Master U.S. Supreme Court limits third-party visitation statutes, holding that courts must give special weight to the childrearing decisions of fit parents. with this comprehensive case brief.
Troxel v. Granville is a foundational Supreme Court decision delineating the constitutional boundaries of third-party visitation laws—often called “grandparent visitation” statutes. The case arose during a wave of state enactments in the 1990s that expanded nonparent visitation rights based on the child’s best interests. Troxel holds that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a fundamental liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children, and that courts must accord a fit parent’s choices “special weight.” The decision rejects a regime in which a judge can substitute a generalized best-interests judgment for that of a fit parent without deference.
For family law and constitutional law students, Troxel is essential: it anchors parental autonomy within substantive due process, clarifies the limits of state intervention in intact families, and recalibrates the best-interests standard when invoked by nonparents. Although the Court issued a fractured set of opinions and declined to articulate a precise level of scrutiny or to invalidate the statute facially, Troxel set the national baseline against which state visitation statutes are drafted, litigated, and interpreted.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)
After the parents of two young children, Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel, separated, Brad regularly took the children to visit his parents, Jenifer and Gary Troxel. Brad later died by suicide. Granville, the custodial mother, permitted limited visitation with the Troxels but declined their request for more extensive time. Relying on Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3)—which allowed “any person” to petition for visitation “at any time” if in the child’s best interests—the Troxels sought court-ordered visitation. Without finding Granville unfit or that the children would be harmed by reduced grandparent contact, the trial court ordered a substantial visitation schedule (including one weekend per month, holiday time, and two weeks in summer), effectively replacing the mother’s decision with its own view of the children’s best interests. The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, and the Washington Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional on its face under the federal Due Process Clause. By the time of the litigation, Granville had married and her husband adopted the children, but the core dispute concerned the scope of third-party visitation and the constitutional protection owed to a fit parent’s decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment on narrower, as-applied grounds.
Does application of a Washington statute authorizing courts to award visitation to any third party based solely on a judge’s best-interests determination violate the Fourteenth Amendment due process right of a fit parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her children?
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects a fundamental liberty interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children. Courts must give a fit parent’s childrearing decisions “special weight,” and may not override those decisions based merely on a judge’s contrary view of the child’s best interests without deference to the parent and without findings (e.g., of unfitness or harm) that justify intrusion. A statute that authorizes broad third-party visitation based solely on best interests, without according deference to a fit parent’s determination, is unconstitutional as applied. Troxel does not announce a categorical facial invalidation of all third-party visitation statutes nor a single definitive level of scrutiny, but it establishes a constitutional baseline of parental deference.
Yes. As applied to a fit parent here, the Washington statute violated the mother’s substantive due process rights because the trial court failed to give her decision special weight and instead substituted its own best-interests judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court on narrower, as-applied grounds, declining to hold the statute facially unconstitutional.
Plurality (O’Connor, joined by Rehnquist, Ginsburg, and Breyer): The Court rooted parental rights in a line of substantive due process precedents—Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Prince v. Massachusetts, Stanley v. Illinois, Parham v. J.R., and Wisconsin v. Yoder—recognizing that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in directing the upbringing of their children. The Washington statute was “breathtakingly broad,” permitting any person to seek visitation at any time based only on an open-ended best-interests standard. In this case, the trial court never found Granville unfit, did not require a showing of harm or potential harm to the children from reduced grandparent visitation, and gave no deference to Granville’s considered decision to limit visitation. Instead, it effectively replaced the mother’s judgment with the court’s own, imposing a robust visitation schedule. The plurality emphasized that while the State may sometimes intervene (e.g., where a child faces harm), judges may not ignore a fit parent’s choices simply because the judge believes more visitation would be better. A fit parent is presumed to act in the child’s best interests, and courts must give those decisions “special weight.” Concurrences (Souter; Thomas): Justice Souter agreed the statute was unconstitutional as applied and would have invalidated it on its face because it lacked a requirement of deference to parental decisions. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, expressly characterizing the parental right as fundamental and applying strict scrutiny; he concluded the State lacked a compelling interest to mandate visitation over a fit parent’s objection on these facts. Dissents (Stevens; Scalia; Kennedy): Justice Stevens argued that children’s interests, including relationships with nonparents, may justify state intervention in some circumstances and criticized the plurality’s constraints. Justice Scalia acknowledged the tradition of parental rights but doubted their judicial enforceability under the Constitution’s text. Justice Kennedy favored more nuanced consideration and questioned the Washington Supreme Court’s facial invalidation, suggesting room for case-specific applications. The Court thus held that, at minimum, courts must presume a fit parent’s decision is in a child’s best interests and afford it special weight; a bare best-interests override, particularly under a statute as expansive as Washington’s, is constitutionally infirm when applied to a fit parent.
Troxel sets the constitutional floor for third-party visitation: fit parents are entitled to substantial deference, and courts may not displace their choices with an unguided best-interests analysis. The case catalyzed widespread statutory reforms, with many states adding presumptions favoring fit parents, limiting who may petition, requiring a showing of harm or disruption, and tailoring visitation orders. Doctrinally, Troxel anchors parental rights in substantive due process while leaving unresolved the exact level of scrutiny, inviting later courts to develop standards (often invoking strict scrutiny or a presumption of parental fitness). For law students, Troxel illustrates how family law rules are constrained by constitutional principles and how fractured Supreme Court decisions can still produce powerful, practical guidance.
“Special weight” requires courts to presume that a fit parent acts in the child’s best interests and to defer substantially to the parent’s decision. A court may not substitute its own best-interests judgment for that of the parent absent countervailing findings—such as parental unfitness, harm or potential harm to the child, or other circumstances specified by statute—that justify intrusion. Mere disagreement with the parent’s assessment is insufficient.
No. The plurality avoided a facial ruling and held the statute unconstitutional as applied in this case because the trial court failed to give the mother’s decision special weight. Some Justices (e.g., Souter) would have found the statute facially invalid, but the controlling disposition was narrower. As a result, states may retain third-party visitation statutes if they are narrowly tailored and incorporate parental deference.
The plurality did not specify a level of scrutiny. Justice Thomas’s concurrence would apply strict scrutiny, recognizing the parental right as fundamental and requiring a compelling state interest and narrow tailoring. Post-Troxel, many courts treat interference with a fit parent’s decisions as requiring strict scrutiny or, at minimum, a strong presumption in favor of the parent coupled with a harm requirement or similarly robust threshold.
In response to Troxel, many states amended statutes to limit who may petition (e.g., grandparents or other close relatives), require thresholds (such as death of a parent or established relationships), adopt rebuttable presumptions favoring fit parents’ decisions, and require a showing of harm or potential harm if visitation is denied. Courts also adjusted doctrine to ensure explicit deference to parental decisions and to constrain open-ended best-interests overrides.
No. Troxel permits third-party visitation when constitutional safeguards are respected. If a statute and a court’s application give special weight to a fit parent’s decision and require adequate justification (often unfitness, harm, or other compelling factors), visitation orders can be constitutional. Troxel prohibits only the substitution of a judge’s best-interests view for a fit parent’s choice without deference or sufficient justification.
Troxel v. Granville constitutionalizes parental autonomy in the visitation context, insisting that courts defer to fit parents and rejecting open-ended best-interests overrides sought by nonparents. By framing parental decision-making as a protected liberty interest, the Court rebalanced the relationship between family courts and constitutional constraints.
For practitioners and students, Troxel is both a warning and a guide: state statutes must be tailored to respect parental prerogatives, and trial courts must articulate deference and make specific findings before intruding. Even as the precise level of scrutiny remains debated, Troxel’s command—that the fit parent’s decision receives special weight—remains the controlling principle.