Master Supreme Court decision establishing that Congress may not commandeer state governments to enact or administer federal regulatory programs. with this comprehensive case brief.
New York v. United States is a cornerstone of modern federalism and the leading case on the anti-commandeering doctrine. The Supreme Court held that while Congress has broad power to regulate private conduct and to encourage state participation through incentives, it cannot directly compel states to legislate or administer a federal regulatory scheme. This decision preserves the structural protections of the Tenth Amendment by drawing a bright line between permissible federal inducements and impermissible federal commands directed at state governments.
The case reverberates across domains that rely on cooperative federalism, including environmental law, criminal law, and sports gambling regulation. It clarifies that political accountability is a constitutional value: federal officials must bear responsibility for federal policies, and state officials should not be forced to take the blame for federal directives. New York v. United States thus supplies a critical framework that later cases such as Printz v. United States and Murphy v. NCAA would extend.
505 U.S. 144 (1992)
In response to a national problem of disposing low-level radioactive waste, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, later amended in 1985. The statute sought to induce states to manage waste generated within their borders through a cooperative federalism scheme that included three incentives: (1) monetary incentives that allowed states hosting disposal sites to collect surcharges, portions of which would be redistributed to states meeting federal milestones; (2) access incentives permitting host states or regional compacts, with congressional consent, to gradually deny access to their disposal facilities to states that failed to meet deadlines; and (3) the take title provision, which required a noncompliant state to take title and possession of all low-level radioactive waste generated within the state and to assume liability for damages, unless the state implemented a regulatory program in conformity with federal standards and deadlines. New York, initially a participant in a regional compact and having begun site selection, faced significant local opposition and ultimately challenged the constitutionality of the federal scheme. New York, along with local governments and private parties, sued the United States, arguing that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment by commandeering the state legislative process. Lower federal courts largely upheld the statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Act’s incentives, particularly the take title provision, exceeded Congress’s authority under the Constitution.
Does the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 violate the Tenth Amendment by compelling states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program, specifically through the take title provision, and are the Act’s other incentives constitutional exercises of federal power?
Under the anti-commandeering doctrine, Congress may not compel states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. The Tenth Amendment preserves state sovereignty as a structural limit on federal power. Congress may encourage state participation by: (1) regulating private actors directly under its enumerated powers (e.g., the Commerce Clause); (2) offering financial incentives or conditional grants under the Spending Clause, provided conditions are unambiguous and not coercive; and (3) employing conditional preemption that gives states a choice between regulating according to federal standards or allowing the federal government to regulate directly. However, Congress cannot require a state to legislate, regulate, or take title to property as a means of enforcing federal policy.
The take title provision unconstitutionally commandeers state governments in violation of the Tenth Amendment and is invalid. The monetary incentives and access incentives are constitutional exercises of Congress’s Spending Clause and Commerce Clause powers. The unconstitutional provision is severable, and the remainder of the Act is upheld.
The Court emphasized that the federal structure of the Constitution protects individual liberty by dividing authority between federal and state governments. The Tenth Amendment is not an independent font of state power but a reaffirmation that Congress must act within its enumerated powers and may not conscript state governments into federal service. Applying this principle, the Court evaluated each of the Act’s three incentives. First, the monetary incentives were valid under the Spending Clause. Congress may offer funds or financial benefits to states conditioned on compliance with federal objectives, so long as the conditions are clear, related to the federal interest, and not coercive. The surcharge scheme and redistribution to compliant states fell within these bounds and were accepted voluntarily by states. Second, the access incentives were valid. Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause and by consenting to interstate compacts to authorize host states or compacts to restrict access to disposal sites for noncompliant states. Because Congress could directly regulate interstate disposal of low-level radioactive waste, it could also structure market access consequences tied to compliance. These provisions did not force states to legislate; rather, they altered the legal environment consistent with federal power over interstate commerce. Third, the take title provision crossed the constitutional line. It presented states with a Hobson’s choice: either enact and administer a federal regulatory program in accordance with federal directives, or take title to waste and assume liability for it. Both alternatives commandeered the state. Unlike permissible conditional preemption, where a state may decline to regulate and leave regulation to the federal government, the take title provision left no option to stand aside. This undermined political accountability by blurring responsibility: state officials would bear the brunt of unpopular policies that were effectively federal mandates. The Court rejected arguments that the provision was justified as an exercise of the Commerce Clause. Even if Congress had the power to regulate low-level waste directly, it could not deploy that power to conscript state governments as instruments of federal policy. Finally, the unconstitutional take title clause was severable from the rest of the statute because Congress’s broader objectives could continue to be served by the valid monetary and access incentives, and the statute included a severability framework consistent with preserving the remainder.
New York v. United States is the foundational modern statement of the anti-commandeering doctrine. It establishes that Congress cannot force state legislatures or executives to implement federal regulatory programs, preserving clear lines of political accountability and respecting state sovereignty. The case delineates permissible tools of cooperative federalism—conditional spending, conditional preemption, and direct regulation of private actors—while rejecting federal commands directed at states. Its principles were extended in Printz v. United States, which barred commandeering of state executive officers, and reaffirmed in Murphy v. NCAA, which clarified that Congress cannot command states to refrain from enacting laws either. For law students, the case is essential for understanding the Tenth Amendment, federalism limits, and doctrinal distinctions between preemption, inducement, and commandeering.
It is the principle that Congress cannot compel states to enact, administer, or enforce federal regulatory programs. While Congress may regulate individuals directly and may encourage states through spending or conditional preemption, it may not direct the states as sovereigns to govern according to federal instructions.
Preemption regulates private conduct by making federal law supreme over conflicting state law; states remain free to legislate unless federal law occupies the field or conflicts arise. Commandeering, by contrast, targets state governments and forces them to legislate or administer a federal program. New York permits preemption and direct federal regulation but prohibits federal commands to state governments.
The Court upheld the monetary incentives (valid under the Spending Clause) and the access incentives (valid under the Commerce Clause and congressional consent to compacts). It struck down the take title provision as unconstitutional commandeering because it forced states either to regulate per federal directives or take ownership and liability for private waste.
Congress can regulate private actors directly under enumerated powers; offer conditional funding to states with clear, related, and noncoercive terms; use conditional preemption by setting federal standards while allowing states to regulate or cede the field to federal regulators; and authorize interstate compacts with consent.
Printz extended New York’s anti-commandeering principle to state executive officials, invalidating federal directives that required local law enforcement to conduct background checks. Murphy reaffirmed and expanded the doctrine by holding that Congress cannot direct states to maintain prohibitions either; a federal law forbidding states from authorizing sports gambling was unconstitutional commandeering.
New York v. United States demarcates the constitutional limits of cooperative federalism. It confirms that Congress may entice states to participate through spending and conditional preemption and may regulate private conduct directly, but it cannot coerce state governments to legislate or administer federal programs. This preserves political accountability and respects the sovereignty of states within the constitutional structure.
The decision provides a durable framework for evaluating federal statutes that enlist states in regulatory efforts. By distinguishing valid inducements from impermissible commands, New York remains a touchstone for courts, policymakers, and students analyzing the balance of power between the national government and the states.