Master U.S. Supreme Court recognized sex stereotyping as evidence of sex discrimination and established the mixed-motive burden-shifting framework under Title VII. with this comprehensive case brief.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins is a landmark Title VII decision that reshaped disparate treatment analysis when an employment decision is motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate reasons. The Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff shows that a protected trait, such as sex, played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to prove it would have made the same decision absent the discriminatory motive. Critically, the Court also recognized that sex stereotyping constitutes discrimination because of sex.
The case marks a turning point in Title VII jurisprudence by clarifying how courts should handle mixed-motive evidence and by formally acknowledging that decisions based on gender norms and stereotypes violate federal law. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 later modified the consequences of an employer’s same-decision showing, Price Waterhouse remains foundational for understanding motivating factor causation, the role of stereotyping, and the allocation of proof in employment discrimination cases.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
Ann Hopkins, an exceptionally successful senior manager at the accounting firm Price Waterhouse, was considered for partnership in 1982. She was the only woman among 88 candidates. Her record included leading a major government contract win worth millions and receiving strong praise for her technical and business development skills. Nonetheless, partner evaluations included comments that she was too aggressive and abrasive and reflected gendered expectations that she should be more feminine, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and be less macho. The firm did not grant her partnership that year and deferred a decision; Hopkins was told to improve her interpersonal skills. After the deferral, she was not meaningfully re-nominated and left the firm. Hopkins sued under Title VII, alleging that sex stereotyping infected the partnership decision. The district court found that the decision makers were influenced by sex-based stereotypes and that Price Waterhouse failed to prove it would have made the same decision absent sex-based considerations. The D.C. Circuit affirmed liability, approving a burden-shifting approach but stating that the employer’s same-decision defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In a Title VII disparate treatment case where both legitimate and illegitimate factors influenced an employment decision, what is the proper framework and burden of proof, and does reliance on sex stereotyping constitute discrimination because of sex?
Under Title VII, when a plaintiff shows that an illegitimate criterion (such as sex) played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the illegitimate factor into account. Sex stereotyping is a form of discrimination because of sex. Note: After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, if the plaintiff establishes that a protected trait was a motivating factor, the employer’s same-decision showing no longer eliminates liability but limits remedies (generally to declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees).
Yes. The Court held that sex stereotyping is evidence of discrimination because of sex. In mixed-motive cases, once the plaintiff shows that sex played a motivating part in the decision, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision absent the discriminatory motive. The Court rejected the clear and convincing standard and remanded for application of the proper preponderance standard.
Text and purpose of Title VII: The plurality reasoned that Title VII’s because of language does not require a plaintiff to prove that a discriminatory motive was the sole or but-for cause when multiple motives are present. Requiring strict but-for causation would undermine the statute’s purpose by allowing employers to hide discriminatory motives behind some legitimate reason. The Court adopted a motivating part standard for the plaintiff’s initial showing in mixed-motive cases. Burden allocation and standard: Once a plaintiff proves that an illegitimate factor actually played a motivating part, the risk of uncertainty should fall on the employer who created the mixed-motive situation. Therefore, the burden shifts to the employer to show it would have made the same decision even without the discriminatory motive. The plurality and a majority of the Court agreed that the employer’s burden is by a preponderance of the evidence, rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s higher clear and convincing standard. Sex stereotyping: Drawing from the record, the Court identified numerous comments that Hopkins should act and appear more feminine and that her assertiveness was unwelcome in a woman. The Court concluded that employment decisions based on sex-role stereotypes are prohibited because they involve evaluating an employee based on gender-based norms rather than individual merit. Such stereotyping is discrimination because of sex under Title VII. Concurring views and evidentiary nuance: Justice O’Connor concurred in the judgment, emphasizing that the burden shift should occur only when the plaintiff produces direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision. Although the plurality did not require direct evidence, lower courts often treated O’Connor’s concurrence as controlling. Congress later amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to codify the motivating factor framework and modify the consequences of the same-decision defense, and the Supreme Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa (2003) clarified that direct evidence is not required under the 1991 statute to obtain a mixed-motive instruction. Remedy under pre-1991 law: At the time of Price Waterhouse, if the employer met its same-decision burden, it avoided liability. The 1991 amendments later changed this remedial landscape while preserving the core motivating factor concept that Price Waterhouse established.
Price Waterhouse is pivotal for three reasons: it recognized sex stereotyping as actionable discrimination under Title VII; it created the mixed-motive framework with a burden shift to the employer upon a plaintiff’s motivating factor showing; and it set the preponderance standard for the employer’s same-decision defense. For law students, the case is essential to understanding how courts analyze causation and proof in disparate treatment cases, how evidentiary burdens move between parties, and how statutory amendments (the Civil Rights Act of 1991) and later cases (such as Desert Palace) modified but did not erase Price Waterhouse’s core teachings. It remains a foundational starting point for modern Title VII mixed-motive doctrine and for recognizing that gender-based role expectations are unlawful.
A mixed-motive case involves an employment decision influenced by both legitimate reasons (such as performance concerns) and illegitimate reasons (such as sex). In such cases, once the plaintiff shows that a protected trait was a motivating factor, the burden shifts to the employer to prove it would have made the same decision absent the discriminatory motive.
The plurality did not require direct evidence. However, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence suggested that direct evidence should be required to shift the burden. Many courts treated her concurrence as controlling until the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa (2003), which clarified that direct evidence is not necessary under the statutory motivating factor provision.
The 1991 Act codified motivating factor liability (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) and altered the same-decision defense (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). After 1991, if a plaintiff proves a protected trait was a motivating factor, liability attaches. The employer’s same-decision showing limits remedies (typically to declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees) rather than providing a complete defense.
Price Waterhouse recognized that evaluating employees based on gendered norms or expectations—such as criticizing a woman for being insufficiently feminine—is discrimination because of sex. This insight is crucial for proving discrimination when overtly sexist policies are absent but biased evaluative criteria persist.
The Court held that the employer must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered the impermissible factor. The Court rejected the higher clear and convincing standard imposed by the court of appeals.
Price Waterhouse’s stereotyping principle has informed cases recognizing that adverse actions based on gender norms can be sex discrimination. After Bostock v. Clayton County (2020), discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is necessarily because of sex, and stereotyping evidence can further support such claims under the motivating factor framework.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins reframed the legal landscape for disparate treatment claims by validating the mixed-motive model and recognizing sex stereotyping as unlawful. It addressed the reality that employment decisions often arise from a blend of legitimate and illegitimate reasons and allocated burdens to prevent employers from benefitting from discriminatory motives.
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 altered the consequences of the same-decision defense, Price Waterhouse’s core teachings remain central: motivating factor causation, the employer’s burden to prove same decision, and the impermissibility of gender-based stereotypes. For students and practitioners alike, the case continues to anchor Title VII analysis and informs jury instructions, evidentiary strategy, and doctrinal development.