Master Early English tort case recognizing liability for intentionally and unlawfully deterring third parties from trading with the plaintiff. with this comprehensive case brief.
Tarleton v. M'Gawley is a foundational English decision in the law of economic torts. Decided at the close of the 18th century, the case established that one may not, without lawful justification, use threats or violence to drive away prospective customers from another trader. The court recognized a protectable interest in prospective business relations, even in the absence of a concluded contract, and drew a line between fair competition and unlawful interference.
The opinion sits alongside Keeble v. Hickeringill as a landmark delineating the boundary between vigorous rivalry and wrongful disturbance. Whereas persuasion and ordinary competition are permissible, coercive tactics such as menaces and force are not. Tarleton thus supplies an early articulation of the unlawful means principle that later informs modern doctrines of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and unfair competition in both English and American law.
Tarleton v. M'Gawley (1793) 1 Peake 270, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. at Nisi Prius)
The plaintiffs maintained a trading factory on the West African coast. The defendant, master of a rival trading vessel operating nearby, sought to divert local traders from dealing with the plaintiffs. To that end, he ordered the firing of great guns from his ship at or near the trading place and issued threats meant to deter the local inhabitants from approaching or doing business with the plaintiffs. As a result, the local traders were frightened off and declined to trade with the plaintiffs, who suffered loss of expected business. The plaintiffs brought an action on the case alleging that the defendant maliciously and advisedly interfered with their trade by means of threats and gunfire, even though no specific contracts had been concluded with the deterred traders at the time.
Whether a defendant is liable in tort for intentionally and maliciously deterring third parties from trading with the plaintiff by threats and acts of intimidation, notwithstanding the absence of a concluded contract between the plaintiff and those third parties.
A person who, without lawful justification, intentionally and maliciously interferes with another's trade or prospective economic relations by threats, menaces, or other unlawful means is liable in an action on the case for the resulting damage. It is not necessary that a binding contract exist between the plaintiff and the third parties; it suffices that the plaintiff possessed a reasonable, probable expectancy of trade which the defendant wrongfully prevented.
Yes. The defendant's use of threats and gunfire to deter third parties from trading with the plaintiffs was wrongful and actionable; the plaintiffs could recover for their resulting economic loss despite the absence of a specific contract.
The court emphasized the longstanding principle that, while competition and persuasion are lawful, intentionally preventing another from exercising his trade by menaces or violence is not. In line with Keeble v. Hickeringill, the defendant's conduct was maliciously aimed at disturbing the plaintiffs' business, not merely improving his own through fair means. The law protects a trader's reasonable expectation of custom from coercive interference because such tactics undermine free commerce and public order. The absence of a concluded bargain with the deterred traders did not defeat the claim, as the essence of the wrong lay in the defendant's unlawful means and intent, which directly caused the loss. The plaintiffs showed they had willing traders who would have dealt with them but for the defendant's intimidation; that proximate causal link sufficed to ground liability.
Tarleton is a bedrock case for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. It clarifies that economic competition has limits: one may solicit customers, but one may not employ unlawful means to drive them away from a rival. The case anchors the unlawful means requirement that distinguishes actionable interference from permissible competition and presages later authorities such as Lumley v. Gye (inducing breach of contract), Mogul Steamship (defining lawful competitive conduct), and modern torts governing interference and unfair competition. For students, it illustrates how tort law protects economic interests even absent a formal contract when the defendant's intentional, unjustified, and coercive conduct causes predictable business loss.
No. The court allowed recovery despite the absence of a concluded contract. The protected interest was the plaintiff's reasonable and probable expectation of trade, which the defendant intentionally and unlawfully frustrated through threats and intimidation.
The use of unlawful means. Persuasion and ordinary competitive tactics are permissible. But threats, menaces, or violence that intentionally deter third parties from dealing with a rival cross the line into tortious interference.
Both cases condemn malicious interference with another's livelihood by unlawful disturbance. In Keeble, the defendant fired guns to scare ducks away from a decoy pond; in Tarleton, the defendant used gunfire and threats to scare away prospective traders. Together, they articulate the principle that malicious disturbance by unlawful means is actionable.
No. The actionable harm in Tarleton was economic loss from the wrongful diversion of prospective customers. The tort protects economic interests against intentional, unjustified interference by unlawful means even without physical injury or property damage.
Intent was central. The court characterized the conduct as malicious and advisedly undertaken to deter trade with the plaintiff. Liability flows from deliberately employing unlawful means to interfere with another's business, not from merely competing or incidentally causing loss.
It is taught as an early anchor for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and the unlawful means doctrine. Courts and commentators cite it when distinguishing fair competition from tortious conduct and when explaining why proof of a formal contract is unnecessary if the defendant's unlawful acts intentionally obstruct a probable business expectancy.
Tarleton v. M'Gawley marks a pivotal moment in the development of economic torts. It firmly establishes that while the law promotes free competition, it does not allow traders to wield threats or violence to frighten away a rival's customers. The case protects a trader's reasonable prospects and reflects a policy choice to maintain open markets free from coercive disturbance.
For modern students and practitioners, Tarleton underscores two enduring themes: intent matters, and means matter. Even fierce competition must be conducted through lawful, noncoercive methods. Where a defendant intentionally employs unlawful means to thwart another's expected trade, tort liability will lie notwithstanding the absence of a formal contract.