Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad: The Proximate Cause Case Everyone Gets Wrong

A man running to catch a train was helped aboard by two railroad employees. In the process, they dislodged a package he was carrying — which, unknown to anyone, contained fireworks. The fireworks exploded, causing a shockwave that knocked over a large scale at the other end of the platform, which fell on Mrs. Palsgraf, injuring her.

Judge Cardozo framed the issue as one of duty: the railroad employees may have been negligent toward the man with the package, but they owed no duty to Mrs. Palsgraf because her injury was entirely unforeseeable. You can only owe a duty of care to foreseeable plaintiffs — people within the “zone of danger” created by your negligent act. Mrs. Palsgraf was not in that zone.

Judge Andrews argued that once you commit a negligent act, you owe a duty to anyone who is injured as a result — the scope of liability should be determined by proximate cause, not duty. Under Andrews' view, the question is whether Mrs. Palsgraf's injury was a “natural and continuous sequence” from the negligent act, however remote.

Most students remember Palsgraf as a proximate cause case. It's actually a duty case — at least under Cardozo's majority, which is the law. Cardozo never reaches proximate cause because he finds no duty in the first place. Andrews reframes it as proximate cause. Understanding this distinction is crucial for exams: duty (Cardozo) and proximate cause (Andrews) are separate elements that can each limit liability.

Palsgraf teaches that negligence is relational — you must be negligent with respect to the particular plaintiff, not just negligent in the abstract. This is the foreseeability-based approach to duty that most American jurisdictions follow today.