Master The Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana slaughterhouse monopoly and narrowly construed the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect only rights of national citizenship. with this comprehensive case brief.
The Slaughter-House Cases represent the Supreme Court's first major interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, decided just five years after its ratification. In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld a Louisiana statute centralizing all animal slaughter in the New Orleans area at a single, state-chartered facility. More consequential than the immediate outcome was the Court's narrow reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, confining its protection to a limited set of rights arising from federal citizenship rather than safeguarding the broad civil rights traditionally associated with state citizenship.
That approach profoundly shaped constitutional law. By limiting the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Court foreclosed it as a vehicle for protecting most civil liberties against state infringement, prompting later courts to turn to the Due Process Clause to incorporate the Bill of Rights and to protect certain substantive liberties. The case remains foundational for understanding federalism, the scope of state police powers, and the trajectory of rights protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. It also sets a cautionary baseline against which later doctrinal developments, including Saenz v. Roe and debates in McDonald v. City of Chicago, are measured.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (U.S. Supreme Court)
In 1869, to address severe public health problems in New Orleans arising from unregulated slaughtering and animal waste disposal, the Louisiana legislature enacted a statute granting the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company an exclusive 25-year franchise to operate the only stock landing and slaughterhouse within designated parishes (including Orleans). The statute did not prohibit independent butchers from practicing their trade, but required that all slaughtering within the affected area occur at Crescent City's regulated facility, where butchers could rent stalls and services for fixed fees subject to governmental oversight. A group of independent butchers, organized through associations, challenged the law, arguing that it destroyed their right to pursue their chosen occupation and conferred an unconstitutional monopoly. They contended the statute violated the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on involuntary servitude and the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses. The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the statute. Multiple related cases were consolidated and reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court as the Slaughter-House Cases.
Does a state law granting an exclusive slaughterhouse franchise as a public health measure violate the Thirteenth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, or Equal Protection Clauses by depriving butchers of the right to pursue their trade free from monopoly restrictions?
The Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only those privileges or immunities that owe their existence to federal citizenship, not the broad array of civil rights incident to state citizenship such as the right to pursue a lawful occupation. States retain broad police powers to regulate for public health, safety, and welfare, which may include reasonable monopolies or exclusive franchises. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, not limitations on economic activity. The Equal Protection Clause was principally directed at preventing state-sponsored racial discrimination, and the Due Process Clause does not forbid reasonable health and safety regulations that do not arbitrarily deprive persons of property or liberty.
No. The Louisiana statute is a valid exercise of the state's police power and does not violate the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments. The Privileges or Immunities Clause protects only rights of national citizenship, which do not include the right to practice a trade. The law does not violate Equal Protection or Due Process, and it does not impose involuntary servitude.
Writing for the majority, Justice Miller framed the Civil War Amendments as principally aimed at eradicating slavery and ensuring the civil and political rights of the newly freed population. He emphasized federalism: the Constitution traditionally left most civil rights to state protection. On that backdrop, a broad reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immities Clause would make the Court a perpetual censor on state legislation and upend the balance of state and federal authority. Interpreting the phrase privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, the Court distinguished national from state citizenship. It held that the clause protects only those rights that arise from the national character or the federal government, such as access to federal institutions and seaports, the use of navigable waters, the right to protection on the high seas and abroad, the right to travel to the seat of government, to petition Congress, and to seek the writ of habeas corpus. By contrast, most civil rights, including the right to practice a trade, to make contracts, and to own property within a state, were rights of state citizenship. Because the butchers' asserted right concerned a state-created civil right, it fell outside the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The Court rejected the Thirteenth Amendment claim, concluding that the statute neither imposed slavery nor compelled labor for another. It also rejected the Equal Protection claim, characterizing the clause as aimed primarily at preventing racial discrimination against freedmen, a concern not implicated by a neutrally applicable slaughterhouse regulation. As to Due Process, the Court found no arbitrary deprivation of liberty or property: the law regulated the location and conditions of slaughtering to abate a grave public health hazard, allowed butchers to continue their trade at the designated facility, and set fees subject to regulation. The dissents, led by Justice Field and joined by Chief Justice Chase and Justices Bradley and Swayne, argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause should protect fundamental rights of citizens, including the right to pursue a lawful occupation, drawing on Corfield v. Coryell's understanding of fundamental privileges and immunities. Justice Bradley further suggested that the Due Process Clause protects substantive liberty from unreasonable monopolies, foreshadowing later substantive due process jurisprudence. The majority, however, declined to adopt such an expansive reading, prioritizing state police powers and a limited national rights conception.
The decision effectively cabined the Privileges or Immunities Clause to a narrow set of national rights, rendering it largely dormant for federal rights protection against the states. As a result, later incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights occurred through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause rather than through Privileges or Immunities. The case also signaled deference to state police powers in economic regulation. While its reading of Equal Protection was later broadened in cases like Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Slaughter-House's Privileges or Immunities holding remains controlling. The clause saw limited revival in Saenz v. Roe, where the Court recognized a right to interstate travel and to become a citizen of another state. Debates in McDonald v. City of Chicago further spotlighted the case, with Justice Thomas urging revival of Privileges or Immunities for incorporation. For law students, Slaughter-House is indispensable for understanding the structure of the Fourteenth Amendment, federalism, and the historical path of rights protection in constitutional law.
Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause prevents states from discriminating against citizens of other states with respect to fundamental rights when they are traveling or doing business in the forum state. The Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, as interpreted in Slaughter-House, protects only rights that stem from national citizenship. The Court held that most civil rights, such as the right to pursue a trade, are incidents of state citizenship and thus fall outside the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities protection.
The Court gave illustrative examples rather than an exhaustive list: access to federal institutions and seaports, use of navigable waters, protection on the high seas and abroad, the right to travel to and reside in the seat of government, to transact business with the federal government, to seek habeas corpus, to assemble and petition Congress, and protections secured by federal treaties and laws. The asserted right to practice a trade within a state did not qualify.
No, but it greatly limited it. The clause survives to protect a narrow set of national rights. In modern law, the Supreme Court used it in Saenz v. Roe to protect the right to travel and to become a citizen of another state on equal terms. However, most incorporation of the Bill of Rights and protection of substantive liberties has proceeded through the Due Process Clause, a path shaped by Slaughter-House's narrow reading.
The Supreme Court consolidated multiple related suits brought by independent butchers and associations challenging the same Louisiana statute. The Court issued a single opinion resolving the common constitutional questions, hence the collective title Slaughter-House Cases.
No. The Court affirmed that states may, under their police powers, create exclusive franchises or monopolies when reasonably related to public health, safety, or welfare. Such laws can still be challenged on other grounds, including state constitutional provisions, antitrust statutes, or modern equal protection doctrines if they involve suspect classifications, but they are not per se unconstitutional under the federal Constitution.
By restricting the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Slaughter-House largely removed it as a vehicle for enforcing civil liberties against the states. Courts subsequently turned to the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, first to protect certain economic liberties during the Lochner era and later to incorporate most of the Bill of Rights and safeguard non-economic fundamental rights. The modern incorporation doctrine is thus partly a product of Slaughter-House's narrow approach.
The Slaughter-House Cases mark a pivotal moment in constitutional interpretation. In upholding Louisiana's health-driven slaughterhouse monopoly, the Supreme Court drew a sharp line between national and state citizenship, construing the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause to protect only a limited set of national rights. That interpretive choice preserved broad state police powers but severely curtailed the clause as an engine of rights against state action.
The decision's doctrinal legacy is profound. It redirected the course of constitutional rights litigation toward the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, shaping both the incorporation of the Bill of Rights and the development of substantive due process. For students and practitioners, Slaughter-House is essential to understanding the architecture of the Fourteenth Amendment, the contours of federalism, and the historical evolution of civil rights protection in the United States.