Master Ohio probate court upholds a will provision conditioning a son's inheritance on marrying within the Jewish faith within seven years as a reasonable, enforceable partial restraint on marriage. with this comprehensive case brief.
Shapira v. Union National Bank is a staple of the Wills and Trusts curriculum because it squarely confronts a recurring tension in succession law: the common-law preference for testamentary freedom versus societal commitments to individual liberties, particularly the fundamental right to marry. The case involves a will provision that conditions a son’s inheritance on marrying a Jewish woman born of Jewish parents within seven years. The beneficiary argues that the clause is unconstitutional and contrary to public policy, while the estate insists it merely reflects the testator’s lawful freedom to dispose of his property with conditions.
The court’s analysis serves as a template for evaluating so-called partial restraints on marriage in donative instruments. Beyond its doctrinal importance, Shapira is pedagogically significant because it forces students to grapple with the elusive state-action doctrine, the contours of public policy in private donative transfers, the reasonableness test for restraints on marriage, and drafting lessons (such as the importance of a clear time limit and a gift-over) that can determine enforceability.
39 Ohio Misc. 28, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio C.P. 1974)
Dr. Samuel Shapira died leaving a will that provided gifts to his sons on the condition that each son marry a Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish within seven years of the testator’s death. The will named Union National Bank as executor and provided that if a son failed to satisfy the marriage condition within the seven-year period, his share would pass over to a remainder beneficiary (including, inter alia, the State of Israel). One son, Daniel Shapira, brought a declaratory judgment action in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division (Mahoning County), seeking to invalidate the condition as unconstitutional and contrary to public policy. He argued that the condition impermissibly burdened his fundamental right to marry and violated the Fourteenth Amendment, invoking cases recognizing marriage as a fundamental right. He further contended that the condition was an unreasonable restraint on marriage and too vague for enforcement. The executor defended the clause as a permissible partial restraint, noting the limited time frame, the definiteness of the condition, and the testator’s absolute right to dispose of his property (including the right to disinherit entirely).
Is a testamentary provision conditioning a beneficiary’s inheritance on marrying within a specified religion within a set time a valid, enforceable partial restraint on marriage, or is it unconstitutional and contrary to public policy?
At common law and under the law of Ohio, a testator’s freedom of disposition is paramount and testamentary conditions are generally enforceable unless they violate public policy or law. A total restraint on marriage is void as against public policy; however, a partial restraint—such as requiring marriage within a particular religion—will be upheld if reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonableness is assessed by factors including the duration allowed for compliance, the clarity of the condition, the size of the eligible pool of potential spouses, and whether the condition encourages divorce or inhibits an existing marriage. Constitutional claims generally fail absent state action; the mere enforcement of a private donative condition does not transform the private disposition into state action, and there is no constitutional right to inherit. Conditions must also be sufficiently definite to be administered by the court.
The court upheld the will provision as a valid, reasonable partial restraint on marriage and enforceable as a condition precedent to taking under the will. The clause did not violate the Constitution (no state action), was not contrary to public policy, and was sufficiently definite. The executor was authorized to administer the estate consistent with the condition and the gift-over.
1) Testamentary freedom and partial restraints: The court emphasized the strong policy favoring a testator’s right to dispose of property as he wishes, including the right to disinherit. If a testator may withhold a gift entirely, the lesser imposition of attaching conditions to a gift is not inherently objectionable. The condition here was a partial restraint—marriage within the Jewish faith within seven years—not a total prohibition on marriage, and did not require divorce or inhibit an existing marriage. The seven-year window and the defined religious criterion made compliance practicable. 2) Reasonableness: The court applied the traditional reasonableness test. It found the condition reasonable because: (a) it was limited in time (seven years); (b) it did not bar marriage, but channeled it; (c) the class of eligible spouses (Jewish women born of Jewish parents) was not so small as to make marriage unreasonably difficult; and (d) the testator’s motive—preserving the Jewish faith and lineage—was not unlawful or offensive to public policy. The presence of a gift-over (to, among others, the State of Israel) supported the conclusion that the condition reflected a genuine, permissible intent rather than a punitive scheme. 3) Constitutional claims and state action: Although marriage is a fundamental right, the court rejected the argument that enforcing a private testamentary condition amounted to unconstitutional state action. The state was not restraining marriage; it was honoring a private dispositive plan. The beneficiary remained free to marry anyone, but could not compel receipt of a conditional gift while disregarding the condition. Unlike cases such as Shelley v. Kraemer, there was no state-imposed barrier or penalty on the exercise of the right to marry; there was only the private testator’s choice not to confer a benefit absent the condition. 4) Definite and administrable terms: The court found the condition sufficiently clear and administrable. The requirement that the spouse be a Jewish woman whose parents were Jewish was an objective criterion capable of proof. The time period was fixed and easily measured. Collectively, these considerations led the court to uphold the clause as a valid, enforceable condition precedent that did not violate constitutional norms or public policy.
Shapira is a leading case on the enforceability of testamentary marriage conditions and the boundary between private donative freedom and constitutional constraints. It teaches that courts generally uphold reasonable partial restraints on marriage in wills and trusts, especially when they are time-limited, definite, and accompanied by gift-over provisions. The decision is also a key vehicle for exploring state action doctrine in private law contexts, illustrating why constitutional protections do not ordinarily invalidate private donative choices. For students and practitioners, Shapira underscores critical drafting lessons (clarity, reasonableness, and alternate takers) and situates the ongoing policy debate over religious and other identity-based conditions in inheritance.
Not in this context. The court held that enforcing a private will provision is not state action restraining marriage. The beneficiary remains free to marry anyone; the consequence is only the loss of a conditional gift. Because there is no constitutional right to inherit, and because the state is not imposing the restraint, the clause does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Courts look at whether the restraint is partial (not a total bar to marriage), whether there is a reasonable time to comply, the size and accessibility of the eligible pool of spouses, whether the condition encourages divorce or restrains an existing marriage, the definiteness of the terms, and whether the testator’s motive is lawful. Shapira found the seven-year limit, the definable religious requirement, and the sizable potential pool of eligible spouses sufficient to deem the restraint reasonable.
Possibly. Conditions that tend to induce divorce or restrain an existing marriage are often deemed void as against public policy. Shapira involved an unmarried beneficiary and a forward-looking condition precedent. If compliance would require divorce, many courts would refuse to enforce the condition.
Shapira held that the clause was not contrary to public policy because testamentary freedom permits identity-based conditions if they are reasonable and do not require unlawful acts. While modern sensibilities may view certain identity-based conditions skeptically, courts typically distinguish private donative choices from state-imposed discrimination. Some jurisdictions, however, may scrutinize conditions based on race or other protected traits more closely under their own public policy doctrines.
The clause included (1) a clear, objective condition (marry a Jewish woman with Jewish parents), (2) a reasonable compliance period (seven years), and (3) a gift-over designating alternate takers if the condition failed. These features demonstrated reasonableness, administrability, and a genuine donative scheme rather than a punitive restraint.
Shelley recognized that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants can constitute state action. Shapira distinguished that context, emphasizing that enforcing a private inheritance condition does not impose a legal barrier to marriage; it merely respects a private choice to condition a gift. Thus, the court found no unconstitutional state action in enforcing the will.
Shapira v. Union National Bank affirms that a testator’s freedom of disposition includes the ability to attach reasonable, partial restraints on marriage to a gift. The court treated the clause as a condition precedent that is time-limited, objective, and consonant with legitimate donative purposes, not as a state-imposed restriction on a fundamental right.
For law students, Shapira is a foundational case for analyzing restraints on marriage in wills and trusts, the state-action threshold for constitutional claims in private law, and the practical drafting elements that make conditional bequests enforceable. It remains an essential reference point in evaluating the public policy limits of testamentary conditions.