Master Supreme Court enforced the Endangered Species Act’s mandate that federal agencies must not jeopardize endangered species, halting completion of Tellico Dam despite sunk costs and continuing appropriations. with this comprehensive case brief.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill is a landmark Supreme Court decision interpreting the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), particularly Section 7’s command that federal agencies must ensure their actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species or destroy or adversely modify their critical habitat. The case famously involved the nearly completed Tellico Dam project and the tiny snail darter fish, and it framed the ESA as embodying a strong, precautionary commitment to species protection even when such protection is costly or inconvenient.
At its core, TVA v. Hill is a powerful statement about statutory interpretation, congressional priorities, and judicial duty. The Court read the ESA’s text as a strict mandate, rejected arguments grounded in equitable balancing and sunk costs, and refused to treat appropriations measures as silently amending substantive law. The decision stands as a touchstone for administrative and environmental law, reinforcing the principle that when Congress speaks in comprehensive, mandatory terms, courts must enforce the statute as written.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
Congress authorized the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to build the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River in the late 1960s, and construction began soon thereafter. In 1973, after the project was well underway, Congress enacted the ESA. Around the same time, biologists discovered the snail darter, a small perch-like fish, in the portion of the river that would be inundated by the dam’s reservoir. In 1975, the snail darter was formally listed as an endangered species, and its critical habitat was designated in the Little Tennessee River. Citizens, including Hiram Hill, sued to enjoin completion and operation of the dam, invoking the ESA’s citizen-suit provision and Section 7’s requirement that all federal agencies ensure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize endangered species or destroy or adversely modify their critical habitat. The district court found that completion would likely extirpate the snail darter in its native habitat but denied an injunction based on equities, emphasizing that the project was nearly complete and had received ongoing appropriations. The Sixth Circuit reversed and ordered an injunction. On certiorari, TVA argued that Section 7 should not apply to a nearly completed, preexisting project and that subsequent appropriations implicitly sanctioned completion; plaintiffs argued that the ESA imposed a mandatory duty that admitted of no such exceptions.
Does Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act require courts to enjoin a nearly completed federal project that would jeopardize an endangered species or destroy its critical habitat, notwithstanding significant sunk costs and continued congressional appropriations for the project, and absent an explicit statutory exemption or repeal?
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1536, mandates that all federal agencies, in consultation with the designated wildlife agencies, must insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by them is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of designated critical habitat. The ESA constitutes a comprehensive, protective scheme in which Congress gave endangered species priority over the primary missions of federal agencies. Repeals by implication are strongly disfavored; appropriations measures do not amend or repeal substantive law absent clear and manifest intent. When Congress has enacted a clear statutory command, courts enforce it as written rather than balancing equities or considering sunk costs.
Yes. Section 7 imposes a mandatory duty that precludes completion of a federal project likely to jeopardize an endangered species or destroy its critical habitat. The ESA applies to ongoing projects, even those initiated before the Act, and continued appropriations do not implicitly repeal or create exceptions to the ESA. The injunction against completing the Tellico Dam was therefore proper.
The Court, per Chief Justice Burger, began with the ESA’s text, emphasizing Section 7’s unqualified language that all federal agencies shall insure their actions do not jeopardize endangered species or destroy or adversely modify critical habitat. This phrasing was read as a clear, mandatory command, embodying what the Court called an institutionalized caution designed to halt and reverse extinction trends. The statute contained no exception for projects that were substantially completed, expensive, or previously authorized. Turning to legislative history, the Court found that Congress intended endangered species to receive the highest priority, even at substantial economic cost. The Court rejected TVA’s argument that judicial equitable discretion should permit balancing the public interest in completing the dam (given sunk costs) against species protection. Congress had already made the relevant policy choice in the statute; courts are not free to override that by ad hoc equitable balancing where the statutory mandate is explicit. The Court also rejected TVA’s reliance on post-ESA appropriations for the Tellico project and various committee reports suggesting that Congress expected completion. Appropriations riders and committee comments cannot implicitly amend or repeal substantive environmental protections; repeal by implication requires clear and manifest legislative intent, which was absent. The Court found that Section 7 applies to ongoing federal actions, regardless of when they began, and that the proper remedy for a statutory violation of this kind is injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s order enjoining completion and operation of the Tellico Dam.
TVA v. Hill is a cornerstone of environmental and administrative law for three reasons. First, it cements the ESA’s Section 7 as a stringent, prophylactic constraint on federal agency action, prioritizing species protection even against large sunk investments. Second, it is a leading case on statutory interpretation and appropriations law, teaching that clear statutory text controls and that appropriations do not silently alter substantive duties. Third, it constrains judicial equitable discretion where Congress has spoken in mandatory terms, underscoring the separation-of-powers principle that courts enforce, not rewrite, statutes. For law students, the case is indispensable for understanding the ESA, the plain meaning canon, the presumption against implied repeal, and the limits of balancing in the face of clear legislative commands.
Yes. After TVA v. Hill, Congress amended the ESA in 1978 to create the Endangered Species Committee (the so-called God Squad) empowered to grant exemptions in limited circumstances. The Committee later declined to exempt Tellico on cost-benefit grounds. Congress then enacted a specific appropriations rider in 1979 exempting the Tellico project, and the dam was completed. The Supreme Court’s statutory holding, however, remains intact and governs other projects.
Yes. The Court held that Section 7 applies to ongoing federal actions even if they were authorized or begun before enactment of the ESA or before the species was listed. Once the federal agency continues to authorize, fund, or carry out an action, it has a duty to ensure that action does not jeopardize listed species or adversely modify critical habitat.
Because appropriations do not amend or repeal substantive law absent a clear statement. The Court applied the presumption against repeal by implication, finding no explicit statutory language exempting Tellico Dam from Section 7. Committee reports or budgetary line items cannot silently negate the ESA’s substantive protections.
Section 7 governs federal agencies, requiring them to ensure their actions do not jeopardize listed species or adversely modify critical habitat. Section 9 generally prohibits takes of listed species by any person, public or private. TVA v. Hill primarily turned on Section 7’s agency duty and consultation requirements, not Section 9’s take prohibition.
The Court held that where Congress has imposed a clear, mandatory duty, courts may not reweigh equities to craft exceptions based on cost, timing, or project completion. The statutory command controlled, and injunctive relief was appropriate to enforce it, notwithstanding the substantial investment already made.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill established that the ESA’s text means what it says: federal agencies must not take actions that jeopardize endangered species or adversely modify critical habitat, and courts must enforce that command even when doing so is costly or disruptive. The decision affirms the primacy of clear statutory directives over equitable balancing and underscores that agency missions yield when Congress has prioritized species protection.
For students and practitioners, the case endures as a foundational authority on the ESA, statutory interpretation, and the relationship between appropriations and substantive law. It demonstrates that robust environmental mandates can reshape federal projects and that any exceptions must come from Congress explicitly, not from judicial improvisation or implicit funding cues.