader antidiscrimination mandate while avoiding redundancy between the two statutes. Legislative History and Purpose: Congress enacted the EPA first, setting out a narrow equal-work rule with explicit defenses. Title VII followed, broadly prohibiting discrimination because of sex in all terms and conditions of employment, including compensation. The Bennett Amendment was intended to harmonize the two statutes by ensuring that the EPA's defenses remained available to employers in Title VII wage cases, not to constrict Title VII to the EPA's narrower equal-work coverage. Reading the Amendment to import the equal-work requirement would unduly shrink Title VII's scope and undermine its remedial purpose. Application: The plaintiffs produced evidence from the County's own job-evaluation study indicating their jobs were valued at 95% of men's jobs but were paid at roughly 70%, along with other evidence suggesting intentional sex-based depression of their pay. Because Title VII reaches intentional compensation discrimination even when jobs are not equal, the district court erred in granting summary judgment based solely on failure to show equal work. The County remains free on remand to assert any of the EPA's affirmative defenses, such as a factor other than sex. Limits—Comparable Worth: The Court emphasized that it was not recognizing a generalized comparable-worth cause of action under Title VII. The decision permits a Title VII wage claim without equal work when there is proof of intentional discrimination, but it does not hold that Title VII requires courts to reweigh or set wages based purely on job-comparability studies in the absence of discriminatory intent.
Gunther is foundational for pay discrimination law. It confirms that Title VII is broader than the Equal Pay Act and that plaintiffs may challenge intentional sex-based wage disparities even when men and women hold different jobs. At the same time, it preserves the EPA's four defenses for employers in Title VII wage cases and declines to endorse a pure comparable-worth theory. For law students, the case is crucial for understanding statutory interaction, the Bennett Amendment, and the evidentiary pathways—beyond strict equal-work comparisons—by which plaintiffs can prove compensation discrimination under Title VII.
The Bennett Amendment is a clause in Title VII stating that a wage differential based on sex is not an unlawful employment practice if it is authorized by the Equal Pay Act. The Supreme Court interpreted this language to incorporate only the Equal Pay Act's four affirmative defenses (seniority, merit, production, or any factor other than sex) into Title VII—not the EPA's equal-work requirement. Thus, Title VII wage claims are not limited to situations where men and women perform equal work.
No. The Court expressly declined to endorse a generalized comparable-worth theory. Gunther allows Title VII wage suits without proving equal work when there is evidence of intentional sex-based discrimination. It does not hold that Title VII requires courts to equalize pay based solely on job evaluation studies or assessments of job comparability absent proof of discriminatory intent.
An EPA claim requires proof that a woman is paid less than a man for substantially equal work, after which the burden shifts to the employer to prove one of the four EPA defenses. Under Title VII after Gunther, a plaintiff may challenge sex-based compensation disparities even if the jobs are not equal, but she must prove intentional discrimination (or, under later Title VII frameworks, show that sex was a motivating factor), and the employer may still assert the EPA defenses.
The plaintiffs offered the County's own job-evaluation study valuing their jobs at roughly 95% of the men's jobs, contrasted with an actual pay cap at about 70% of men's pay, along with evidence suggesting the wage-setting process intentionally depressed women's pay because of sex. This evidence, if credited, could show intentional discrimination, making summary judgment inappropriate under Title VII even though the jobs were not equal under the EPA.
Employers may invoke the Equal Pay Act's four defenses: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system measuring earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (4) a differential based on any factor other than sex. Gunther makes clear these defenses apply in Title VII wage cases by virtue of the Bennett Amendment.
Gunther broadens plaintiffs' avenues by allowing Title VII claims targeting intentional sex-based pay disparities even when jobs differ, making internal pay-setting documents, job evaluations, and decisionmaker statements central evidence. For employers, it underscores the need to document legitimate, non-sex-based reasons for pay differentials and to ensure that compensation systems can be justified under the EPA defenses.
County of Washington v. Gunther reshaped the landscape of wage discrimination law by clarifying that Title VII's prohibition on sex-based compensation discrimination is not confined to the Equal Pay Act's equal-work requirement. By interpreting the Bennett Amendment to incorporate only the EPA's affirmative defenses, the Court preserved Title VII's broader reach while maintaining employers' statutory defenses.
For students and practitioners, Gunther is an essential guide to pleading and proving compensation discrimination. It encourages careful attention to evidence of intent—such as job evaluations, pay policies, and decisionmaker rationale—while cautioning that Title VII is not a mandate for courts to impose comparable-worth pay structures in the absence of discriminatory intent.
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