Master California trial court recognized a pre-possessory interest in an unowned baseball and ordered an equitable division of proceeds between rival claimants. with this comprehensive case brief.
Popov v. Hayashi is a modern staple of Property law that revisits classic first-possession disputes—think Pierson v. Post—through the lens of a real-world scramble for valuable personal property: Barry Bonds’s 73rd home-run baseball. The case forced the court to answer when a would-be possessor has done enough to claim ownership over abandoned property that becomes the subject of a chaotic public contest. In doing so, the court crafted and applied two related concepts: a baseball-specific possession standard (often called Gray’s Rule) and a novel, equitable "pre-possessory interest" for a claimant whose attempt at possession was thwarted by the unlawful acts of others.
Beyond its headline-grabbing facts, the decision matters because it harmonizes rigid possession doctrine with equitable considerations. It recognizes that property law must deter wrongful interference without granting windfalls. The court concluded that neither claimant had superior title and ordered the ball sold with proceeds split equally. This outcome gives students a nuanced example of how courts mediate between bright-line rules of possession and equitable remedies when multiple innocent parties contend for valuable, abandoned property in a setting rife with crowd misconduct.
Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002)
On October 7, 2001, Barry Bonds hit his record-setting 73rd home-run ball into the right-field bleachers at Pacific Bell Park. Plaintiff Alex Popov positioned himself to catch the ball and made contact with it in the pocket of his glove. As he tried to secure it, a violent, unlawful mob surge—punching, grabbing, and tackling—engulfed him. During that melee the ball was dislodged from Popov’s glove and fell to the ground. Defendant Patrick Hayashi, who had also been knocked down and who did not participate in the assault, saw the loose ball and secured it. Hayashi left the scrum with the ball and asserted ownership. Popov sued Hayashi for conversion, claiming he had obtained possession (or, at least, a legally cognizable claim) before being dispossessed by the crowd. The case presented extensive video evidence and expert testimony, including a proposed standard (Gray’s Rule) for when a spectator possesses a baseball hit into the stands. The trial court found Hayashi acted in good faith and did not physically assault Popov but also found that Popov’s attempted catch was interrupted by unlawful acts of third parties.
Did Popov acquire a property interest sufficient to support a conversion claim when he made a significant but incomplete attempt to catch the baseball that was interrupted by unlawful crowd interference, and if so, how should the court resolve competing claims between Popov and the later, good-faith possessor, Hayashi?
Possession of abandoned personal property (such as a baseball hit into the stands) requires control with intent to possess. Under Gray’s Rule, a ball is possessed only when the would-be catcher has complete control of it and both the ball’s and the catcher’s momentum have ceased; if the ball is dislodged before that moment, possession is not achieved. However, when an actor undertakes significant but incomplete steps to achieve possession of abandoned property and is prevented from fully possessing it by the unlawful acts of others, the actor acquires a legally cognizable pre-possessory interest—a qualified right to possession that can support a conversion claim. Conversion in California requires the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession at the time of conversion and the defendant’s wrongful act or disposition of the property inconsistent with that right; good faith is generally not a defense, but equitable principles may shape the remedy when multiple innocent parties have colorable claims.
Popov did not achieve full possession under Gray’s Rule, but his effort was interrupted by unlawful acts, creating a pre-possessory interest sufficient to support a conversion claim. Hayashi later obtained actual possession without wrongdoing. Because neither party had a superior claim to the entire ball, the court ordered the ball sold and the proceeds divided equally between Popov and Hayashi.
The court first adopted Gray’s Rule to evaluate possession in the stadium context: a spectator possesses a batted ball only when he has complete control and both his and the ball’s momentum have ceased. Reviewing video and testimony, the court found that Popov did not reach this point of stabilized control; the ball was in his glove only momentarily before the mob surge dislodged it, so he lacked full possession. Still, the court refused to treat the melee as legally irrelevant. It found the crowd’s conduct unlawful (assaults and batteries) and concluded that permitting that wrongdoing to determine title would undermine public policy. To reconcile these concerns, the court recognized a pre-possessory interest: when significant but incomplete steps toward possession are thwarted by unlawful interference, the actor has a qualified, legally protectable interest. That interest supported Popov’s standing to sue for conversion. The court then assessed Hayashi’s claim. It credited evidence that Hayashi neither assaulted Popov nor otherwise acted wrongfully; he found and secured the loose ball in good faith. Under traditional first possession principles, Hayashi achieved actual possession of abandoned property after the ball became free again. The court thus faced competing, legitimate claims: Popov’s equitable, qualified interest created by wrongful interference versus Hayashi’s subsequent, good-faith possession. Awarding the entire ball to Popov would deprive an innocent possessor; awarding it entirely to Hayashi would effectively ratify the crowd’s unlawful disruption. Drawing on equitable precedents involving divided or indeterminate ownership in found property, the court fashioned a remedy of equitable division: the ball would be sold and the proceeds split equally. This solution vindicated Popov’s pre-possessory interest without penalizing Hayashi’s good-faith possession and avoided incentivizing future mob behavior.
Popov v. Hayashi is central to Property courses for three reasons. First, it modernizes the first possession framework with a context-specific standard (Gray’s Rule) for when possession occurs in chaotic environments. Second, it introduces the pre-possessory interest—an equitable concept that protects would-be possessors from the consequences of unlawful interference even when full possession is not achieved. Third, it demonstrates how courts may blend property doctrine and equitable remedies (like equitable division) when multiple innocent claimants have colorable claims and a clean allocation would either reward wrongdoing or unduly punish a good-faith possessor. The case thus bridges classical cases on capture and finders with real-world, policy-sensitive adjudication.
It is a qualified, legally cognizable interest that arises when a person takes significant but incomplete steps to acquire possession of abandoned property and is thwarted by the unlawful acts of others. It does not amount to full title or exclusive possession but supports a claim (such as conversion) and may warrant equitable relief when competing with an innocent possessor.
Under Gray’s Rule, mere contact or momentary control during ongoing momentum is not possession. Because the ball was dislodged before Popov stabilized it, he never attained full possession. The court recognized his pre-possessory interest due to unlawful interference but declined to award him the entire ball since Hayashi later obtained possession without wrongdoing.
Likely yes. Without unlawful interference, Popov would have either secured possession (entitling him to the ball) or failed to do so (leaving the ball free for the first person to possess it). The pre-possessory interest exists specifically to address unlawful disruption; absent that, the case would be resolved under standard first possession rules.
Conversion is a strict liability tort in which good faith is generally not a defense. The court recognized that Popov’s pre-possessory interest could support a conversion claim. However, given Hayashi’s innocence and subsequent actual possession, the court used equitable principles to craft an appropriate remedy—equitable division of proceeds—rather than awarding the entire value to one side.
It updates capture doctrine (e.g., Pierson v. Post) by applying a context-specific test for possession and adds an equitable overlay (pre-possessory interest) to account for unlawful interference. It also resonates with finders cases where courts sometimes divide value among multiple claimants when neither has an unquestionably superior right.
Popov v. Hayashi shows how courts can adapt possession doctrine to messy, real-world facts without abandoning core principles. The court preserved the bright line that possession requires control and cessation of momentum (Gray’s Rule), yet acknowledged that law should not reward mob behavior by stripping a diligent actor of protection when unlawful interference prevents completion of possession.
For students, the case is a blueprint for synthesizing doctrine and equity: identify the baseline rule (possession), recognize factual disruptions (unlawful interference), and select a remedy that aligns incentives and fairness (equitable division). It is a vivid reminder that property law is not just about first-in-time rules, but also about designing remedies that discourage wrongdoing and respect good-faith actors.