Master The Supreme Court held that a warrantless, medically supervised blood draw from a DUI arrestee can be a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment due to exigent circumstances and does not violate the Fifth Amendment because it is not testimonial. with this comprehensive case brief.
Schmerber v. California is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case at the intersection of constitutional criminal procedure and forensic evidence. Decided in 1966, the decision established the foundational Fourth Amendment framework for evaluating compelled blood draws in drunk-driving investigations, and it clarified that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination protects against compelled testimonial evidence, not the compelled production of physical evidence like blood. In doing so, the Court articulated a balancing approach to bodily intrusions: even when police have probable cause, the method, context, and necessity of the intrusion must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.
The case has had enduring influence. It inaugurated the “exigent circumstances” doctrine for evanescent biological evidence, recognizing that alcohol naturally dissipates from the bloodstream and may justify acting without a warrant under some conditions. Later decisions refined this framework—most notably Missouri v. McNeely (2013), Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016), and Mitchell v. Wisconsin (2019)—but Schmerber remains the starting point for analyzing when and how the government may lawfully obtain biological samples without a warrant.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
After a car accident, police suspected Armando Schmerber of driving while intoxicated based on the odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, and other observations. He was taken to a hospital for treatment of minor injuries. While there, and over Schmerber’s objection (made on advice of counsel), an officer directed a physician to draw a blood sample. No warrant was obtained. The blood test revealed a blood-alcohol concentration indicative of intoxication, and the prosecution used the result at trial to secure Schmerber’s conviction under California law. On appeal, Schmerber argued that admitting the blood test result violated (1) the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because he was compelled to provide evidence against himself; (2) the Fourth Amendment, because the warrantless blood draw constituted an unreasonable search; and (3) due process and the right to counsel, because the compelled extraction was an impermissible bodily intrusion performed despite his objection and advice of counsel.
Does the compelled, warrantless extraction and chemical analysis of a DUI arrestee’s blood violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures?
1) Fifth Amendment: The privilege against self-incrimination protects against compelled testimonial communications; it does not bar the compelled production of physical evidence, including blood samples. 2) Fourth Amendment: A compelled blood draw is a search. Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but may be justified by exigent circumstances. In DUI investigations, the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream can create exigency that, under the totality of the circumstances, makes it reasonable to forego a warrant. The method of extraction must be reasonable—performed in a medically appropriate manner by qualified personnel in a suitable environment—and supported by probable cause.
The Supreme Court affirmed Schmerber’s conviction. The compelled blood draw did not violate the Fifth Amendment because it produced physical, not testimonial, evidence. Under the Fourth Amendment, the warrantless blood draw was reasonable in light of the exigent circumstances posed by the evanescent nature of blood-alcohol evidence and because it was performed in a reasonable, medically approved manner supported by probable cause.
Fifth Amendment: The Court distinguished between testimonial evidence and physical evidence. The privilege against self-incrimination protects an accused from being compelled to testify or otherwise communicate information from the contents of his mind. It does not extend to the compelled collection of physical characteristics or evidence such as fingerprints, photographs, measurements, or blood. Because Schmerber’s blood sample was used to derive a chemical analysis of its alcohol content—physical evidence rather than testimony—the Fifth Amendment was not implicated. Fourth Amendment: The Court recognized that a blood draw is a search of the person and therefore subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, but the Court evaluated whether exigent circumstances justified bypassing a warrant in these specific conditions. Alcohol rapidly dissipates in the bloodstream, and the officer faced a practical necessity: obtaining a warrant would cause delay while the evidence was literally disappearing. Given probable cause from the officer’s observations (accident, odor of alcohol, symptoms of intoxication), the timing constraints, and the medical setting, the Court deemed the warrantless draw reasonable. Importantly, the Court rejected a broad reading of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine as an independent justification for such bodily intrusions; instead, it relied on the “special facts” creating exigency. Reasonableness of method and due process: The Court emphasized limits. Bodily intrusions require careful scrutiny. The draw here was minimal, common, and safe, executed by a physician in a hospital using accepted medical procedures. As such, it neither “shocked the conscience” under due process precedents nor violated any recognized right to counsel. By contrast, harsher or riskier procedures, or those performed in nonmedical settings, could tip the balance toward unreasonableness. The Court underscored that future cases must evaluate the totality of circumstances, including the need for evidence, availability and feasibility of a warrant, and medical risks and methods employed.
Schmerber established the foundational framework for evaluating compelled blood draws: they are Fourth Amendment searches requiring probable cause and either a warrant or a recognized exception, most notably exigent circumstances due to the evanescent nature of alcohol. It also clarified that compelled biological samples are not testimonial for Fifth Amendment purposes. The case set methodological constraints—medical environment, qualified personnel, and minimal risk—that remain central to reasonableness analysis. For law students, Schmerber is essential to understanding how courts balance bodily integrity against legitimate law enforcement needs. It is the doctrinal springboard for later cases: Missouri v. McNeely (2013) rejected a categorical exigency rule based solely on dissipation and required a case-by-case assessment; Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016) allowed warrantless breath tests incident to arrest but generally required warrants for blood tests absent exigency or consent; and Mitchell v. Wisconsin (2019) recognized that unconscious DUI suspects will typically fall within exigency. Together, these cases refine Schmerber’s core principle: biological evidence may justify swift action, but constitutional reasonableness turns on facts and method.
No. Schmerber permits a warrantless blood draw only when exigent circumstances make it reasonable to forego a warrant—typically where the natural dissipation of alcohol, combined with the specific facts (accident scene, medical treatment, logistical delays), would meaningfully risk the loss of evidence. Later, Missouri v. McNeely (2013) clarified there is no per se exigency from dissipation alone; courts must assess the totality of circumstances.
No. The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled testimonial communications, not the compelled production of physical evidence. A blood sample reveals a physical fact (blood-alcohol concentration) and does not compel the suspect to communicate the contents of his mind. Therefore, the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply.
Reasonableness requires: (1) probable cause to believe the suspect committed DUI; (2) either a warrant or a valid exception, commonly exigent circumstances; and (3) a method that is medically appropriate—performed by qualified personnel in a sanitary setting with minimal risk. Courts weigh these factors under the totality of circumstances.
Schmerber addressed blood draws. Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016) later held that breath tests may be performed without a warrant incident to a DUI arrest due to their minimal intrusiveness, while blood tests generally require a warrant unless exigency or consent applies. Missouri v. McNeely (2013) requires case-specific exigency for warrantless blood draws, and Mitchell v. Wisconsin (2019) recognizes that unconscious DUI suspects typically fall within exigency.
No. The Court in Schmerber found no violation where the blood draw did not involve testimonial compulsion or a critical stage requiring counsel’s presence. The intrusion was physical evidence collection, not a communicative act, and was performed reasonably by medical personnel.
Schmerber v. California marks a pivotal moment in constitutional criminal procedure, establishing that compelled blood draws are searches subject to the Fourth Amendment and that exigent circumstances can justify warrantless acquisition when alcohol is dissipating and delay poses a real risk to evidence. It simultaneously delineates the boundaries of the Fifth Amendment by classifying blood as physical, not testimonial, evidence.
Its enduring value lies in the nuanced balancing it demands: courts must consider probable cause, the feasibility of obtaining a warrant without sacrificing evidentiary value, and the medical reasonableness of the procedure. While subsequent cases have refined the exigency analysis and distinguished between breath and blood testing, Schmerber remains the blueprint for evaluating bodily intrusions in DUI investigations.