Master Landmark case establishing that police may conduct brief investigatory stops and limited frisks on reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. with this comprehensive case brief.
Terry v. Ohio is the foundational Fourth Amendment case that created the modern framework for “stop and frisk.” Before Terry, constitutional doctrine largely treated police–citizen encounters as either consensual or full-scale arrests requiring probable cause. Terry recognized a middle ground: brief investigatory detentions based on reasonable suspicion, coupled with a narrowly tailored frisk for officer safety. In doing so, the Court adapted Fourth Amendment reasonableness to the practical realities of street policing.
For law students and practitioners, Terry supplies both a standard (reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts) and a method (a two-step analysis of justification and scope). It is the springboard for an extensive body of cases governing pedestrian encounters, traffic stops, and protective frisks, and it remains central to debates about public safety, privacy, racial profiling, and the limits of police discretion.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Cleveland Detective Martin McFadden, a plainclothes officer with many years of experience, observed John W. Terry and Richard Chilton on a downtown street repeatedly pacing, peering into the same store window, and conferring with one another. A third man, later identified as Carl Katz, briefly joined them before departing. Based on his observations, McFadden suspected the men were casing the store for a robbery. He approached the trio, identified himself as a police officer, and asked their names. Concerned for his safety and believing the men might be armed, McFadden grabbed Terry, turned him around, and conducted a limited patdown of the outer clothing. Feeling what he immediately recognized as a gun in Terry’s overcoat, he reached into the pocket and removed a revolver. He then frisked Chilton and found another gun; no weapon was found on Katz. Terry and Chilton were charged under Ohio law with carrying concealed weapons. They moved to suppress the guns as the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion, finding the officer’s actions reasonable; the convictions were affirmed on appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Does the Fourth Amendment permit a police officer to stop a person for investigation and conduct a limited patdown for weapons, absent probable cause to arrest, when the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and that the person may be armed and dangerous?
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to brief investigatory detentions and to limited protective frisks. An officer may (1) stop an individual if the officer can point to specific and articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant the intrusion—i.e., reasonable suspicion that the person is engaged in, has engaged in, or is about to engage in criminal activity; and (2) conduct a carefully limited patdown of the outer clothing for weapons if the officer reasonably believes the person is armed and presently dangerous. The encounter must be justified at its inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop, with the frisk confined to what is necessary to discover weapons.
Yes. The stop of Terry and the limited frisk for weapons were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even though the officer lacked probable cause to arrest. The weapons were admissible because the officer had reasonable suspicion based on specific observations and confined his search to a protective patdown for weapons.
The Court, per Chief Justice Warren, began by emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement applies to all seizures of the person, including brief street encounters, and to searches short of a full-blown evidentiary search. Not every encounter is an arrest requiring probable cause; nevertheless, any meaningful restraint on liberty must be justified by objective, articulable facts. The Court adopted a balancing approach: the government’s substantial interests in crime prevention and officer safety versus the individual’s right to personal security and privacy. On the facts, Detective McFadden’s experienced, prolonged observations—repetitive pacing, window-gazing, and conferrals suggestive of “casing” a store—were more than an inchoate hunch. They supplied specific and articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that a robbery was being planned. Given the nature of the suspected crime (robbery), McFadden also had reason to believe the suspects might be armed. The Court underscored that an officer “need not take unnecessary risks” when confronting potentially armed suspects. Thus, a limited patdown of the outer clothing to determine the presence of weapons was reasonable. The scope of the frisk was properly constrained. McFadden initially patted down the outer garments; only after feeling the distinctive contour of a firearm did he reach into Terry’s pocket to retrieve it. This sequence satisfied the second prong of the Terry test: the search was reasonably related in scope to the protective purpose justifying its initiation. The Court rejected the argument that probable cause or a warrant was necessary for such a brief, targeted intrusion because the substantial safety interest and the limited nature of the search made the action reasonable under the circumstances. Concurring opinions elaborated on the need to cabin the doctrine, while Justice Douglas dissented, warning that authorizing searches on less than probable cause risked diluting Fourth Amendment protections. The majority, however, stressed that the standard requires objective, articulable facts and does not license generalized or exploratory searches.
Terry created the doctrinal framework for the investigatory stop and protective frisk, introducing the reasonable suspicion standard and the two-part test (justification and scope). It is the cornerstone of modern street-level policing and later cases involving traffic stops, officer-safety frisks, and the permissible scope of searches during temporary detentions. For law students, Terry is essential because it: (1) defines reasonable suspicion and distinguishes it from probable cause; (2) illustrates the Court’s interest-balancing approach to Fourth Amendment reasonableness; (3) sets limits on the scope and purpose of frisks; and (4) serves as a platform for understanding subsequent developments (e.g., traffic-stop frisks, anonymous tips, high-crime area considerations, and the plain-feel doctrine).
A Terry stop is a brief investigatory detention based on reasonable suspicion—specific and articulable facts suggesting criminal activity is afoot. An arrest is a more extensive seizure requiring probable cause that the individual committed a crime. The practical differences include duration, degree of restraint, and permissible scope of search: during a Terry stop, officers may frisk only for weapons if they reasonably believe the person is armed and dangerous; incident to arrest, officers may conduct a broader search.
No. A frisk requires reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous, not probable cause. However, the frisk must be strictly limited to a patdown of outer clothing to locate weapons; it is not a general evidence-gathering search.
Reasonable suspicion is a common-sense, objective standard based on specific and articulable facts, viewed through the lens of an officer’s training and experience, and the rational inferences drawn from those facts. It is more than a mere hunch but less than probable cause. Context matters—conduct suggestive of an imminent robbery (as in Terry), evasive actions, or reliable tips may contribute, but each case turns on the totality of the circumstances.
The frisk is a narrowly tailored patdown of the outer clothing solely to discover weapons. If the officer feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity as a weapon immediately apparent, the officer may retrieve it. Manipulation or probing beyond what is necessary to determine whether an item is a weapon exceeds Terry’s scope.
Yes, Terry’s principles extend to traffic stops, which are treated as investigatory detentions. If an officer has reasonable suspicion that a driver or passenger is armed and dangerous, a protective frisk of the person and, in some circumstances, a limited search of areas in a vehicle where a weapon might be accessible, may be permissible, subject to the same reasonableness and scope limits.
Potentially, but only if discovered within the strict confines of a lawful frisk. If, during a lawful patdown, the officer immediately recognizes the object’s incriminating character without additional manipulation (for example, contraband whose identity is instantly apparent), seizure may be permitted under the “plain feel” rationale. However, rummaging or squeezing beyond what is necessary to find weapons is not allowed.
Terry v. Ohio reframed Fourth Amendment doctrine to accommodate the realities of street-level policing while attempting to preserve core privacy values. By authorizing brief stops on reasonable suspicion and permitting narrowly tailored frisks for weapons, the Court adopted a flexible reasonableness standard anchored in specific, articulable facts and constrained scope.
For students and practitioners, Terry is more than a discrete holding; it is a methodology. Every Terry analysis asks whether the intrusion was justified at its inception and whether its scope remained tied to officer safety. Mastery of that framework—together with a careful, fact-sensitive application—is indispensable for evaluating pedestrian stops, traffic encounters, and the evolving boundary between public safety and personal security.