Master Massachusetts extended the slayer rule to will substitutes, holding that a murderer cannot benefit from a revocable trust or other nonprobate transfers, and that remainders accelerate to alternate beneficiaries. with this comprehensive case brief.
Clymer v. Mayo is a leading decision from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that powerfully illustrates how equity polices modern estate planning arrangements. While the classic slayer rule (exemplified by Riggs v. Palmer) prevents a killer from profiting through a victim's will or intestacy, Clymer addresses a more contemporary question: whether that principle also applies to will substitutes, such as revocable trusts, life insurance, joint tenancies, and pension or death benefits—devices commonly used to transfer wealth outside of probate.
The court's answer—an unequivocal yes—carries broad implications for practitioners and students. It harmonizes traditional equitable doctrine with the reality that most wealth now transfers via nonprobate mechanisms. By treating the slayer as having predeceased the victim and imposing constructive trusts where necessary, Clymer ensures that a wrongdoer cannot defeat the policy of the slayer rule by clever use of trust and estate planning tools. The case is also notable for its treatment of pour-over wills to inter vivos trusts and the acceleration of remainder interests when a life beneficiary is disqualified.
Clymer v. Mayo, 393 Mass. 754, 473 N.E.2d 1084 (Mass. 1985)
The decedent executed a coordinated estate plan consisting of a will that poured over her probate residue into a revocable inter vivos trust that she had created and retained the power to amend or revoke. Under the trust terms, the decedent's husband (Mayo) was the primary or initial beneficiary—receiving either an outright distribution or beneficial interests (e.g., income for life)—with remainder benefits designated for alternate beneficiaries (family members and/or charities). In addition to the trust and pour-over will, the decedent had arranged several nonprobate transfers in which the husband was named to receive at death, including beneficiary designations and joint tenancy interests. After the estate plan was put in place, the husband feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent. Litigation followed over whether the husband could receive any benefits traceable to the decedent's death—through probate under the will, through the revocable trust funded in part by the pour-over provision, or through other will substitutes such as insurance, joint property, or plan benefits. The estate and alternate beneficiaries sought to bar the husband and to effect distributions to those who would have taken had the husband not survived.
Does the slayer rule bar a murderer from receiving benefits through a revocable inter vivos trust and other nonprobate transfers, and, if so, should the slayer be treated as having predeceased the decedent such that the trust's alternate remainder beneficiaries take by acceleration?
A person who feloniously and intentionally kills another may not profit, directly or indirectly, from the victim's death. This equitable slayer rule applies not only to probate transfers (by will or intestacy) but also to nonprobate transfers, including revocable inter vivos trusts, joint tenancies, life insurance and similar will substitutes. Courts may impose a constructive trust and treat the killer as having predeceased the victim to carry out the decedent's dispositive plan and prevent unjust enrichment, including acceleration of remainder interests where a disqualified beneficiary would otherwise have taken a prior interest. In Massachusetts, a pour-over from a will to an inter vivos trust is valid even if the trust is amendable or amended, and property poured over is administered according to the trust's terms as they exist at the settlor's death.
Yes. The slayer rule bars the husband from receiving any benefit arising from the decedent's death, including as beneficiary of the revocable trust and other nonprobate transfers. The husband is treated as having predeceased the decedent, the equitable remedy of constructive trust prevents his enrichment, and the trust's remainder interests are accelerated to the alternate beneficiaries designated by the decedent.
The court grounded its decision in the long-standing equitable maxim that no one should profit from his own wrong. Although the earliest cases involved testamentary gifts (e.g., Riggs v. Palmer), the policy basis is not limited to probate transfers. Modern estate planning relies heavily on will substitutes—revocable trusts, joint tenancies, beneficiary designations—and allowing a killer to take simply because the asset passes outside probate would elevate form over substance and undermine the rule's deterrent and moral purposes. The court emphasized functional equivalence: a revocable trust, especially one fully controlled by the settlor until death, operates like a will substitute. When the settlor retains the power to revoke or amend and beneficial enjoyment until death, the ultimate disposition is triggered by the settlor's death much like a will. Thus, there is no principled reason to treat such a trust differently from a will for slayer-rule purposes. Extending the rule preserves the decedent's overall estate plan and prevents the wrongdoer from exploiting nonprobate mechanisms. As a remedial matter, equity imposes a constructive trust on any benefits that would otherwise flow to the slayer, ensuring those assets pass to the persons who would have taken absent the slayer's disqualifying conduct. The court therefore treats the slayer as having predeceased the decedent. In the trust context, this means that if the slayer was to take a prior interest (e.g., an outright distribution or a life interest), that interest is forfeited and the remainder accelerates to the alternate beneficiaries named in the trust. The court also confirmed that the pour-over from the will to the inter vivos trust is valid and administered in accordance with the trust's terms as of death, consistent with statutory validation of pour-over gifts. This approach respects the decedent's dispositive scheme while ensuring that no benefit accrues to the killer through either probate or nonprobate channels.
Clymer v. Mayo is widely taught because it integrates classic equitable doctrine with modern estate planning. It confirms that the slayer rule reaches will substitutes, preventing a killer from circumventing public policy through revocable trusts, joint arrangements, or beneficiary designations. The case also illustrates how courts use constructive trusts and the legal fiction that the slayer predeceased to implement the decedent's plan and accelerate remainder interests. For students, it is a cornerstone on the intersection of trusts, wills, and restitution, and a practical reminder that doctrinal rules must adapt to contemporary wealth-transfer vehicles.
No. While a criminal conviction conclusively establishes the killing for many courts, civil proceedings can independently determine whether the killing was felonious and intentional under a preponderance standard. In Clymer's spirit, probate and equity courts may make that finding and impose a constructive trust even absent or before a conviction, provided the evidence supports the elements.
Functionally the same. Because a revocable trust controlled by the settlor until death operates as a will substitute, a beneficiary who murders the settlor is disqualified just as if the benefit were under a will. The slayer is treated as having predeceased, and the trust's alternate beneficiaries take by acceleration.
The equitable principle extends to will substitutes broadly. If the killer is the named beneficiary of insurance or holds survivorship rights in joint property, a constructive trust is imposed to prevent the killer from retaining those benefits. The proceeds or interests pass to the persons who would have taken had the killer predeceased (e.g., contingent beneficiaries or the decedent's estate).
Yes, in the sense that it recognizes statutory validation of pour-over gifts to inter vivos trusts, even if the trust is amendable or was amended after the will's execution. The poured-over property is administered under the trust terms in effect at the settlor's death, subject to equitable limits like the slayer rule.
Acceleration means that when the prior interest (e.g., a life estate or primary gift to the slayer) is forfeited, the next-in-line beneficiaries (remaindermen or alternates) take immediately, as if the prior interest had naturally expired or the prior taker had predeceased. This honors the decedent's dispositive plan without rewarding the slayer.
Riggs applied the slayer rule to a testamentary bequest; Clymer carries that logic forward to the modern estate-planning landscape by applying the same principle to will substitutes and clarifying the remedies (constructive trust and predecease fiction) needed to implement the decedent's plan.
Clymer v. Mayo is a pivotal case for understanding how equitable doctrines police the increasingly nonprobate nature of wealth transfer. By extending the slayer rule to revocable trusts and other will substitutes, the court closed a potential loophole that could have allowed a killer to profit by exploiting form over substance. The decision ensures alignment between public policy, donor intent, and modern planning devices.
For law students, Clymer is an essential bridge between classic slayer-rule jurisprudence and contemporary practice. It offers a clear example of constructive trust as a remedial tool, illustrates the treatment of revocable trusts as will substitutes, and reinforces that courts will treat a slayer as having predeceased to effectuate the decedent's plan and prevent unjust enrichment.
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