Master Supreme Court plurality upholding California’s conclusive marital presumption against a biological father’s due process and equal protection challenges. with this comprehensive case brief.
Michael H. v. Gerald D. sits at the crossroads of family law and constitutional law, testing how far the Constitution protects a biological father’s claim to parenthood when a child is born into an existing marriage. The case addresses the strength of the centuries-old presumption that a child born to a married woman cohabiting with her husband is the child of that marriage—a presumption traditionally designed to protect the integrity of the marital family and the legitimacy of children. California law at the time made that presumption effectively conclusive, foreclosing the biological father from even attempting to rebut it.
In a fractured decision, the Supreme Court rejected the putative biological father’s due process and equal protection claims. The plurality’s methodology—defining the scope of fundamental rights by reference to the “most specific level” of historical tradition—remains controversial, while concurrences refused to embrace that method but agreed that California’s rule passed constitutional muster. For students, the case is essential to understanding rebuttable fatherhood presumptions, the limits of substantive due process in the family context, and how fragmented Supreme Court opinions yield controlling rules.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Carole D., while married to and cohabiting with her husband, Gerald D., engaged in an extramarital relationship with her neighbor, Michael H. During the period in which Carole conceived a child, she had sexual relations with both men. In 1981, Carole gave birth to a daughter, Victoria D., while still married to and living with Gerald. Early genetic testing indicated a very high probability (over 98%) that Michael was Victoria’s biological father. For periods, Carole allowed Michael to visit and develop a relationship with Victoria; at other times, she reconciled with Gerald and cut off Michael’s access. Michael filed actions in California state court seeking to establish paternity and to obtain visitation and parental rights. California Evidence Code § 621 (then in force) created a conclusive presumption that a child born to a married woman living with her husband is a child of the marriage, permitting rebuttal only in narrow circumstances and limiting who could challenge. The state courts applied § 621 to dismiss Michael’s paternity claim and denied him standing to rebut the presumption. Michael, and a guardian ad litem on behalf of Victoria, asserted that application of § 621 violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses by denying the biological father and child an opportunity to establish their relationship.
Does the Due Process Clause confer a fundamental liberty interest on a putative biological father to establish paternity and obtain parental rights in a child born into an existing marital family, notwithstanding a state’s conclusive marital presumption and limits on standing to rebut it; and, if not, does such a presumption violate Equal Protection?
A state may, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, give conclusive effect to the presumption that a child born to a married woman cohabiting with her husband is the child of that marriage and may limit or deny a putative biological father’s standing to rebut that presumption. The plurality evaluated the claimed liberty interest by reference to the most specific level of historical tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted interest, finding no tradition that grants parental rights to an adulterous natural father over the objections of an intact marital family. Without a fundamental liberty interest, the statute need only satisfy rational basis review, which is met by the state’s interests in protecting the integrity and privacy of the marital family, promoting legitimacy and stability for children, and avoiding disruptive paternity litigation. (Concurring Justices declined to endorse the plurality’s “most specific tradition” methodology but agreed the statute is constitutional.)
No. The Constitution does not confer on a biological father a fundamental liberty interest to assert paternity against the marital family in this context, and California’s conclusive marital presumption and standing limitations do not violate Due Process or Equal Protection. The state judgment rejecting Michael’s paternity claim was affirmed.
Plurality (Scalia, joined in relevant parts by Rehnquist; O’Connor and Kennedy concurred in the judgment without joining the historical-method footnote): - Framing the liberty interest: The asserted interest was the right of an adulterous biological father to assert parental rights over a child born into an existing marital unit. To determine whether such an interest is fundamental, the plurality looked to the most specific level of historical tradition relevant to that interest. Historically, Anglo-American law embraced a strong presumption of legitimacy for children born during marriage and declined to recognize rights in third-party putative fathers to disturb the marital family. - Distinguishing prior unwed-father cases: Cases like Stanley v. Illinois, Caban v. Mohammed, Quilloin v. Walcott, and Lehr v. Robertson protect the interests of unwed fathers who have developed substantial relationships with their children, but those cases primarily involved children not born into intact marriages or did not pit the father against an existing marital family. Here, the child’s birth into an ongoing marriage was dispositive in light of the historic protection afforded to that unit. - State interests and rational basis: Because no fundamental right was implicated, rational basis review applied. California’s conclusive presumption and limits on standing were rationally related to legitimate objectives: protecting the privacy and stability of the marital family; shielding children from the social and emotional costs of paternity contests; promoting legitimacy; and avoiding vexatious or destabilizing litigation years after birth. - Equal Protection: The statute’s classifications (favoring the marital father and limiting challenges by putative fathers) did not involve a suspect class or infringe a fundamental right, and thus passed rational basis review for the same reasons. Concurrences: Justices O’Connor and Kennedy concurred in the judgment, agreeing that California could constitutionally prefer the marital family and limit the biological father’s standing, but they declined to join the plurality’s methodology that would always define liberty interests at the “most specific” historical level. Justice Stevens separately concurred in the judgment, emphasizing that while states may constitutionally adopt strong marital presumptions, nothing in the Constitution forbids states from granting visitation or other rights to biological fathers where appropriate; the federal Constitution simply does not mandate it. Dissents: Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, criticized the plurality’s narrow tradition-based framing, arguing that substantive due process protects the liberty of a biological father who has formed a substantial relationship with his child, even when the child was born within a marriage. He would have required, at minimum, an opportunity for Michael to demonstrate that his and the child’s relationships warranted constitutional protection. Justice White also dissented, urging a more flexible approach that recognized the biological and relational ties and questioned the conclusive presumption’s blanket bar.
For family law, the case confirms that states may give powerful—indeed conclusive—effect to the marital presumption and may restrict who may challenge it and when. For constitutional law, it illustrates a limit on substantive due process protection for familial relationships: biology plus some relationship may not suffice when the claim collides with an intact marital family and a long-standing presumption of legitimacy. The fractured opinions also teach students how to identify controlling holdings in plurality decisions: the narrowest ground here is that, whether or not one adopts the plurality’s tradition methodology, the Constitution does not require states to allow a putative father to rebut the marital presumption in these circumstances. Practically, many jurisdictions influenced by the Uniform Parentage Act have adopted limited windows and standing rules for paternity challenges. Michael H. underscores that such constraints are constitutionally permissible, though states remain free to design more permissive regimes recognizing biological fathers’ interests, subject to competing interests of the marital family and child.
California Evidence Code § 621 (as then written) created a conclusive presumption that a child born to a married woman cohabiting with her husband is the child of that marriage. It tightly limited who could attempt to rebut and when—effectively giving only the husband or wife a short window to challenge and denying standing to third-party putative fathers like Michael. The statute aimed to protect the marital family’s stability and the child’s legitimacy.
No. Cases like Stanley, Caban, Quilloin, and Lehr recognize that unwed fathers who grasp their responsibility and develop substantial relationships with their children can have constitutionally protected interests. Michael H. is narrower: when the child is born into an intact marital family, the state may constitutionally prefer the marital unit and foreclose a biological father’s challenge. The Constitution does not require the state to hear his claim in that setting, but states may choose to allow it.
Limited. The plurality used a stringent tradition-based framework to define fundamental rights, but Justices O’Connor and Kennedy expressly declined to join that methodological point. Under Marks v. United States, the narrowest ground controlling the judgment is that, regardless of methodology, California’s strong preference for the marital family and its limits on rebuttal did not violate the Constitution. Lower courts often cite Michael H. for the permissibility of protecting the marital presumption rather than for a binding endorsement of the “most specific tradition” test.
Lehr holds that an unwed father’s opportunity interest gains constitutional protection when he develops a relationship with his child and complies with reasonable state procedures. Michael H. distinguishes Lehr and similar cases on a critical fact: those cases did not require choosing between an intact marital family and a biological father. Where a marital family exists, Michael H. allows the state to prioritize that unit and limit a biological father’s ability to disrupt it.
Not under Michael H. The Court acknowledged blood-test evidence but held that the Constitution does not obligate states to subordinate the marital presumption to genetic truth when a child is born into a marriage. States may consider genetic evidence by statute if they choose, but Michael H. permits them to protect marital stability and the child’s status even in the face of highly probative DNA results.
Yes, but briefly. Because no fundamental right or suspect classification was involved, the Court applied rational basis review and upheld the statute for the same reasons: protecting the marital family and avoiding disruptive paternity disputes are legitimate objectives, and a conclusive presumption with limited standing rationally advances those objectives.
Michael H. v. Gerald D. affirms the constitutional latitude states possess to protect the marital family by employing strong, even conclusive, presumptions of legitimacy when a child is born into a marriage. The decision draws a clear doctrinal line: biological connection and some relationship do not guarantee a constitutional right to displace or intrude upon an intact marital unit, and states may limit a putative father’s standing to contest paternity.
For law students, the case is a touchstone in both family law and substantive due process. It clarifies how rebuttable fatherhood presumptions operate, how and when states can make them conclusive, and how to analyze fragmented Supreme Court opinions to extract the controlling rule. It also provides a lasting framework for evaluating modern parentage statutes that balance genetic truth, the integrity of established families, and the welfare of children.