Master The Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) is not a freestanding exception to execution immunity under the FSIA, preventing attachment of Iranian antiquities in U.S. museums to satisfy terrorism judgments absent another applicable exception. with this comprehensive case brief.
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran is a cornerstone Supreme Court decision at the intersection of judgment enforcement, federal sovereign immunity doctrine, and counterterrorism litigation. The case addressed whether victims who obtained default judgments against Iran for its provision of material support to terrorism could attach ancient Persian artifacts located in U.S. museums to satisfy those judgments. Specifically, the Court considered whether 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)—added when Congress created the FSIA's state-sponsored terrorism exception in § 1605A—provides a freestanding route to execute on a foreign state's property, or whether judgment creditors must still satisfy the preconditions elsewhere in § 1610.
The Court's answer—rejecting a freestanding exception—has significant practical and doctrinal consequences. Practically, it narrows the assets available to satisfy judgments arising from terrorist acts to those that independently fit within FSIA execution exceptions (or other statutes like TRIA). Doctrinally, it reinforces a textualist approach to the FSIA, emphasizing that Congress must speak clearly to displace execution immunity and that the FSIA's execution provisions are exclusive and carefully calibrated. For students and practitioners, Rubin is essential reading for understanding the sharp distinction between jurisdiction to sue a foreign state and the separate, more restrictive rules governing seizure of its property.
138 S. Ct. 816 (U.S. 2018)
In 1997, Hamas carried out a suicide bombing in Jerusalem, injuring and killing multiple individuals, including U.S. nationals. Several victims, including Jenny Rubin, sued the Islamic Republic of Iran in federal court, alleging Iran provided material support to Hamas. Relying on the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (at the time embodied in former § 1605(a)(7) and later replaced and expanded by § 1605A), plaintiffs obtained a substantial default judgment against Iran. Seeking to collect, they targeted ancient Persian artifacts—most notably the Persepolis Fortification Tablets and the Chogha Mish collection—held by the University of Chicago's Oriental Institute and the Field Museum in Chicago. Plaintiffs moved for turnover and attachment under various legal theories, including the FSIA's execution provisions (28 U.S.C. § 1610) and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). The museums and Iran opposed, arguing the artifacts were immune from attachment because they were not used for commercial activity in the United States and were not blocked assets under sanctions law. The district court denied turnover, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether § 1610(g) independently authorizes attachment and execution against foreign-state property to satisfy terrorism-related judgments.
Does 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) provide a freestanding exception to execution immunity that permits judgment creditors with terrorism-related judgments under § 1605A to attach and execute on a foreign state's property regardless of whether that property satisfies the other execution exceptions in § 1610?
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, property of a foreign state in the United States is immune from attachment and execution unless a specific statutory exception in 28 U.S.C. § 1610 applies. Section 1610(g) does not create a freestanding exception to execution immunity; rather, it clarifies that, in terrorism-related cases under § 1605A, the property of a foreign state and its agencies or instrumentalities may be subject to attachment and execution "as provided in this section," and it relaxes certain corporate-separateness barriers, but only where another § 1610 exception is satisfied.
No. Section 1610(g) is not an independent exception to execution immunity. Judgment creditors must identify and satisfy one of § 1610's enumerated execution exceptions before attaching or executing on the foreign state's property. Because the Iranian artifacts in Chicago did not meet any other § 1610 exception, they were immune from attachment.
The Court began with the statutory text and structure of the FSIA. It emphasized that the FSIA draws a sharp distinction between jurisdictional immunity (whether a foreign state may be sued) and execution immunity (whether its property may be seized). Even where jurisdiction is proper under an exception such as § 1605A, execution against a foreign state's property requires compliance with § 1610's separate limitations. Turning to § 1610(g), the Court focused on the clause "as provided in this section," reading it to incorporate the rest of § 1610 rather than to displace it. If § 1610(g) were a freestanding exception, the quoted phrase would be superfluous; by contrast, read as a cross-reference, it confirms that § 1610(g) operates within, not outside, § 1610's framework. The Court also examined § 1610's overall design and Congress's drafting choices. In other provisions—such as TRIA § 201(a) with its "notwithstanding any other provision of law" language—Congress unmistakably created broad execution authority; Congress did not use comparable language in § 1610(g). Instead, § 1610(g) targets a different concern: it ensures that, in terrorism cases, a judgment creditor is not thwarted by corporate-separateness arguments (e.g., whether an entity is majority-owned or controlled) when attaching the property of a foreign state's agencies or instrumentalities, but only when another § 1610 exception is satisfied. This reading harmonizes § 1610(g) with the FSIA's carefully reticulated scheme and avoids nullifying the specific requirements in § 1610(a)–(f), including the "used for a commercial activity in the United States" condition for most foreign-state property. Applying that framework, the artifacts at issue—ancient cultural objects held by museums for research and display—were not used for commercial activity in the United States, were not blocked assets under sanctions, and thus fell outside the FSIA's execution exceptions. Consequently, they remained immune from attachment and execution.
Rubin cements two high-yield lessons for FSIA practice. First, it reaffirms that execution immunity is distinct and more protective than jurisdictional immunity: securing a judgment is not the same as collecting on it. Second, it clarifies that § 1610(g) is not a backdoor to seize any foreign-state property in terrorism cases; judgment creditors must still find an independently applicable exception in § 1610 (or another statute like TRIA) and satisfy its conditions, such as the commercial-use requirement. For law students, Rubin exemplifies careful textual analysis, the primacy of statutory structure in sovereign immunity, and the practical constraints victims face in enforcing terrorism judgments.
The FSIA is the exclusive federal statute governing when foreign states may be sued and when their property may be seized in U.S. courts. It separates (1) jurisdictional immunity—exceptions that allow suits against foreign states (e.g., § 1605A for state-sponsored terrorism)—from (2) execution immunity—exceptions that permit attachment and execution against foreign-state property (primarily § 1610). Even if a plaintiff can sue and win a judgment, they can only collect against property that falls within a specific execution exception.
After Rubin, § 1610(g) is understood as non-freestanding: it does not independently authorize attachment. Instead, it clarifies that in terrorism cases under § 1605A, the property of a foreign state and of its agencies or instrumentalities may be reached, notwithstanding certain corporate-separateness arguments, but only if the property is otherwise attachable under another § 1610 exception (e.g., the property is used for a commercial activity in the United States).
The artifacts—ancient Persian objects housed for research, conservation, and display—were not used for a commercial activity in the United States, which is a key requirement for attaching most foreign-state property under § 1610(a). They were also not blocked assets under sanctions administered by OFAC, which would be necessary to proceed under the separate TRIA pathway. Without an applicable statutory exception, the property remained immune.
Rubin leaves TRIA § 201(a) intact. TRIA allows attachment of a terrorist party's blocked assets to satisfy terrorism judgments, notwithstanding other laws. But judgment creditors must show the specific asset is "blocked" under U.S. sanctions and that the debtor qualifies as a terrorist party. Rubin simply holds that § 1610(g) itself does not grant an independent right to attach non-blocked, non-commercial foreign-state property.
Creditors must meticulously identify assets that independently fall within an execution exception—most often, property used for commercial activity in the U.S., or blocked assets attachable under TRIA. They should develop evidentiary records on an asset's use, ownership, and sanctions status, consider agency/instrumentality property where § 1610(g) can relax separateness barriers, and, where necessary, pursue diplomatic or legislative avenues to expand enforceable remedies.
Rubin underscores that in FSIA litigation, collecting on a judgment is often harder than obtaining one. By holding that § 1610(g) is not a freestanding execution exception, the Court reinforced Congress's careful calibration of when foreign-state property may be reached, preserving the FSIA's structure and comity-sensitive limits.
For students, the case is a model of statutory interpretation and institutional roles: courts apply the FSIA as written, and if broader execution authority in terrorism cases is desired, Congress must say so expressly. Rubin thus frames both the doctrinal boundaries of sovereign immunity and the practical realities of enforcing judgments against foreign states.
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