Master California abolishes the 'stranger to the deed' rule and upholds a deed reservation creating an appurtenant easement in favor of a third party church. with this comprehensive case brief.
Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica is a landmark property case that modernized California easement law. The California Supreme Court expressly discarded the common-law rule that a grantor could not reserve an easement in favor of a third party—a so-called 'stranger to the deed.' By instead elevating the parties’ intent and the protections afforded by modern recording statutes, the court permitted the creation of an easement for the benefit of a nonparty to the conveyance when the deed and surrounding circumstances made that intent clear.
For law students, the case is central to understanding how courts transitioned away from formalistic property doctrines toward functional approaches that honor the purposes of conveyances and protect justified expectations. It also offers a clean illustration of the distinction between easements appurtenant and in gross, the power of recording to put successors on notice, and the interplay of equitable policy and doctrinal reform in servitudes law.
7 Cal. 3d 473, 498 P.2d 987, 102 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Cal. 1972)
The grantor, McGuigan, owned land in Pacifica adjacent to a church. For years she allowed congregants from the First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica to park their cars on a portion of her lot during church services. When she decided to sell that lot (commonly identified in the case as one of two adjoining lots she owned), she insisted that any sale preserve parking rights for the church. She conveyed the lot to the Petersons by a deed that expressly reserved 'an easement for automobile parking during church hours for the benefit of the First Church of Christ, Scientist.' That deed was duly recorded. The Petersons later conveyed the same lot to Willard by a deed that omitted any reference to the church’s parking rights. Willard then sought to quiet title free of the church’s claimed easement, arguing the reservation was void because it purported to benefit a third party not a party to the deed (the so-called 'stranger to the deed' rule) and that he was a bona fide purchaser. The trial court agreed with Willard and quieted title in his favor. The church appealed.
May a grantor, by deed, reserve an easement in favor of a third party who is not a party to the conveyance, and if so, does a subsequent purchaser with record notice take subject to that easement?
A grantor may, by express reservation in a deed, validly create an easement in favor of a third party. The archaic common-law rule forbidding reservations to a 'stranger to the deed' is rejected. Courts should effectuate the grantor’s intent as expressed in the instrument and surrounding circumstances; where the deed is recorded, a subsequent purchaser with actual or constructive notice takes subject to the reserved easement. If the easement benefits a dominant parcel, it is appurtenant and runs with that land.
Yes. The reservation in favor of the church is valid, the court abandons the 'stranger to the deed' rule, and the easement is appurtenant to the church’s land. Willard took title subject to the recorded easement because he had at least constructive notice of it.
The court first identified that the traditional prohibition on reserving an interest in a third party traces to feudal formalism and semantic distinctions between 'reservations' and 'exceptions'—distinctions that have little relevance to modern conveyancing. Contemporary recording systems, routine title searches, and ordinary expectations of parties enable courts to honor the grantor’s intent without endangering clarity of title. Because the deed from McGuigan to the Petersons expressly reserved a parking easement for the church and that deed was recorded, the intent to create a servitude for the church’s benefit was clear and discoverable by any successor in interest. Turning to notice, the court explained that the McGuigan-to-Peterson deed sat in Willard’s direct chain of title; therefore, even if the Peterson-to-Willard deed was silent, the recorded reservation imparted constructive notice. Willard thus could not claim bona fide purchaser status free of the servitude. The court further classified the interest as an easement appurtenant rather than in gross because it facilitated the use and enjoyment of the church property (the dominant estate), not merely a personal privilege. As an appurtenant easement, it runs with the church property and binds successors to the servient land. In rejecting the 'stranger to the deed' rule, the court emphasized that effectuating intent promotes alienability and predictability more than rigid adherence to defunct formalities.
Willard is a foundational case in property law for three reasons: (1) it abolishes the 'reservation to a stranger' rule and adopts an intent-centered approach to servitudes; (2) it demonstrates how recording statutes allocate the risk of non-disclosure, placing successors on constructive notice of burdens in their chain of title; and (3) it clarifies that a parking right tied to the use of a neighboring parcel is an easement appurtenant that runs with that parcel. The case appears frequently on exams testing easement creation, classification, and the effect of recording on successors’ rights and obligations.
The rule barred a grantor from reserving an interest (like an easement) in favor of someone who was not a party to the deed. Willard expressly rejected that formalism, holding that a grantor can reserve an easement for a third party if the deed reflects that intent. Courts should honor clear intent rather than invalidate reservations based on outdated technicalities.
Because the parking right facilitated the use of a specific neighboring parcel—the church property—by enabling congregants to park in connection with church activities. Benefits tied to the use of identifiable land create an appurtenant easement that runs with that land, rather than a personal (in gross) right.
No. The court held that the recorded McGuigan-to-Peterson deed, which contained the reservation, was in Willard’s chain of title and provided constructive notice. That is sufficient to bind a subsequent purchaser, even if his immediate deed did not mention the easement.
Draft explicit easement language identifying the benefited parcel (dominant estate), the burdened parcel (servient estate), the scope (e.g., parking, hours of use), and duration, and record the instrument. Successive deeds should consistently reference the easement. If the parties intend a purely personal privilege, state that it is in gross and non-assignable.
Although Willard specifically addresses easements, its intent-centered, anti-formalist logic and reliance on recording principles align with modern approaches to servitudes generally, including covenants and equitable servitudes. That said, the technical requirements for running with the land differ by doctrine and jurisdiction, so drafters must satisfy those elements.
Willard marks a decisive shift from strict common-law formalism to a modern, purpose-oriented approach in easement creation. By honoring the clearly expressed intent of the parties and leveraging the recording system to protect successors, the court provides a pragmatic template for recognizing third-party benefits without sacrificing certainty of title.
For students and practitioners, the case is a touchstone for analyzing servitude creation and classification. It underscores that an easement that benefits identifiable land is appurtenant and will run with that land, and that a recorded instrument in the chain of title will bind successors notwithstanding omissions in subsequent deeds.