Master The Supreme Court invalidated the Voting Rights Act’s Section 4(b) coverage formula, effectively disabling Section 5 preclearance. with this comprehensive case brief.
Shelby County v. Holder is a landmark decision reshaping federal oversight of state election laws. For nearly half a century, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) used a targeted preclearance regime to prevent jurisdictions with entrenched histories of racial discrimination from implementing changes to voting rules without federal approval. In 2013, the Supreme Court held that the statutory formula identifying which jurisdictions were subject to preclearance was unconstitutional because it was no longer tied to current conditions.
The case is significant as a practical and doctrinal pivot. Practically, it removed the immediate federal check that had blocked thousands of discriminatory voting changes, prompting a wave of state and local election-law alterations. Doctrinally, it sharpened limits on Congress’s Reconstruction Amendments enforcement power, revived the principle of equal sovereignty among the states in this context, and insisted that extraordinary federal remedies must be justified by contemporary evidence of need. Together, these elements make Shelby County a critical study in federalism, separation of powers, and civil rights enforcement.
570 U.S. 529 (2013) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Section 5 of the VRA required certain states and localities with documented histories of racial discrimination in voting to obtain federal preclearance from the Department of Justice or a three-judge court in the District of Columbia before implementing any change to voting procedures. Coverage under Section 5 was determined by Section 4(b), which originally swept in jurisdictions that, as of the 1960s and early 1970s, employed tests or devices and had low voter registration or turnout. Although Congress reauthorized the VRA multiple times, it did not materially update the coverage formula after 1975. In 2006, Congress reauthorized Sections 4(b) and 5 for 25 years, compiling an extensive legislative record documenting ongoing discrimination and hundreds of DOJ objections to proposed changes. Shelby County, Alabama, a covered jurisdiction not eligible for bailout due to recent federal objections in its state, sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a declaratory judgment that Sections 4(b) and 5 were unconstitutional facially and as applied, arguing that the coverage formula no longer reflected current conditions and that preclearance violated principles of federalism and state equality. The district court upheld the provisions, the D.C. Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Does Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which determines which jurisdictions are subject to Section 5 preclearance, exceed Congress’s enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment because it relies on outdated criteria and thus violates constitutional principles of federalism and equal sovereignty of the states?
Under the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may enforce the Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination in voting through appropriate legislation. Remedial and prophylactic measures that depart from the basic distribution of power between states and the federal government must be justified by current needs, be congruent and proportional to the constitutional violations they target, and respect the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the states. Extraordinary measures like preclearance require strong evidence tied to present conditions, and any disparate treatment among states must be sufficiently related to current problems to pass constitutional muster.
Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional because its coverage formula is based on decades-old data and conditions and therefore is not justified by current needs. Section 5 was not invalidated on its face, but it is inoperable unless and until Congress enacts a new, constitutionally valid coverage formula.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, emphasized that preclearance imposes an extraordinary intrusion on state sovereignty by requiring covered jurisdictions to obtain federal permission before altering any aspect of their election laws. While such a remedy was warranted in 1965 due to rampant, pervasive, and recalcitrant racial discrimination that traditional case-by-case litigation could not effectively address, Congress must ensure that the burdens imposed by federal legislation remain congruent with and proportional to current conditions. The Court drew on its federalism jurisprudence, including City of Boerne v. Flores, and on Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, to insist that current burdens must be justified by current needs. The Court acknowledged the Fifteenth Amendment gives Congress broad power to combat racial discrimination in voting but underscored that this power does not authorize subjecting some states to disfavored treatment indefinitely absent contemporary evidence warranting the distinction. Reviving the principle of equal sovereignty, the Court stated that any disparate treatment among states must be sufficiently related to the problem it targets. The Section 4(b) formula, keyed to voter turnout and the use of tests or devices in the 1960s and early 1970s, was no longer an accurate proxy for current discrimination. The majority highlighted improved minority registration and turnout in covered jurisdictions—often equal to or exceeding rates in uncovered states—and noted that Congress, in 2006, reauthorized the statute without updating the formula to reflect present-day data and patterns. Although Congress amassed a voluminous record of ongoing discrimination, the Court found that the record did not justify maintaining the outdated coverage scheme. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, which upheld the original VRA regime, did so based on the dire conditions at the time; that reasoning did not support perpetuating a decades-old map when those conditions had changed. Because Section 4(b) no longer provided a rational and current basis for differentiating among states, it exceeded Congress’s enforcement power and violated constitutional principles. Justice Thomas concurred, concluding Section 5 itself was unconstitutional. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, arguing that Congress’s enforcement power is entitled to substantial deference, that equal sovereignty does not constrain remedial civil rights legislation in this way, and that the record showed ongoing, adaptive discrimination that preclearance uniquely deterred—a point she captured by observing that one does not discard an umbrella in a rainstorm because one is not getting wet.
Shelby County effectively disabled the preclearance regime that had blocked and deterred discriminatory voting changes for decades, shifting enforcement to after-the-fact litigation under Section 2 and the limited bail-in mechanism of Section 3(c). The decision quickly precipitated numerous state and local changes to voting laws, including voter identification requirements, polling place closures, and redistricting choices that previously would have required preclearance. For law students, the case is central to understanding the scope of Congress’s enforcement powers under the Reconstruction Amendments, the Court’s revitalization of equal sovereignty as a constraint on federal civil rights legislation, and the requirement that prophylactic remedies be tailored to contemporary evidence. It also frames current debates and subsequent cases about voting rights, such as Brnovich v. DNC concerning Section 2 and Allen v. Milligan concerning vote dilution, and it underscores the role of legislative updating to sustain robust civil rights protections.
No. The Court invalidated Section 4(b), the coverage formula that determined which jurisdictions were subject to Section 5. Without a valid formula, Section 5 is effectively dormant, but the Court did not hold Section 5 itself unconstitutional. Justice Thomas would have gone further and invalidated Section 5 as well.
Equal sovereignty refers to the idea that all states enjoy equal dignity and status in the federal system. While historically invoked in the context of admitting new states, the Court used it here to require that any federal law imposing disparate burdens on certain states must be sufficiently related to current problems to justify that differential treatment. Because Section 4(b) used outdated data to single out states, the Court found the principle violated.
The Court acknowledged Congress’s broad authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment but insisted that enforcement legislation must be appropriate to current conditions. The majority applied a current-needs requirement, akin to congruence and proportionality analysis, and concluded that the old coverage formula was no longer a suitable or targeted means to prevent unconstitutional voting discrimination.
After the decision, jurisdictions formerly covered by preclearance no longer needed federal approval before changing voting rules. Many implemented measures such as voter ID laws, changes to registration procedures, polling place closures, and redistricting plans that previously would have required preclearance. Voting rights enforcement shifted to reactive litigation under Section 2, and a limited path remained for court-ordered preclearance under Section 3(c) bail-in, which requires proof of intentional discrimination.
Yes. The Court expressly invited Congress to devise a new coverage formula tied to current conditions. Legislative proposals, such as the John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, seek to update coverage criteria and modernize preclearance triggers. Until Congress enacts a valid formula, however, Section 5 remains inoperative.
Shelby County v. Holder stands at the intersection of federalism and civil rights enforcement. By invalidating the VRA’s coverage formula, the Court required Congress to continually recalibrate prophylactic remedies to contemporary evidence and rejected the indefinite use of historically based triggers to single out states for extraordinary oversight. The ruling both reaffirmed and reshaped limits on congressional power under the Reconstruction Amendments, embedding the language of current needs and equal sovereignty into voting rights discourse.
For students and practitioners, the case is essential to understanding the architecture of election law after 2013. It explains why preclearance largely ceased functioning, why litigation under Section 2 has become central and contested, and how doctrinal choices about federalism, separation of powers, and civil rights enforcement reverberate through the practical administration of American elections.