Master New York’s high court defined the justification standard as an objective reasonableness test informed by the defendant’s circumstances and reinstated the indictment arising from the subway shooting. with this comprehensive case brief.
People v. Goetz is a foundational case in criminal law on the contours of self-defense, particularly the meaning of “reasonably believes” under New York Penal Law § 35.15. The New York Court of Appeals used the case to clarify whether a defendant’s belief in the necessity of deadly force is assessed objectively, subjectively, or by some hybrid of the two. Against the backdrop of a highly publicized subway shooting, the court rejected a purely subjective approach and announced an objective reasonableness standard that nonetheless accounts for the defendant’s circumstances and perceptions.
The decision is significant for defining the relationship between a defendant’s actual belief and what the law deems reasonable, for guiding jury instructions on justification, and for shaping debates over race, fear, and vigilantism in the law of self-defense. It continues to be taught as a leading authority on how statutory language like “reasonably believes” mediates between subjective experience and objective legal standards.
People v. Goetz, 68 N.Y.2d 96, 497 N.E.2d 41, 505 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y. 1986)
On December 22, 1984, Bernhard Goetz was riding a New York City subway when four teenage youths approached and asked him for five dollars. Goetz, who had previously been the victim of a mugging and who carried an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver, stated that he perceived the youths as intending to rob him. In rapid succession, he fired multiple shots, wounding all four. He then approached one youth, Darrell Cabey, and fired an additional shot that severed Cabey’s spinal cord, leaving him paralyzed. Goetz fled New York and later surrendered in New Hampshire, where he gave statements to police describing his perceptions and intentions during the encounter. A New York County Grand Jury indicted Goetz for attempted murder, assault, reckless endangerment, and criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court dismissed the violent felony counts on the ground that the grand jury had been improperly instructed on the justification defense—using an objective reasonableness standard rather than what the court viewed as a purely subjective test. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the lower courts’ interpretation of the self-defense statute and the propriety of the grand jury charge.
Under New York Penal Law § 35.15, is the justification standard for the use of deadly physical force assessed under a purely subjective belief of the defendant, or does it require an objective reasonableness component measured by what a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have believed?
New York Penal Law § 35.15 permits the use of physical force when and to the extent a person reasonably believes it to be necessary to defend against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force. The use of deadly physical force is justified only if the actor reasonably believes such force is necessary to defend against the use or imminent use of deadly physical force, or to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of certain forcible crimes (including robbery), and, with limited exceptions, the actor cannot use deadly force if he knows he can retreat with complete safety. The term “reasonably believes” imposes an objective component: the defendant’s belief must be one that a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation could have held, taking into account the circumstances as the defendant perceived them.
The Court of Appeals held that the justification defense under § 35.15 requires an objective standard of reasonableness—what a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation would have believed—rather than a purely subjective belief standard. Because the grand jury was properly instructed with an objective reasonableness formulation, the lower courts erred in dismissing the indictment; the dismissed counts were reinstated.
The court anchored its interpretation in the statutory text, emphasizing the Legislature’s use of “reasonably believes,” which signals an objective component, as opposed to an entirely subjective inquiry into the defendant’s personal belief. Examining the 1960s revision of New York’s Penal Law and the accompanying commentaries, the court noted that New York deliberately adopted an objective threshold distinct from the Model Penal Code’s more subjective framing (“believes”) and its separate treatment of reckless or negligent mistakes. In other words, New York required not just an honest belief in the necessity of deadly force, but a belief that is reasonable under the circumstances. At the same time, the court rejected a rigid, blind objective test divorced from the defendant’s actual situation. The proper inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation—accounting for relevant factors such as the defendant’s knowledge, prior experiences (including past victimization), and the immediacy of the perceived threat—could have believed deadly force was necessary. The court cautioned that idiosyncratic fears, irrational beliefs, or biases cannot by themselves meet the standard. Applying this framework to the grand jury proceedings, the court concluded the prosecutor’s instructions correctly conveyed an objective reasonableness test informed by the defendant’s circumstances. Because justification was an issue fairly raised by the evidence presented, it was proper to instruct the grand jury; and since the instruction was correct, the trial court’s dismissal of the attempted murder, assault, and reckless endangerment counts was improper. The evidence before the grand jury was legally sufficient to support the indictment.
Goetz is the leading New York case on the self-defense standard. It articulates the now-canonical hybrid: an objective reasonableness test applied in light of the defendant’s situation. The case is indispensable for understanding how courts parse “reasonably believes,” how juries should be instructed on justification, and how evidence of a defendant’s perceptions and prior experiences is relevant without converting the defense into a purely subjective standard. Beyond doctrine, the case is a touchstone in discussions about the social meaning of “reasonableness,” especially where race, fear, and crime intersect. It contrasts with stand-your-ground statutes and the Model Penal Code, highlighting that New York retains an objective constraint and a duty to retreat (where safely possible) even when a defendant honestly fears harm. For law students, Goetz frames core exam issues: identifying the right standard, applying it to granular facts, and evaluating the interaction between statutory text, legislative history, and policy.
It is an objective reasonableness standard informed by the defendant’s circumstances. The defendant must actually believe deadly force is necessary, and that belief must be one a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation could have held. The court rejected a purely subjective test.
Past experiences are relevant insofar as they form part of the defendant’s situation and inform what a reasonable person in that situation might believe. They may be considered by the factfinder when assessing reasonableness, but they do not authorize idiosyncratic or irrational beliefs to satisfy the standard.
No. The MPC emphasizes the actor’s subjective belief and then addresses unreasonable mistakes via grading (e.g., negligence or recklessness). New York’s statute uses “reasonably believes,” which the court interpreted as requiring an objective reasonableness component. New York does not recognize a general “imperfect self-defense” that reduces liability based solely on an honest but unreasonable belief.
The duty to retreat remains part of New York’s justification scheme: a person may not use deadly physical force if they know they can safely retreat, except in one’s dwelling and in other specified circumstances. Goetz did not eliminate this requirement; it clarified the lens through which beliefs about necessity are judged.
Potentially. Stand-your-ground statutes generally remove the duty to retreat in public places if the actor is lawfully present. Many still require an objectively reasonable belief in the necessity of force, but the retreat element is treated differently. Goetz’s core contribution—the objective reasonableness requirement—would often persist, but the retreat analysis would change.
Separate from this appellate ruling on the indictment and legal standard, Goetz was later tried and acquitted of the most serious charges (attempted murder and assault) but was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon and served a jail sentence. In a subsequent civil suit, a jury found him liable and awarded substantial damages to one of the victims.
People v. Goetz provides a clear, durable statement of New York’s self-defense standard: a defendant’s belief in the necessity of deadly force must be both honestly held and objectively reasonable when viewed from the defendant’s situation. By rejecting a purely subjective test, the court constrained justification to ensure that private perceptions of danger are disciplined by community norms of reasonableness.
For students and practitioners, Goetz is a blueprint for issue-spotting and argument: anchor analysis in statutory text, integrate legislative history, and evaluate how specific facts—prior experiences, knowledge, immediacy, and alternatives like retreat—bear on the ultimate question of reasonableness. Its enduring relevance lies in how it calibrates individual self-protection with societal limits on the use of deadly force.