Master Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that narrowly defined “family,” recognizing constitutional protection for extended-family living arrangements. with this comprehensive case brief.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland is a cornerstone substantive due process case at the intersection of constitutional family privacy and local land-use regulation. The Supreme Court struck down a city zoning ordinance that criminalized a grandmother’s decision to live with her son and two grandsons who were cousins, concluding that the Constitution protects the sanctity and autonomy of the family—including extended family—against unjustified governmental intrusion. The Court distinguished prior precedent upholding restrictions on households of unrelated individuals, emphasizing that government power is at its zenith in land-use matters only until it encroaches upon fundamental personal relationships.
For law students, Moore offers a nuanced lesson in doctrinal technique: it features a plurality that recognizes a fundamental liberty interest in family living arrangements, a concurrence voting to invalidate the law on narrower rational-basis grounds, and dissents defending broad zoning authority. The case thus teaches both the substance of constitutional family protections and the methodology of deriving a controlling rule when the Court is fragmented, while also serving as a caution about overreliance on Belle Terre v. Boraas when relatives are involved.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (U.S. Supreme Court)
The City of East Cleveland, Ohio, enacted a zoning ordinance limiting occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a “single family,” and then defined “family” with unusual narrowness. The ordinance permitted, for example, a husband and wife and their unmarried children, and in limited circumstances a grandparent and grandchildren who were siblings, but it prohibited a household including a grandparent and two grandchildren who were cousins (i.e., children of different children of the grandparent). Inez Moore, a grandmother, lived in a single-family home with her son and two grandsons who were first cousins. The city ordered her to remove one grandson within a week; when she refused, she was criminally charged and convicted of violating the ordinance. She received a sentence of five days in jail and a $25 fine (stayed pending appeal). Moore challenged the ordinance, arguing it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it arbitrarily intruded on the family’s choice of living arrangements and bore little relation to the city’s stated goals of preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic, and reducing burdens on the public schools.
Does a city violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing a zoning ordinance that narrowly defines “family” and criminalizes a grandmother’s choice to live with her son and two grandsons who are cousins, purportedly to prevent overcrowding and related problems?
The Due Process Clause protects the sanctity and autonomy of the family—including extended family relationships—against unjustified governmental interference. While municipalities possess broad zoning power, regulations that select among close relatives and dictate which family members may live together intrude upon a protected liberty interest and must be at least rationally related to legitimate objectives; where the government burdens fundamental choices concerning family living arrangements, heightened scrutiny applies and the ordinance must be carefully tailored to serve important interests. In Moore, a plurality recognized the fundamental character of extended-family cohabitation; the controlling judgment also rested, at minimum, on the conclusion that the ordinance’s definition of “family” was irrationally underinclusive and arbitrary in relation to the city’s stated aims.
No. The zoning ordinance is unconstitutional. By narrowly defining “family” to exclude certain close relatives and criminalizing their cohabitation, the city impermissibly intruded on the constitutionally protected liberty of family life; the ordinance was not sufficiently related—or even rationally tailored, on the narrowest grounds—to the city’s legitimate interests.
Plurality (Powell, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun): The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family as a central, deeply rooted social institution, and that protection extends beyond the nuclear family to embrace the extended family—a traditional arrangement found throughout American history. The ordinance here went far beyond regulating densities or structures; it selectively chose which blood relatives could live together and criminalized other quintessentially familial arrangements. The city’s asserted interests—preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic, and reducing school burdens—were not advanced in any meaningful way by the ordinance. It was poorly tailored: for example, it allowed a household with multiple grandchildren so long as they were siblings, but barred a single additional grandchild who was a cousin. Such arbitrary line-drawing among close relatives demonstrated that the regulation did not genuinely serve the stated ends and instead impermissibly intruded into family life. Belle Terre v. Boraas was distinguishable because that case involved unrelated persons; here, the government targeted close relatives, directly burdening a protected liberty interest. Concurrence (Brennan, joined by Marshall): Brennan emphasized the cultural and socioeconomic reality that extended-family living arrangements are vital, particularly for minority and low-income families. The ordinance reflected an impermissible, class- and culture-bound preference for a nuclear family ideal. The Constitution does not permit government to impose a single model of family life on diverse communities. Concurrence in the judgment (Stevens): Even under deferential review, the ordinance failed. The city’s definition of “family” irrationally permitted some close relatives to live together while excluding others without a logical connection to congestion or school-impact goals. Traditional zoning concerns (e.g., use, bulk, density) cannot justify arbitrary selection among close relatives; under cases such as Euclid and Nectow, zoning must at least bear a rational relation to legitimate ends. Dissents: The dissenting Justices would have upheld the ordinance, reasoning that land-use regulation warrants broad deference and that Belle Terre supports the city’s ability to define permissible household compositions. They rejected the notion that the Due Process Clause protects extended-family cohabitation as a fundamental right and viewed the ordinance as a permissible means to control neighborhood density and related externalities.
Moore is a leading case on constitutional family privacy and the limits of zoning power. It stands for the proposition that government may not, without adequate justification, dictate which close relatives may live together. The case meaningfully narrows Belle Terre by distinguishing regulations of unrelated group living from incursions into family autonomy. For doctrine, Moore illustrates how a plurality can articulate a broad substantive due process protection (extended-family living arrangements) while the judgment can also rest on narrower grounds (irrationality under deferential review). Practically, Moore constrains municipal definitions of “family” in occupancy codes and informs challenges to ordinances that penalize extended-family households, particularly where regulations are underinclusive, culturally biased, or arbitrarily selective.
Belle Terre upheld a zoning ordinance restricting unrelated persons from living together, emphasizing deference to land-use regulation focused on density and neighborhood character. Moore, by contrast, involved close relatives; the ordinance sliced within the family by allowing some relatives (e.g., siblings) but excluding others (e.g., cousins) to live together. The Court distinguished Belle Terre and found heightened constitutional concern when government intrudes into the composition of a family unit, and at least an absence of rationality in the city’s line-drawing.
The plurality treated family living arrangements, including extended family, as a protected liberty interest warranting heightened scrutiny. However, because Justice Stevens concurred on rational-basis grounds, the narrowest-ground reading is that at minimum the ordinance was irrational. Many courts cite Moore for a substantive due process protection of family integrity while recognizing that, even under rational basis, selective exclusion of close relatives without a real connection to legitimate ends is unconstitutional.
The judgment rested on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plurality spoke in terms of substantive due process and family privacy. Justice Stevens also analyzed the ordinance’s irrationality through due process (police power) principles traceable to Euclid and Nectow. Equal Protection was not the basis of the decision, though the arbitrariness analysis resembles equal protection rational-basis review.
The city claimed interests in preventing overcrowding, limiting traffic, and reducing school enrollment burdens. The Court found the ordinance poorly tailored and underinclusive. It allowed multiple grandchildren if they were siblings but barred a single cousin, a distinction that does not meaningfully advance the asserted goals. Because the ordinance selected among close relatives without a logical relationship to those ends, it impermissibly burdened family life.
Moore is invoked to challenge occupancy codes and zoning definitions that penalize extended-family households, especially where ordinances privilege a nuclear-family ideal or operate as culturally biased restrictions. It supports the principle that cities may regulate density and use but cannot arbitrarily dictate which close relatives may share a home. Courts also use Moore to distinguish regulations of unrelated group homes from those affecting families, often requiring closer fit or invalidating arbitrary family definitions.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland marks a constitutional limit on the zoning power: while municipalities may regulate the use and bulk of property to promote public welfare, they cannot arbitrarily police the intimate composition of a household of relatives. The decision embeds the sanctity of extended family life within substantive due process and ensures that governments cannot impose a one-size-fits-all model of family living without strong, carefully tailored justification.
For law students, Moore is essential both for its doctrinal substance and its method. It demonstrates how a plurality can articulate a robust liberty interest, while the controlling result can also rest on the ordinance’s irrationality. In practice, when analyzing family-definition ordinances, you must (1) distinguish unrelated from related-household regulations, (2) identify the governmental interests and tailoring, and (3) assess whether the law intrudes on protected family autonomy or is arbitrary even under deferential review.