Master Supreme Court held that, in a felon-in-possession case, a court abuses its discretion under Rule 403 by admitting the name and nature of a prior felony when the defendant offers to stipulate to the status element. with this comprehensive case brief.
Old Chief v. United States is a cornerstone evidence case for understanding how Federal Rule of Evidence 403 operates when the government seeks to prove a prior conviction as an element of an offense. The decision addresses a common prosecutorial choice in felon-in-possession prosecutions: whether to present the full record of a defendant’s prior felony conviction or to accept a defendant’s stipulation to the fact of a qualifying prior. The Court held that when the only relevance of the prior conviction is to prove the defendant’s legal status (i.e., being a felon), the risk of unfair prejudice from naming and describing the prior offense substantially outweighs any incremental probative value over a stipulation.
The case is significant because it clarifies that Rule 403 balancing must account for available evidentiary alternatives that are equally probative and less prejudicial. It also articulates the limits of the prosecution’s otherwise legitimate interest in telling a coherent narrative of its case-in-chief. Old Chief is frequently invoked in motions in limine to “sanitize” prior convictions in § 922(g)(1) cases and beyond, shaping how trial courts manage the tension between probative value and propensity prejudice.
519 U.S. 172 (1997) (Supreme Court of the United States)
John Old Chief was charged in federal court with multiple counts arising from an altercation, including possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). To satisfy the status element of § 922(g)(1)—that he had previously been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year—Old Chief offered to stipulate that he had such a qualifying prior conviction. The prior was a federal conviction for assault causing serious bodily injury. The government refused the stipulation and sought to introduce the judgment of conviction identifying the name and nature of the prior offense. Over defense objection under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (unfair prejudice substantially outweighing probative value), the district court admitted the record. The jury convicted Old Chief on the § 922(g)(1) count (and he was acquitted on other charges). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government was entitled to prove its case with evidence of its own choosing. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In a § 922(g)(1) prosecution, does a district court abuse its discretion under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 by admitting the name and nature of a defendant’s prior felony conviction when the defendant offers to stipulate to the fact of a qualifying prior conviction?
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, courts must exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. In performing this balancing, courts must consider the availability of alternative evidence with the same probative value but lower risk of unfair prejudice. Where the sole relevance of a prior conviction is to prove the defendant’s status as a felon (e.g., an element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), and the defendant offers to stipulate to that element, the government may be required to accept the stipulation; the name and nature of the prior offense must be excluded because their marginal probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair propensity prejudice.
Yes. It is an abuse of discretion under Rule 403 to admit the name and nature of the prior felony when the defendant offers to stipulate to the status element, because the stipulation provides equivalent probative value with far less risk of unfair prejudice.
The Court, per Justice Souter, began by reaffirming that the government typically may present its case “with evidentiary richness and narrative integrity.” However, evidence must still survive Rule 403 balancing. The Court emphasized that 403 requires judges to consider not only the inherent probative value and prejudicial risk of the proffered evidence, but also the existence of evidentiary alternatives that can prove the same fact with less prejudice. In a § 922(g)(1) case, the prior conviction is relevant only for the legal status element—whether the defendant was previously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year. The particular label and details of the prior offense add no legitimate probative value on that element beyond the bare fact of conviction, yet they carry a significant risk that jurors will draw forbidden propensity inferences (e.g., concluding that a defendant with a prior violent felony is more likely to misuse a firearm now). The Court rejected the government’s narrative-completeness argument, distinguishing between contextual facts that complete the story of the charged offense and facts relevant only to a formal element unrelated to the charged conduct. Where the element is simply a legal status, the government’s narrative interest must yield to Rule 403’s prejudice-avoidance mandate. The offered stipulation here was an evidentiary admission that fully satisfied the element with the same probative force as a judgment record. Because the stipulation eliminated any legitimate need to present the name and nature of the prior offense, the district court’s admission of the more inflammatory evidence was an abuse of discretion. The Court further concluded the error was not harmless, given the real risk that knowledge of a prior assault conviction could taint the jury’s assessment of the firearm charge. Justice O’Connor’s dissent (joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy and Thomas) argued that the prosecution should be free to choose its evidence and that a stipulation is not a categorical substitute; the majority responded that Rule 403 balancing, not an absolute rule, compels exclusion when an equally probative, less prejudicial alternative is offered for a status element.
Old Chief is a leading case on Rule 403 and the admissibility of prior convictions. It establishes that: (1) courts must consider evidentiary alternatives when balancing probative value against unfair prejudice; (2) in felon-in-possession prosecutions, a defendant’s stipulation to status generally precludes admission of the name and nature of the prior felony; and (3) the prosecution’s preference for narrative completeness does not override Rule 403 when the prior conviction bears only on a formal status element. For law students, the case illustrates the interaction between Rules 401, 403, and 404(b), and it provides a practical template for motions in limine to sanitize prior-conviction proof. It also clarifies the limits of the government’s right to prove its case as it chooses, signaling that evidentiary discretion is bounded by prejudice considerations when equally probative alternatives exist.
No. Old Chief is limited to situations where the prior conviction is relevant only to a status element (such as § 922(g)(1)). If the name or nature of the prior conviction is independently relevant to another permissible purpose—such as proving intent, knowledge, absence of mistake under Rule 404(b), or identity—then the government may decline a stipulation, and the court will conduct a standard Rule 403 balancing. Old Chief does not create a categorical stipulation right; it requires exclusion only when a stipulation is equally probative of the element and the details would cause unfair prejudice.
The Court held that when a judge balances probative value against unfair prejudice, the judge should weigh whether there is other evidence available that proves the same point with less risk of prejudice. A defendant’s stipulation to an element is one such alternative; if the stipulation supplies the same probative force for that element, admitting more inflammatory proof (like the descriptive details of a prior felony) is disfavored. This principle extends beyond § 922(g)(1) and informs 403 analysis generally.
The standard approach is a 'sanitized' stipulation or admission that the defendant was previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, without identifying the offense’s name, nature, or facts. The stipulation is read to the jury and/or admitted as an exhibit, and the jury is instructed that the element is satisfied. The court typically bars the government from introducing the judgment record’s descriptive details absent some additional permissible relevance.
Old Chief addressed evidence offered to prove an element in the government’s case-in-chief, not other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b) or impeachment by prior conviction under Rule 609. If the government offers prior-crimes evidence for a permissible 404(b) purpose (e.g., intent), the court still applies 403 balancing, but Old Chief’s rationale does not require acceptance of a stipulation unless it is truly an equally probative and less prejudicial alternative. For Rule 609, which governs impeaching a testifying defendant, the analysis is separate and tailored by the rule’s own balancing standards; Old Chief does not bar 609 impeachment but reminds courts to be vigilant about unfair prejudice.
In bench trials, the risk of unfair prejudice is reduced, but Rule 403 still applies and courts may still accept stipulations to avoid unnecessary detail. Outside § 922(g)(1), Old Chief’s core principle—that courts should consider less prejudicial evidentiary alternatives when available—guides 403 balancing broadly. That said, if the prior conviction’s specifics are independently relevant to contested issues, Old Chief does not compel exclusion.
Old Chief recalibrates the Rule 403 balance when prior convictions are offered solely to prove a status element. By requiring courts to consider equally probative, less prejudicial alternatives—like stipulations—the decision curbs the powerful propensity inference that can arise when jurors learn the name and nature of a defendant’s prior crimes. The ruling preserves the government’s general right to tell its story but sets a principled limit when narrative detail adds only prejudice, not probative value.
For practitioners and students, Old Chief is both a doctrinal anchor and a practical tool. It supports motions in limine to sanitize prior-conviction proof in felon-in-possession cases and teaches a method of 403 analysis that looks beyond evidence in isolation to the availability of less prejudicial substitutes. Its influence reaches across criminal trials wherever status elements or equally probative alternatives are in play.