Master The Supreme Court held that Montana courts lacked general personal jurisdiction over BNSF for FELA suits by nonresidents and that FELA §56 does not confer state-court personal jurisdiction. with this comprehensive case brief.
BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell is a landmark personal jurisdiction decision that cements the Supreme Court's post-Daimler framework limiting where corporations can be sued on claims unrelated to the forum. It squarely addresses whether a state may exercise general (all-purpose) jurisdiction over a large, nationwide enterprise simply because the company does substantial, continuous business there, and whether the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) independently authorizes state courts to assert personal jurisdiction over railroads in any state where they operate.
The Court held that FELA §56 governs venue in federal court and authorizes service of process for federal courts, but does not expand state-court personal jurisdiction. Reaffirming Daimler's "at home" test for general jurisdiction, the Court concluded that BNSF—incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Texas—was not at home in Montana despite having extensive operations there. Tyrrell thus significantly curtails forum shopping in FELA and other nationwide litigation and is now a staple case on the modern limits of general jurisdiction.
BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 198 L. Ed. 2d 36 (2017) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Two separate FELA suits were filed in Montana state court against BNSF Railway Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. Neither suit had a connection to Montana: one plaintiff, Robert Nelson, was a North Dakota resident who alleged he sustained knee injuries while working for BNSF in North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota; the other plaintiff, Kelli Tyrrell (a South Dakota resident), sued as the personal representative of her late husband Brent Tyrrell, alleging he was exposed to toxic substances while working for BNSF in South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska, and Wyoming. BNSF maintained significant operations in Montana—over 2,000 miles of track and more than 2,000 employees—amounting to about 6% of its track, about 5% of its workforce, and less than 10% of its revenue, but was neither incorporated nor headquartered there. The Montana trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction in one case and denied dismissal in the other; on consolidated review, the Montana Supreme Court held that Montana courts could exercise general jurisdiction over BNSF based on (1) FELA §56 and (2) Montana's 'doing business' approach to general jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
1) Does FELA §56 authorize state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over railroads in any state where they do business? 2) Consistent with the Due Process Clause, may Montana courts exercise general personal jurisdiction over BNSF for claims that do not arise out of or relate to the company's activities in Montana?
• FELA §56 sets venue for federal district courts and provides for service of process in federal FELA actions; it does not confer personal jurisdiction on state courts. State courts hearing FELA cases apply their own jurisdictional rules subject to constitutional due process limits. • General personal jurisdiction over a corporation exists where the corporation is 'essentially at home' in the forum state. The paradigm forums are the corporation's place of incorporation and principal place of business; only in an 'exceptional case' may a corporation be deemed at home elsewhere. Mere substantial, continuous, and systematic business in a state—even if large in absolute terms—does not render a corporation at home there. See Daimler AG v. Bauman and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown; compare Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
1) No. FELA §56 does not provide state courts with personal jurisdiction over railroads; it addresses federal venue and federal service of process only. 2) No. Montana courts lack general personal jurisdiction over BNSF in these cases because BNSF is not 'at home' in Montana and the claims do not arise from BNSF's Montana activities.
Statutory interpretation. The Court read FELA §56's text as addressing federal court venue—permitting suit in a federal district where the defendant resides, where the cause of action arose, or where the defendant is doing business—and as authorizing nationwide service of process for federal courts. The statute's reference to concurrent jurisdiction with state courts concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. Nothing in §56 purports to expand state-court authority to hale out-of-state defendants into court beyond constitutional limits. Thus, state courts adjudicating FELA claims must rely on state long-arm statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process constraints. Due process analysis. Applying Daimler, the Court rejected Montana's 'doing business' theory of general jurisdiction. General jurisdiction requires that the corporation be 'essentially at home' in the forum. The paradigmatic forums are the corporation's state of incorporation and principal place of business. While an 'exceptional case' can justify another forum (e.g., when the forum effectively becomes the corporation's temporary principal base as in Perkins), BNSF's Montana contacts did not approach that mark. BNSF's in-state operations—thousands of employees and miles of track—were significant in absolute terms but constituted a small percentage of its nationwide operations. Such proportional analysis is critical under Daimler; allowing general jurisdiction wherever a large national company does substantial business would resurrect the disapproved 'doing business' approach and render the 'at home' standard meaningless. Other arguments. The Court also noted that registration to do business and appointment of an agent for service do not by themselves create general jurisdiction absent clear statutory consent, and the Montana Supreme Court's decision did not rest on any such consent theory. Finally, because the claims were unconnected to Montana, specific jurisdiction was unavailable, and thus no Montana court could hear these cases consistent with due process. The Court reversed and remanded. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that §56 does not confer personal jurisdiction on state courts but disagreeing with the majority's general jurisdiction analysis and its application of Daimler to BNSF's extensive Montana operations.
Tyrrell cements Daimler's restrictive general jurisdiction framework and rejects efforts to use FELA to expand state-court personal jurisdiction over out-of-state railroads. It curbs forum shopping by plaintiffs seeking plaintiff-friendly state courts for claims unconnected to the forum. For civil procedure, Tyrrell is essential reading on (i) the distinction between venue, service of process, and personal jurisdiction; (ii) the limits of general jurisdiction over nationwide corporations; and (iii) the continued vitality of the 'exceptional case' carve-out after Daimler. The decision also foreshadows later jurisdiction cases restraining expansive theories of state-court authority over nonresident defendants.
No. The Supreme Court held that §56 governs federal venue and authorizes service of process in federal court FELA actions; it does not expand state-court personal jurisdiction. State courts hearing FELA suits must have personal jurisdiction under their long-arm statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process limits.
General jurisdiction allows a court to hear any and all claims against a defendant, but only where the defendant is 'at home' (usually its place of incorporation or principal place of business, absent exceptional circumstances). Specific jurisdiction permits suit only when the claims arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum. In Tyrrell, specific jurisdiction was unavailable because the plaintiffs' injuries had no connection to Montana; and general jurisdiction failed because BNSF was not 'at home' in Montana.
Daimler instructs that the magnitude of a company's in-state business, standing alone, does not establish general jurisdiction. The relevant inquiry is whether the company's affiliations render it essentially at home in the forum, which is ordinarily limited to incorporation and headquarters. BNSF's Montana operations—though large—were a small slice of its nationwide activities and did not present the kind of 'exceptional case' like Perkins.
No. The Court noted that registration and appointment of an agent for service do not automatically equal consent to general jurisdiction absent clear statutory language, and the Montana Supreme Court did not rely on a consent theory. The Court therefore did not resolve the broader registration-as-consent question in Tyrrell.
Tyrrell narrows plaintiffs' ability to select forums based solely on a defendant's extensive business operations. Unless claims arise from forum-related conduct (specific jurisdiction), plaintiffs generally must sue corporate defendants where they are incorporated or headquartered, or in another forum where the 'exceptional case' standard is met.
BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell reinforces the modern, constitutional limits on state-court authority over out-of-state corporate defendants. By holding that FELA §56 does not expand personal jurisdiction and by applying Daimler's 'at home' test, the Court rejected a return to the discredited 'doing business' approach to general jurisdiction.
For students and practitioners, Tyrrell underscores the importance of disaggregating venue, service of process, and personal jurisdiction; it highlights the centrality of corporate 'home' forums for general jurisdiction; and it warns against using federal statutes as backdoor vehicles to circumvent due process limits in state courts.
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