Master Vermont Supreme Court recognizes a private necessity privilege to trespass and imposes a duty on landowners not to expel those seeking refuge from imminent peril. with this comprehensive case brief.
Ploof v. Putnam is a foundational torts case that crystallizes the common-law doctrine of private necessity. Faced with a sudden storm, a sailor moored his sloop to a private dock to protect his family and vessel. The dock owner’s servant unmoored the boat, resulting in injuries and damage. The Vermont Supreme Court held that the sailor’s entry was privileged by necessity and that the landowner (through his servant) acted wrongfully by expelling him. The decision articulates both the scope of the necessity privilege and the correlative duty of landowners to refrain from actively ejecting those acting under necessity.
For law students, the case is indispensable because it frames how private necessity operates as an incomplete privilege: it justifies what would otherwise be a trespass and blocks liability for the mere entry, yet it does not authorize an owner to forcibly remove the entrant. Paired with later cases like Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., Ploof helps distinguish when necessity merely excuses entry and when compensation is owed for property damage caused while invoking that privilege.
Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908)
Ploof, with his wife and two minor children aboard his sloop, was sailing on Lake Champlain when a sudden, violent storm arose, creating imminent danger to life and property. To avoid the peril, Ploof moored his vessel to Putnam’s private dock. While the storm continued, Putnam’s servant (acting within the scope of his employment and authority over the dock) intentionally unfastened the sloop’s moorings, thereby casting the vessel back into the storm. The sloop was driven ashore and wrecked; Ploof and his family suffered personal injuries and damages to the vessel and its contents. Ploof sued Putnam, asserting that the servant’s act was wrongful given the necessity that compelled Ploof to use the dock.
Does the doctrine of private necessity privilege a person to enter and remain on another’s property to avoid imminent serious harm, thereby making it wrongful for the landowner (or the landowner’s servant) to eject the person, and rendering the landowner liable for resulting injuries caused by such ejection?
Private necessity creates a privilege to enter and temporarily remain on another’s property when reasonably necessary to avoid serious harm to human life or significant property interests. This necessity excuses what would otherwise be a trespass and imposes a correlative duty on the landowner not to expel or interfere with the entrant while the necessity persists. An owner (and the owner’s agent or servant) who unreasonably ejects a person acting under necessity is liable for resulting harms. Under respondeat superior, a master is liable for torts committed by a servant acting within the scope of employment.
Yes. The storm created a necessity that privileged Ploof to moor at the private dock. The servant’s unmooring of the sloop during the emergency was wrongful, and Putnam is liable for the injuries and damages proximately caused by his servant’s act.
The court recognized long-standing common-law principles that necessity may justify conduct that would otherwise constitute a trespass, especially when human life is at stake. The emergence of a sudden and violent storm presented an imminent peril to Ploof and his family, and mooring at the nearest available dock was a reasonable and proportionate response. Because the entry was privileged by necessity, Putnam had a correlative duty not to interfere with Ploof’s use of the dock while the emergency persisted. By ordering or allowing his servant to unfasten the sloop—an affirmative act that exposed Ploof and his family to the very danger they sought to avoid—Putnam breached that duty. The court emphasized that necessity does not license the owner to take steps that aggravate the peril; rather, it obliges the owner to tolerate the temporary intrusion. Furthermore, the servant acted within the scope of his employment in managing the dock, so Putnam is vicariously liable for the servant’s wrongful conduct. The injuries and property damage were the natural and proximate result of the wrongful unmooring, supporting liability.
Ploof v. Putnam is a cornerstone of the private necessity doctrine. It clarifies that necessity privileges emergency entries onto private property and imposes on landowners a duty to refrain from active ejection while the danger persists. The case is frequently paired with Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. to illustrate that private necessity is an incomplete privilege: it excuses the trespass, but if the entrant causes damage to the property while protecting his own interests, compensation may still be required. Ploof thus frames essential questions about competing property and personal safety interests, proportionality, and the scope of landowner obligations during emergencies.
Private necessity arises when an individual invades another’s property to protect private interests (e.g., saving oneself or one’s property from imminent harm). It privileges the entry and bars liability for the trespass itself but may still require compensation if damage to the property occurs. Public necessity involves actions taken to avert a public disaster (e.g., destroying property to stop a fire’s spread) and typically provides a broader privilege that can preclude compensation for property damage. Ploof concerns private necessity.
No compensation was at issue in Ploof because the plaintiff’s use did not damage the dock; the harm flowed from the defendant’s wrongful unmooring. Ploof establishes the privilege to enter and remain. Whether a trespasser must pay for damage inflicted while exercising the privilege is more fully addressed in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., where the court required compensation for dock damage caused during a storm.
The servant managed or controlled access to the dock and acted within the scope of his employment when he unmoored the sloop. Under respondeat superior, a master is vicariously liable for torts committed by a servant in the scope of employment. Because the servant wrongfully interfered with a privileged entrant, Putnam bore liability for the resulting harms.
There must be a reasonable belief in imminent and serious harm to human life or significant property interests, and the response must be proportionate. In Ploof, a sudden, violent storm presented an immediate peril, and mooring at the nearest dock was a reasonable means of avoiding that harm.
Ploof does not impose an affirmative duty to provide aid; rather, it imposes a negative duty not to interfere with the entrant’s reasonable, necessity-driven use. The landowner must refrain from ejecting or obstructing the entrant while the necessity continues. Some jurisdictions recognize additional duties under particular circumstances, but Ploof’s core holding is a duty not to expel.
Ploof v. Putnam confirms that private necessity can privilege entry onto another’s land when necessary to avert imminent harm, and it translates that privilege into a correlative obligation on landowners not to eject those seeking shelter. The court grounded its analysis in longstanding common-law principles favoring the protection of life and safety over the technicalities of property rights.
For students and practitioners, the case is a crucial building block in understanding how tort law balances competing interests under emergency conditions. Along with cases like Vincent, Ploof helps delineate when necessity justifies entry, when compensation is owed for ensuing damage, and how vicarious liability can attach to landowners whose agents wrongfully interfere with privileged entrants.