Master Landmark case establishing territorial, power-based limits on state personal jurisdiction. with this comprehensive case brief.
Pennoyer v. Neff is the cornerstone of traditional personal jurisdiction in American civil procedure. Decided in 1878, the case constitutionalized a territorial, power-based conception of jurisdiction: a state court may not impose personal obligations on a nonresident unless the defendant is served within the forum, voluntarily appears, or otherwise consents, and may proceed against property only if that property is seized at the outset of the suit. The decision ties jurisdiction to both due process and state sovereignty, framing jurisdiction as an exercise of a state's coercive power within its borders.
For generations, Pennoyer provided the baseline from which modern jurisdiction doctrine evolved. Although International Shoe Co. v. Washington later introduced the more flexible "minimum contacts" test, Pennoyer remains essential to understanding the traditional bases of jurisdiction (presence/"tag" service, consent, domicile, and attached property), the difference between in personam and in rem/quasi in rem actions, and why service by publication alone cannot support a personal judgment against an absent nonresident.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Neff retained an Oregon attorney, Mitchell, to perform legal services. After a fee dispute, Mitchell sued Neff in Oregon state court (Mitchell v. Neff) to recover attorney's fees. At the time of suit, Neff was not present in Oregon and did not appear. Pursuant to an Oregon statute permitting constructive notice to nonresidents, Mitchell served Neff by publication in a local newspaper. Neff did not respond, and the court entered a default judgment for Mitchell. No property belonging to Neff was attached or seized at the commencement of the action. After the default judgment, Neff acquired title to a parcel of land in Oregon by federal patent. Mitchell then executed on the judgment: the sheriff levied on Neff's Oregon land and sold it at a judicial sale. Sylvester Pennoyer purchased the property at the sheriff's sale and received a deed. Neff subsequently returned and brought an ejectment action in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Oregon against Pennoyer, collaterally attacking the underlying Oregon judgment as void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The lower federal courts ruled for Neff, and Pennoyer appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
May a state court enter a personal judgment against a nonresident defendant who was not personally served within the forum and did not appear, and then enforce that judgment against the defendant's in-state land that was not attached at the commencement of the action?
Due process and principles of state territorial sovereignty limit a state court's jurisdiction: - In personam: A state court lacks authority to render a personal judgment against a nonresident who is neither personally served with process within the forum nor voluntarily appears or consents. Service by publication alone is insufficient for a personal judgment. - In rem/quasi in rem: A state court may adjudicate rights in property located within the state if the property is brought under the court's control by seizure or attachment at the outset of the suit and notice appropriate to that proceeding is provided. Post-judgment seizure cannot retroactively confer jurisdiction. - Judgments rendered without jurisdiction are void and not entitled to enforcement; they may be collaterally attacked for lack of jurisdiction.
No. Because Neff was not personally served within Oregon and did not appear, the Oregon court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter a binding personal judgment. And because Neff's Oregon land was not attached at the commencement of the action, the court lacked in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the property. The default judgment was void, the sheriff's sale conveyed no title, and Neff was entitled to recover the land from Pennoyer.
1) Territorial power and sovereignty: The Court grounded its analysis in the principle that each state has authority over persons and property within its borders but not beyond them. A personal judgment imposes obligations on the person; thus, a state cannot bind a nonresident not present in the state unless the person voluntarily submits or otherwise consents to jurisdiction. 2) Due process and notice: The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires a process consistent with fundamental fairness. Service by publication may suffice to alert interested parties in proceedings against property within the state, but it is inadequate to support a personal judgment against an absent, nonappearing nonresident because it does not provide the kind of notice and assertion of power due process requires for in personam obligations. 3) Distinguishing in personam from in rem/quasi in rem: The Court drew a sharp line between personal obligations and proceedings directed at a res (property). For property-based jurisdiction, the property must be seized or attached at the outset so that the court acquires control over the res and can notify claimants. Seizing property only after obtaining a default personal judgment does not cure the initial lack of jurisdiction. 4) Timing and retroactivity: Because Neff's land was not attached when Mitchell filed suit and obtained default judgment, the Oregon court never obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction over that property. The later execution and sheriff's sale could not retroactively validate a void judgment. 5) Collateral attack and full faith and credit: A judgment entered without jurisdiction is void and not entitled to respect. Thus, Neff could collaterally attack the Oregon default judgment in his federal ejectment suit; the sheriff's deed conveyed no title because it rested on a void judgment. 6) Limited exceptions: The Court noted narrow categories in which constructive service could be sufficient (e.g., proceedings to determine status or rights in property within the state), but those did not include imposing personal liability for a debt on an absent, nonappearing nonresident.
Pennoyer established the traditional, territorial bases of personal jurisdiction: presence (including transient "tag" service), consent (express or implied), domicile/residency, and property attached at the outset for in rem/quasi in rem actions. For decades it constrained state courts to those power-based grounds and made clear that service by publication alone cannot support a personal judgment against an absent nonresident. While International Shoe later supplanted Pennoyer's rigid territorialism with the minimum contacts standard, Pennoyer remains foundational. Modern doctrine still recognizes several Pennoyer-era principles: personal service on an individual physically present in the forum (tag jurisdiction) is constitutionally sufficient; consent and waiver can independently support jurisdiction; and judgments entered without jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked. Pennoyer also frames why Shaffer v. Heitner later required minimum contacts for all assertions of jurisdiction, including quasi in rem, thereby limiting Pennoyer's property-based approach.
Service by publication provides, at best, constructive notice. Pennoyer held that for a court to impose personal obligations (a personal judgment) on a nonresident who does not appear, due process requires either personal service within the forum or voluntary submission to the court's authority. Publication may be adequate in a true in rem proceeding where the court first seizes the property within the state, but it cannot, standing alone, support an in personam judgment against an absent nonresident.
Yes, likely. If Mitchell had commenced the suit by attaching Neff's Oregon property, the court could have exercised quasi in rem jurisdiction over the res and, after appropriate notice, entered a judgment enforceable up to the value of the attached property. That judgment would not impose personal liability beyond the res. Under modern law after Shaffer v. Heitner, even quasi in rem assertions require minimum contacts, but at the time of Pennoyer, timely attachment would have been sufficient.
Pennoyer's strict territorial model has been largely superseded by International Shoe's minimum contacts framework and its progeny. However, Pennoyer still matters in three ways: (1) it explains the historical baseline and the traditional bases (presence/tag service, consent, domicile, and property attachment); (2) some traditional bases remain independently sufficient, such as transient service on an individual physically present in the forum (Burnham v. Superior Court) and consent/waiver; and (3) its collateral attack principle—that judgments without jurisdiction are void—continues to be applied.
The Court anchored its limits on state court jurisdiction in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, reasoning that imposing personal liability without personal service or voluntary appearance deprives a defendant of property without due process of law. Due process thus constitutionalized the territorial power limits: a state may not bind a nonresident with a personal judgment absent proper jurisdictional grounds.
In personam actions seek to impose personal obligations and require personal jurisdiction over the defendant; they demand personal service in the forum or consent/appearance. In rem and quasi in rem actions are directed at property; the court must first seize or attach the property within the state to assert power over it, and the resulting judgment affects only interests in that property (and, for quasi in rem, is limited to the value of the attached res). Publication notice may suffice in the latter category if the res is properly before the court.
Pennoyer v. Neff constitutionalized a territorial, power-based understanding of personal jurisdiction that dominated American civil procedure for decades. By insisting on personal service within the forum or property attachment at the outset, the Court tied jurisdiction to state sovereignty and due process, and it sharply demarcated personal judgments from property-based proceedings.
Even though modern doctrine favors a contacts-and-fairness inquiry, Pennoyer continues to shape the field. It supplies the historical grammar for the traditional bases that still matter, illuminates the due process roots of jurisdictional limits, and explains why courts cannot enforce judgments entered without jurisdiction. For law students, mastering Pennoyer is essential both to understand where personal jurisdiction came from and to appreciate what International Shoe changed—and what it did not.