Master The Supreme Court held that redistricting predominantly based on race triggers strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, even when the plan is facially neutral. with this comprehensive case brief.
Shaw v. Reno is the foundational modern case on racial gerrymandering. In the wake of the 1990 census, North Carolina drew a serpentine congressional district intended to create a second majority-minority district. The Department of Justice had pressured the state under the Voting Rights Act to improve minority electoral opportunities. But the Supreme Court held that when race predominates in drawing district lines, the plan is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, even if the statute is facially neutral and even if the state acted with the goal of increasing minority representation.
Shaw launched a new line of equal protection doctrine that distinguishes racial gerrymandering claims from vote dilution claims under the Voting Rights Act. It established that bizarre district shapes may be evidence that race, not traditional districting principles, drove line-drawing decisions, thereby requiring the state to show that its use of race is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. The case thus sits at the intersection of equal protection, the Voting Rights Act, and the mechanics of redistricting, shaping how states may consider race without violating the Constitution.
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Supreme Court of the United States)
After the 1990 census, North Carolina gained a 12th congressional seat and, as a covered jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, had to obtain federal preclearance for any new districting plan. The state first proposed a plan with one majority-minority district. The Department of Justice objected, indicating the state could and should create a second majority-minority district. In response, North Carolina enacted a revised plan that included a second majority-minority district, the now-famous District 12, which stretched roughly 160 miles along Interstate 85, was extremely narrow in places, and carved through multiple counties, towns, and precincts in a way that followed pockets of Black voters. Five white voters sued federal and state officials, alleging the plan constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by sorting citizens based on race. The three-judge district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning the plaintiffs had not alleged intentional discrimination or vote dilution. The Supreme Court noted the plan had been precleared by the DOJ but that preclearance does not bar constitutional review.
Does a state redistricting plan that creates irregularly shaped districts in a manner suggesting race was the predominant factor state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause that must be reviewed under strict scrutiny, notwithstanding Voting Rights Act preclearance?
Racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. A redistricting plan, though facially neutral, is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause if race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a district. Bizarre district shape and departures from traditional districting principles are evidence that race predominated. Under strict scrutiny, the state must show that its use of race is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Voting Rights Act compliance may be a compelling interest, but the use of race must still be narrowly tailored and cannot amount to racial balancing or maximization.
Yes. The plaintiffs stated a cognizable Equal Protection claim. Districts that are so irregular that they can be understood only as efforts to separate voters by race are subject to strict scrutiny. The district court's dismissal was reversed and the case was remanded for determination whether the plan could satisfy strict scrutiny. Voting Rights Act preclearance does not insulate the plan from constitutional review.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, reasoned that the Equal Protection Clause applies not only to laws overtly classifying persons by race but also to governmental actions that classify citizens by race in practice. The creation of a district whose contours are unexplainable on grounds other than race strongly suggests that voters were separated primarily because of their race. Such sorting threatens to reinforce racial stereotypes and foster the perception that elected officials are representatives of a particular racial group rather than of their constituency as a whole, risks balkanization, and therefore triggers the most exacting judicial scrutiny. The Court emphasized that districting influenced by race is not per se unconstitutional, and that the state may consider race for legitimate purposes, such as compliance with the Voting Rights Act. However, when race predominates over traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions, the plan must be justified under strict scrutiny. Bizarre shape is not itself the constitutional violation; it is evidence of predominant racial motivation. The Court rejected the argument that preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act immunizes a plan from constitutional challenge. Federal preclearance addresses retrogression in minority voting strength but does not answer whether the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied. The Court also held that the plaintiffs, as voters of the challenged districts, had standing to assert a non-dilution equal protection injury: being assigned to a district on the basis of race subjects them to a stigmatic and representational harm cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment, even absent proof that their individual voting power was diluted. The dissents argued that the plaintiffs alleged no injury cognizable under equal protection and that bizarre shape, without proof of discriminatory intent or effect, should not trigger strict scrutiny. The majority responded that the core injury in a Shaw claim is race-based governmental classification itself, not reduced electoral strength, and that such classifications warrant strict scrutiny. Because the record did not establish whether any compelling interest or narrow tailoring justified the plan, the Court remanded.
Shaw created the modern racial gerrymandering doctrine. It established that a facially neutral redistricting plan will undergo strict scrutiny when race predominates, with bizarre shape serving as potent, though not dispositive, evidence. After Shaw, the Court in Miller v. Johnson, Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), and Bush v. Vera clarified that Voting Rights Act compliance may be a compelling interest but that the state must show narrow tailoring, including fidelity to traditional districting principles and a strong basis in evidence of potential VRA liability. Shaw also distinguished racial gerrymandering claims from vote dilution claims under the VRA, which use the Gingles framework, and from partisan gerrymandering, which the Court later held nonjusticiable in federal court. For law students, Shaw is essential to understanding equal protection limits on the use of race in redistricting and the delicate balance between ensuring minority opportunity and avoiding unconstitutional racial sorting.
No. The Court did not invalidate the districts in this initial decision. It held that the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable equal protection claim and that the plan is subject to strict scrutiny. The case was remanded for further proceedings. On remand and in subsequent litigation, the plan was ultimately struck down in Shaw v. Hunt (1996) for failing narrow tailoring.
Courts look to direct and circumstantial evidence. Bizarre or highly irregular district shapes, significant departures from traditional districting principles (compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions and communities of interest), a legislative record showing racial targets or racial headcounts, and expert analyses can all indicate that race predominated. The shape itself is not the violation but is powerful evidence of racial motive.
Shaw holds that Voting Rights Act preclearance does not insulate a plan from equal protection review. While compliance with the VRA can be a compelling interest, a state must still narrowly tailor its use of race. That requires more than racial maximization; the state must have a strong basis in evidence of a potential VRA violation and must adhere to traditional districting principles where feasible.
Any voter residing in a challenged district has standing to bring a Shaw-type claim. The injury is being classified by the government on the basis of race in district assignment, which carries representational and stigmatic harms. Plaintiffs need not show individual vote dilution to establish standing.
A Shaw claim alleges unconstitutional racial classification in districting and triggers strict scrutiny regardless of whether a group's voting strength was diluted. A Section 2 vote dilution claim asserts that an electoral structure results in minorities having less opportunity to elect preferred candidates and is evaluated under the Gingles framework and totality of the circumstances. The harms and proofs differ.
Shaw addresses racial gerrymandering and remains fully justiciable. By contrast, the Supreme Court held in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019) that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions nonjusticiable in federal court. Thus, while federal courts continue to adjudicate racial gerrymandering claims under strict scrutiny, partisan gerrymandering claims must be resolved, if at all, under state law or in political processes.
Shaw v. Reno reshaped redistricting law by identifying a distinct equal protection injury when voters are assigned to districts primarily because of race. It affirmed that race may be considered to comply with federal law but that the Constitution forbids race from predominating absent a compelling interest and narrow tailoring. The decision thus set the terms of engagement for states navigating the interplay between the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act in drawing districts.
For students of constitutional and election law, Shaw is indispensable. It underscores the Court's skepticism of race-based governmental classifications, emphasizes the evidentiary role of district shape and traditional criteria, and frames the modern inquiry later refined in Miller, Shaw II, and Bush v. Vera. It remains a key tool for assessing whether line-drawing respects both minority voting rights and constitutional limits.