Master New Jersey Supreme Court limits a landowner’s right to exclude where migrant workers need access to legal and medical aid, reversing trespass convictions. with this comprehensive case brief.
State v. Shack is a foundational property law case that recalibrates the traditional primacy of the right to exclude by foregrounding human dignity and access to essential services. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that a landowner who houses migrant workers cannot use trespass law to isolate them from governmental and charitable assistance. In doing so, the court articulated a key principle: property rights serve human values and therefore must sometimes yield to competing personal and societal interests.
For law students, Shack is a paradigmatic illustration of how the common law of property evolves through balancing. It reframes ownership from absolute dominion into a set of relational entitlements and obligations, particularly where vulnerable populations are concerned. It also provides a practical template for “reasonable access” rules and highlights how courts may avoid constitutional holdings by resolving disputes on state-law grounds and common-law privileges.
58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971)
Tedesco, a New Jersey farmer, employed and housed migrant agricultural workers on his farm. Two defendants—Frank Tejeras, a field worker employed by a federally funded anti-poverty program to provide health and social services to migrants, and Peter Shack, a staff attorney with a federally funded legal services organization—went to the farm to render aid to specific workers residing there (one injured and in need of medical assistance; another seeking legal counsel). Tedesco confronted them, insisting they meet workers only in his office and in his presence, and forbade private consultations in the workers’ living quarters. The defendants refused, citing the need for confidential medical and legal communications and the workers’ right to receive visitors. Tedesco summoned state police, and both defendants were charged with criminal trespass under New Jersey law. They were convicted in municipal court; the conviction was affirmed on appeal to the county court. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted review.
May a landowner who houses migrant workers use the criminal trespass statute to bar government-funded medical and legal aid workers from entering the property to confer privately with the workers who reside there?
Ownership of real property does not include the right to bar access to governmental or charitable workers reasonably seeking to assist occupants living on the premises. Property rights serve human values and must accommodate the rights and needs of those persons. Migrant workers, as lawful occupants, have the right to receive visitors of their choice, including legal and medical aid providers, and to receive them in private. A landowner may impose reasonable, nondiscriminatory time, place, and manner regulations and may require visitors to identify themselves and state their general purpose, but may not deny or condition access so as to isolate residents from necessary services or intrude upon confidential professional relationships. Entry for such purposes is privileged and not a criminal trespass.
No. The landowner’s asserted right to exclude does not permit isolation of migrant workers from public and charitable assistance. The defendants’ entry to provide medical and legal aid to residents was privileged; their trespass convictions were reversed.
The court began by emphasizing that property rights are instrumental: they exist to serve human values, not to enable dominion over persons. Although the landowner held title to the farm and provided on-site housing, the migrant workers were lawful occupants with legitimate privacy interests and the right to receive visitors. The owner’s property interest could not be used to strip occupants of that fundamental incident of occupancy. The court noted that the defendants were government-funded aid workers providing essential services—legal counsel and medical/health assistance—uniquely necessary to a vulnerable, frequently isolated population. Denying access would effectively nullify the workers’ practical ability to obtain those services. The court thus treated the defendants’ entry as privileged because it was reasonably necessary to reach the occupants for socially sanctioned purposes consistent with public policy. In calibrating interests, the court recognized the owner’s legitimate concerns for order and safety. It therefore authorized reasonable regulations: the owner may require visitors to identify themselves, state a general purpose, and comply with reasonable time and place limitations that do not frustrate the services. However, the owner could not insist on being present at legal or medical consultations, as that would undermine confidentiality and core professional duties, nor could he compel that meetings occur only in his office. The court resolved the case on state property and trespass principles rather than on constitutional grounds, underscoring that common-law doctrines—including necessity and privileges grounded in public policy—limit the trespass statute’s reach. To the extent a conflict might arise with federal programs, the court indicated state law would have to yield, but it found such a constitutional determination unnecessary because the common law already accommodated access. Given these principles, the defendants’ conduct was not unlawful; their presence was justified and privileged. Using criminal trespass to isolate migrant workers would invert the function of property law by turning it into a tool for domination rather than a framework serving human welfare.
State v. Shack is a staple of the property curriculum because it reframes the right to exclude as a presumptive, not absolute, entitlement subject to accommodation for competing human interests. It is frequently paired with cases like Marsh v. Alabama and, in contrast, Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, to analyze the scope and limits of exclusionary rights. Shack also clarifies that residents—even without formal leases—retain privacy and associational interests, and it supplies a practical, administrable approach to reasonable access and professional confidentiality on private land. More broadly, it exemplifies how courts can resolve conflicts at the level of state property and tort law without resort to constitutional holdings, while still vindicating human dignity and public policy.
No. The decision is narrow. It protects reasonable access by governmental or charitable service providers to occupants residing on the land, where access is necessary to deliver essential services and respects reasonable time, place, and manner limits. It does not authorize entry onto private property to assist non-occupants or for purposes unrelated to the occupants’ needs.
They have privacy interests and the right to receive visitors of their choice, including medical and legal aid providers, in private. The owner cannot condition occupancy on surrendering those rights, cannot insist on being present during meetings, and cannot use trespass law to isolate them from assistance.
Yes. The owner may adopt reasonable, nondiscriminatory rules—such as requiring identification, limiting visits to reasonable hours, and ensuring safety—so long as those rules do not effectively deny access or prevent confidential communications necessary to deliver the services.
Primarily no. The court resolved the case on state property and trespass principles, recognizing common-law privileges and public policy limits on the right to exclude. It acknowledged that state law could not frustrate federal programs, but it found a constitutional ruling unnecessary because the common law already supported access.
It qualifies the right to exclude by making explicit that ownership must be balanced against the rights of those on the land and broader public interests. The case stands for the proposition that property rights are relational and instrumental, not absolute, especially when the owner’s control would undermine human dignity and access to essential services.
State v. Shack is a landmark articulation of property law’s human-centered mission. By recognizing a privilege to enter private land to reach residents for medical and legal aid, the court rejected an absolutist vision of ownership and reaffirmed that property rules must facilitate, not frustrate, human welfare and access to justice.
For students and practitioners, the case offers a durable framework: property entitlements are strong but limited; occupants maintain privacy and associational rights; and reasonable regulations are permissible so long as they do not defeat necessary services. Shack thus remains a touchstone for analyzing the right to exclude in contexts where property rights intersect with human rights.