Master Supreme Court limits police use of deadly force against fleeing suspects under the Fourth Amendment. with this comprehensive case brief.
Tennessee v. Garner is the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case that recalibrated the constitutional boundaries of police use of deadly force. Decided in 1985, the Court rejected the broad common-law "fleeing felon" rule and imposed a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard tailored to modern policing realities. The decision holds that deadly force is a seizure and is presumptively unreasonable when used to stop an unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect.
The case’s importance extends far beyond its facts. It reshaped statutes, police policies, training standards, and civil litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Garner introduced a now-canonical test: deadly force may be used only when necessary to prevent escape and the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others, and, if feasible, a warning must be given. This framework undergirds contemporary debates about policing and public safety.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (U.S. Supreme Court)
On October 3, 1974, Memphis police officers responded to a nighttime burglary call. Officer Elton Hymon observed a suspect—15-year-old Edward Eugene Garner—run from the house and attempt to climb a chain-link fence. Shining his flashlight, Hymon saw Garner’s face and hands and concluded he was unarmed and of slight build. Believing Garner had committed a felony burglary and relying on a Tennessee statute authorizing officers to use "all necessary means" to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon, Hymon ordered Garner to halt and, when he continued climbing, fired a single shot to prevent his escape. The bullet struck Garner in the back of the head; he died shortly thereafter. Garner had taken a small amount of property and around ten dollars from the house. Garner’s father filed a § 1983 action against the officer, the Memphis Police Department, and others, alleging a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violation and challenging the Tennessee statute’s constitutionality. The district court upheld the statute and found the force reasonable. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the statute was unconstitutional insofar as it authorized deadly force against an unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect. Tennessee sought review, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Does the Fourth Amendment permit a police officer to use deadly force to prevent the escape of an unarmed, nondangerous fleeing felony suspect?
The use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing suspect is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Deadly force may not be used unless (1) it is necessary to prevent the suspect’s escape and (2) the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. If feasible, a warning must be given before deadly force is employed.
No. The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of an unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect. Tennessee’s statute, authorizing deadly force under such circumstances, is unconstitutional, and the officer’s use of deadly force in this case was unreasonable.
1) Deadly force as a seizure and the Fourth Amendment framework: The Court, per Justice White, held that shooting a suspect to stop flight is a "seizure" and thus must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Reasonableness is assessed by balancing the nature of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. 2) Severity of intrusion vs. governmental interest: The intrusion—taking of life—is the ultimate use of force. Against this, the state’s interest in preventing the escape of a suspect who does not pose an imminent danger is comparatively weak, especially when the suspected crime is nonviolent and the suspect appears unarmed. The Court emphasized that it is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape; when a suspect poses no immediate threat, deadly force is an unjustifiable means of seizure. 3) Rejection of the common-law fleeing felon rule: The Court explained that the historical rule arose in a different era when most felonies were punishable by death and suspects were more likely to evade identification, rendering escape prevention more weighty. Modern criminal law classifies many nonviolent offenses as felonies, and improved investigative tools reduce the necessity of using lethal means to prevent escape. Thus, the old rule does not align with contemporary Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 4) National consensus and professional standards: The Court noted that many states and police departments had already moved toward a "dangerousness" requirement, limiting deadly force to situations involving immediate threats. This policy trend supported the constitutional standard the Court adopted. 5) Application to the facts: Officer Hymon had no probable cause to believe Garner posed a significant threat. Hymon believed Garner was unarmed, of slight build, and suspected only of a property crime. Although Garner was fleeing, there was no indication he threatened the officer or others. Consequently, deadly force was not necessary nor justified, and the Tennessee statute was unconstitutional to the extent it authorized such force. The Court also stated that, where feasible, officers must provide a warning before resorting to deadly force. 6) Response to counterarguments: Tennessee argued that the state’s interest in apprehending felons and deterring crime justified the statute. The Court disagreed, finding general deterrence and escape prevention insufficient to justify lethal intrusion absent probable cause of immediate danger. The constitutional balance turns on the particularized threat posed by the suspect, not the categorical label of "felon."
Tennessee v. Garner is a cornerstone of constitutional limits on police use of force. It replaced the broad common-law fleeing felon rule with a Fourth Amendment standard keyed to necessity and dangerousness, requiring probable cause that a suspect poses a significant threat before deadly force may be used and a warning when feasible. The decision reshaped state statutes and police department policies nationwide and provides the doctrinal backbone for civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging police shootings. Garner also sets the stage for Graham v. Connor’s objective reasonableness test, together forming the foundation of modern police use-of-force jurisprudence.
Deadly force is permissible only if it is necessary to prevent escape and the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. When feasible, the officer must first issue a warning.
Garner addresses when deadly force may constitutionally be used and articulates a dangerousness/necessity threshold. Graham v. Connor (1989) later provided the broader Fourth Amendment framework for all force—deadly and nondeadly—requiring evaluation under an objective reasonableness standard considering the facts and circumstances. Together, Garner supplies a specific deadly-force rule within Graham’s general reasonableness analysis.
Garner rejects categorical reliance on the felony label. The key is not whether the offense is a felony or misdemeanor, but whether the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious bodily harm and whether deadly force is necessary to prevent escape. Using deadly force against a fleeing misdemeanant almost never satisfies Garner’s standard.
Garner requires a warning "if feasible." Feasibility depends on the circumstances—time, distance, immediacy of threat, and tactical constraints. When a warning can be safely and effectively given without increasing risk to officers or others, it should be given; when split-second threats make warning impracticable, the lack of warning may be justified.
Garner clearly established by 1985 that deadly force against an unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect is unconstitutional. In qualified immunity analysis, courts ask whether the law was clearly established at the time of the incident and whether a reasonable officer would have understood the conduct to be unlawful. Post-1985 incidents involving similar facts often defeat qualified immunity; however, immunity may still apply when fact-specific differences or rapidly evolving threats make the unlawfulness less clear.
Yes, in the sense that vehicle shootings are seizures evaluated under the Fourth Amendment and Garner’s dangerousness/necessity principles. But later cases (e.g., Scott v. Harris; Plumhoff v. Rickard) apply the same reasonableness balancing to high-speed pursuits, often finding deadly force reasonable when a suspect’s driving poses a grave, immediate risk to others. The analysis still turns on imminent danger and necessity under the totality of circumstances.
Tennessee v. Garner fundamentally reoriented the constitutional analysis of police deadly force. By recognizing deadly force as a severe seizure subject to strict reasonableness constraints, the Court rejected a categorical fleeing-felon approach and required individualized probable cause of dangerousness, necessity to prevent escape, and a warning when feasible.
For law students and practitioners, Garner is essential doctrine in constitutional policing and § 1983 litigation. Its rule shapes statutory frameworks, departmental policies, and judicial evaluations of police shootings, and it operates in tandem with Graham v. Connor to structure modern use-of-force jurisprudence under the Fourth Amendment.