Master Landmark English case holding that mistake of age is no defense to a morals-protection offense, effectively imposing strict liability as to the victim’s age. with this comprehensive case brief.
Regina v. Prince is a foundational case in criminal law on the interplay between mens rea, mistake of fact, and statutory strict liability in morals-protection offenses. Decided by the English Court for Crown Cases Reserved in 1875, the decision holds that a defendant’s honest and reasonable mistake about a girl’s being over the statutory age is no defense to the crime of taking her out of her father’s possession against his will. The case thus stands at the crossroads of two classic doctrines: the presumption that criminal liability requires a guilty mind, and the legislative choice to protect minors by imposing strict liability regarding age.
For law students, Prince is indispensable because it supplies the conceptual architecture for understanding how and why some offenses—particularly those protecting children and public morals—attach liability without permitting mistake-of-age defenses. The judges’ varied opinions generated two influential rationales. One reads the statute as creating strict liability for the age element; the other is the so‑called moral wrong doctrine, which deems the defendant sufficiently blameworthy because he intentionally engaged in conduct that was wrongful even under the facts as he believed them. Both strands continue to shape debates about strict liability, statutory rape, and the scope of mistake-of-fact defenses in common law and modern codes.
Regina v. Prince, LR 2 CCR 154 (Ct. for Crown Cases Reserved 1875)
Prince was charged under section 55 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, which made it a misdemeanor to unlawfully take an unmarried girl under sixteen out of the possession and against the will of her father (or other lawful guardian). The evidence showed that the girl, with her own consent, left her father’s custody and went with the defendant. Crucially, the girl represented that she was over sixteen, and the jury found as a fact that Prince honestly and reasonably believed she was eighteen. The trial court reserved the question whether that belief—if reasonable—negated the requisite mens rea or otherwise provided a defense. The Court for Crown Cases Reserved addressed whether the conviction could stand notwithstanding the jury’s finding about the defendant’s belief as to age.
Whether an honest and reasonable mistake of fact regarding the girl’s being over the age of sixteen is a defense to the offense of unlawfully taking an unmarried girl under sixteen out of the possession and against the will of her father, under section 55 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
When a statute criminalizes the taking of a girl under a specified age from parental or custodial control, the age element is treated as a matter of strict liability: an honest and reasonable mistake as to age is not a defense. The general presumption that crimes require a guilty mind is satisfied where the defendant intentionally engages in conduct independently wrongful (e.g., taking a young woman from her father’s possession against his will), and the legislature may impose absolute responsibility for the protected-status fact (age) to effectuate child-protection purposes.
No. A mistaken but reasonable belief that the girl was over sixteen is no defense; the conviction was affirmed.
The court’s majority reached the same bottom line through overlapping but distinct rationales. First, several judges interpreted section 55 as allocating the risk of mistake about age to the actor. The statute’s protective purpose is to shield young girls and their custodians; allowing a mistake-of-age defense would substantially frustrate that aim. Because Parliament did not expressly require knowledge of age, the court inferred that the legislature intended strict liability for the age element. Second, some judges reasoned that mens rea existed even on the defendant’s version of the facts. On this account—the moral wrong doctrine—Prince intentionally did an act wrongful in itself: he took a young, unmarried woman out of her father’s possession against the father’s will. That moral blameworthiness sufficed to establish a guilty mind, even if he was mistaken about a circumstance (her being under sixteen) that elevated the moral wrong to the statutory crime. The defendant, having chosen to do a wrongful act, bore the risk that the surrounding circumstances would render it criminal. A prominent dissent (Brett, J.) argued that the presumption of mens rea should control: if the facts had been as the defendant reasonably believed them to be, his conduct would not have violated section 55, so he lacked the culpable mental state as to the essential element of the crime. The dissent rejected the moral wrong rationale as too amorphous and cautioned against reading strict liability into criminal statutes absent clear legislative direction. The majority, however, concluded that either the statute imposed strict liability as to age or that the defendant’s intent to do a wrongful act satisfied the mens rea requirement, leaving mistake of age immaterial.
Prince is a cornerstone of strict liability doctrine in morals and child-protection offenses. It entrenched two enduring ideas: (1) legislatures may make certain status or attendant circumstances (like a victim’s age) strict-liability elements to protect vulnerable classes; and (2) where a defendant intentionally does something independently wrongful, a mistake about an aggravating circumstance will not excuse—captured by the moral wrong (and later, related legal wrong) doctrines. The case is frequently invoked in discussions of statutory rape and other age-based offenses, contrasts sharply with later cases favoring a strong mens rea presumption (e.g., Sweet v. Parsley), and provides a platform for analyzing mistake-of-fact defenses under both common-law and Model Penal Code frameworks. For students, it is a paradigmatic vehicle for exam analysis on mens rea, strict liability, mistake of fact, and legislative purpose.
No. Prince deals specifically with a statute protecting minors where the circumstance of age is treated as strict liability. The general rule remains that an honest mistake of fact can negate mens rea if, had the facts been as the defendant believed, his conduct would not be criminal. Prince is an exception grounded in legislative purpose and the perceived independent wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.
The moral wrong doctrine holds that if the defendant intentionally engages in conduct that is morally wrongful even under the facts as he believed them, a mistake about an aggravating circumstance will not exculpate him from a related crime. In Prince, judges relying on this view reasoned that taking a young, unmarried woman from her father’s custody without consent was wrongful per se; therefore, the defendant’s mistake about age did not negate culpability.
Prince is frequently cited to justify strict liability as to the victim’s age in statutory rape and similar offenses. While jurisdictions vary—some allow limited mistake-of-age defenses—Prince provides the classic rationale: protecting minors warrants allocating the risk of mistake to the actor. It also supplies the analytical template for distinguishing between elements that require mens rea and protective-status facts that do not.
Sweet v. Parsley (1969) reaffirmed a strong presumption that criminal statutes require mens rea absent clear contrary intent, narrowing the reach of strict liability. R v. Tolson (1889) recognized a reasonable mistake-of-fact defense to bigamy where the defendant reasonably believed her spouse was dead. Prince stands as a counterpoint: despite the presumption of mens rea, courts may read strict liability into protective offenses or find culpability via moral wrong reasoning.
Disaggregate the offense: identify conduct, circumstance, and result elements; then assign mens rea to each. In Prince, the conduct (taking from custody against the father’s will) carried culpability, while the circumstance (under sixteen) was deemed strict liability to advance legislative purpose. This element-by-element approach clarifies whether mistake-of-fact can negate liability.
Both. The text lacked an explicit mens rea for age, allowing an inference of strict liability, and the policy of protecting minors strongly supported allocating the risk of mistake to the defendant. The judges’ moral wrong analysis underscores that normative policy judgments about child protection significantly influenced the outcome.
Regina v. Prince crystallizes a critical boundary in criminal law: even amid the presumption favoring mens rea, legislatures may dispense with fault for certain protective-status elements, especially in offenses designed to safeguard minors and public morals. The case’s dual rationales—strict liability for age and the moral wrong doctrine—equip courts to impose liability where a defendant engages in independently wrongful conduct, despite a mistake about aggravating circumstances.
For students and practitioners, Prince endures as a touchstone for analyzing mistake-of-fact defenses, parsing elements by type, and evaluating how legislative purpose can justify strict liability. It also remains a counterweight in debates over expansive mens rea presumptions, reminding us that in some domains the law chooses protection and deterrence over individualized fault regarding particular facts.