Master North Carolina Supreme Court held that a battered spouse who killed her sleeping abuser was not entitled to self-defense instructions because the threat was not imminent. with this comprehensive case brief.
State v. Norman is a seminal North Carolina Supreme Court decision that defines the outer limits of self-defense when invoked by battered spouses. The case is frequently taught in criminal law and evidence courses because it squarely addresses whether the psychological reality of battering can modify or relax the black-letter imminence requirement embedded in self-defense doctrine. By rejecting a self-defense instruction where the abuser was asleep at the time of the killing, the court insisted on a strict conception of imminence even in the face of profound, chronic abuse.
The opinion is important for two reasons. First, it differentiates the roles of justification and excuse by refusing to convert a history of battering into a legal license for anticipatory homicide. Second, it clarifies how battered spouse syndrome evidence may be used: it can inform the reasonableness of a defendant’s perception and fear, but it cannot erase the doctrinal requirement that the threatened harm be imminent at the moment deadly force is used. Norman thus frames the evidentiary and doctrinal boundaries that continue to shape battered spouse litigation nationwide.
State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 (1989)
Judy Ann Norman endured approximately two decades of extreme and escalating abuse by her husband, John Thomas Norman. The record reflected frequent beatings, threats to kill her, degradation, forced prostitution, deprivation of food and sleep, and total domination that left her isolated and fearful. She had attempted to seek help from authorities and family without success and had been warned by her husband that any effort to leave would result in her death. On the day in question, after a period of particularly severe abuse, including forced prostitution and threats, Norman went to her mother’s house but later returned to the marital home. While her husband slept, she retrieved a pistol and shot him three times in the back of the head, killing him. At trial, the defense presented expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome to explain Norman’s perception of danger and the dynamics of the abusive relationship. The trial court declined to instruct the jury on perfect or imperfect self-defense, and the jury convicted Norman of voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals ordered a new trial, concluding that self-defense instructions should have been given. The North Carolina Supreme Court granted review.
Whether evidence of prolonged and severe domestic abuse and battered spouse syndrome can support jury instructions on perfect or imperfect self-defense when the defendant killed her abuser while he was asleep, such that no imminent threat existed at the moment of the killing.
In North Carolina, perfect self-defense justifies a homicide when: (1) the defendant was not at fault in provoking or engaging in the confrontation; (2) the defendant actually believed it was necessary to kill to save herself from death or great bodily harm; (3) the belief was reasonable under the circumstances; and (4) the threatened harm was imminent. Imperfect self-defense mitigates murder to voluntary manslaughter when the defendant, though not entitled to perfect self-defense (for example, because her belief was unreasonable), nevertheless actually believed it was necessary to kill to protect herself from imminent death or great bodily harm. The requirement of imminence is not satisfied by threats of future harm or by general ongoing danger; it requires an immediate threat at the time deadly force is used. Expert testimony on battered spouse syndrome may be relevant to the reasonableness and subjective perception of danger, but it does not eliminate the legal requirement of imminence.
No. Because the deceased was asleep and posed no immediate threat at the moment of the killing, the evidence did not support submission of either perfect or imperfect self-defense to the jury. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the voluntary manslaughter conviction.
The Court emphasized that self-defense is a narrow justification for the use of deadly force and hinges on the imminence of the threatened harm. Imminence operates as a doctrinal boundary between defensive force and preventive or retaliatory homicide. Although the record amply demonstrated that Norman endured horrific abuse and lived under credible threats of death, the Court concluded that those facts could not establish imminence when the victim was asleep and not engaging in an attack or an immediately impending assault. The Court acknowledged that battered spouse syndrome evidence can assist a jury in evaluating whether a defendant’s fear was genuine and whether her assessment of danger was reasonable compared to a hypothetical reasonable person similarly situated. However, the Court declined to adopt a battered spouse exception to the imminence element. To do so, it explained, would erode the limiting function of imminence and convert self-defense into a doctrine permitting preemptive killing based on predictions of future harm. Such a result, the Court reasoned, raises profound policy concerns more appropriately addressed by the legislature than by judicial expansion of common law defenses. As to imperfect self-defense, the Court held that the doctrine still requires an actual belief in the necessity to kill to avoid imminent death or great bodily harm. Because no immediate confrontation or attack was underway, the evidence could not satisfy even the subjective imminence component. Thus, the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on either perfect or imperfect self-defense, and the Court of Appeals erred in ordering a new trial.
Norman is a leading case on the limits of self-defense for battered spouses. It teaches that expert evidence of battering informs the reasonableness of a defendant’s perception but cannot replace the legal requirement that the threat be imminent at the moment of the killing. For law students, the case is essential to understanding the difference between justification (self-defense) and mitigation (imperfect self-defense), the function of the imminence element as a limiting principle, and how social science evidence interacts with established doctrinal elements. Norman also frames ongoing debates about whether legislative reforms or alternative defenses should address situations where long-term abuse creates a credible but non-immediate risk of lethal harm.
Perfect self-defense is a complete justification that results in acquittal if the defendant was not at fault, actually and reasonably believed deadly force was necessary, and faced imminent death or great bodily harm. Imperfect self-defense reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter when the defendant actually believed deadly force was necessary to repel an imminent threat but that belief was unreasonable (or the defendant was at fault in some limited ways). Both forms require imminence; imperfect self-defense cannot apply where no immediate threat existed.
The Court recognized that battered spouse syndrome evidence is relevant to explain a defendant’s perception of danger and to inform the reasonableness of that perception. However, such evidence does not eliminate or relax the imminence requirement. In other words, the syndrome can help a jury understand why the defendant feared for her life, but it cannot transform a non-imminent threat (such as when the abuser is asleep) into an imminent one.
Imminence requires an immediate threat of death or great bodily harm at the time deadly force is used. The victim’s being asleep meant there was no ongoing attack or immediate danger; the feared harm, though very real, was prospective. The Court viewed self-defense as a response to present necessity, not a permissible preemptive strike against a future threat.
No. The decision leaves intact the use of self-defense in situations where a battered spouse faces an attack or an immediately impending assault. Battered spouse syndrome evidence remains admissible to help establish the defendant’s honest and reasonable perception of imminent danger. Norman only holds that the doctrine does not extend to killings where no immediate threat exists at the moment of the act.
The trial court refused to instruct on perfect or imperfect self-defense, and the jury convicted Norman of voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on the ground that self-defense instructions should have been given. The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the voluntary manslaughter conviction.
Norman underscores that any modification to the imminence requirement to address chronic abuse is a matter for the legislature, not the courts. The case catalyzed discussion about alternative avenues for addressing battered spouse cases, such as evidentiary reforms, sentencing considerations, or statutory defenses, while keeping the core self-defense elements intact.
State v. Norman sets a clear doctrinal boundary: even in the face of appalling, long-term abuse, self-defense requires an imminent threat at the moment deadly force is used. By drawing this line, the court preserved the limiting function of imminence and signaled that battered spouse syndrome evidence, while relevant and powerful, cannot alone justify or mitigate a homicide where the danger is not immediate.
For students and practitioners, Norman remains a pivotal case for understanding how courts integrate social science evidence into traditional criminal law frameworks and how justification and mitigation doctrines interact. It invites careful analysis on exams and in practice about the timing of the threat, the defendant’s perceptions, and the appropriate legal vehicle—if any—for addressing the tragic realities of domestic violence.