Master Massachusetts’ high court refused to use extrinsic evidence to alter a will’s clear bequest to “my heirs at law,” awarding the estate to the sole heir (an aunt) rather than numerous cousins. with this comprehensive case brief.
Mahoney v. Grainger is a staple of wills-and-trusts courses because it crystallizes two core doctrines of will construction: courts privilege the objective meaning of the will’s words over extrinsic expressions of subjective intent, and technical terms in a lawyer-drafted instrument are presumed to carry their settled legal meaning. The case stands for the proposition that, absent an ambiguity, evidence of what the testator told the drafter about whom she wished to benefit cannot be used to contradict the will’s plain language.
Against the equitable pull of honoring a testator’s alleged oral intent, the court doubles down on formalism and the non-reformation rule for wills. By construing the phrase “my heirs at law” according to the Massachusetts intestacy statute, the court awarded the entire residuary estate to the testatrix’s sole heir—her aunt—despite proof that the testatrix told her lawyer she wished to benefit numerous first cousins. Mahoney is thus both a cautionary tale in drafting and a doctrinal anchor for the limits of extrinsic evidence in testamentary interpretation.
283 Mass. 189, 186 N.E. 86 (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 1933)
The testatrix executed a will prepared by an attorney. The residuary clause devised the residue of her estate “to my heirs at law living at my decease, to be divided equally between them, share and share alike,” or materially equivalent language. At the time of her death, the testatrix left surviving one maternal aunt and numerous first cousins. Under the Massachusetts intestacy statute then in force, an aunt (a relative of a nearer degree) would be the sole heir at law, excluding first cousins (more remote collaterals). In the probate court, proponents for the cousins offered extrinsic evidence, including testimony from the scrivener-attorney, that the testatrix told him she intended her cousins to take and that he selected the language “heirs at law” to carry out that wish. The probate court relied on that extrinsic evidence and decreed distribution among the cousins. The aunt appealed, arguing that the will’s language was unambiguous, that “heirs at law” must be given its technical legal meaning, and that extrinsic evidence was inadmissible to vary the terms of the will.
When a will drafted by an attorney gives the residuary estate to the testatrix’s “heirs at law,” may a court admit extrinsic evidence of the testatrix’s oral statements to show she intended her first cousins to take, notwithstanding that the intestacy statute identifies a single aunt as the sole heir at law?
A will is construed to effectuate the testator’s intent as expressed in the language of the instrument, read in light of the circumstances known to the testator at execution. Technical words used in a lawyer-drafted will are presumed to have their settled legal meaning. Extrinsic evidence may be considered to explain a latent ambiguity or to identify persons or property described, but it is inadmissible to contradict or vary the clear, unambiguous terms of the will or to substitute a different disposition than that expressed on its face. The term “heirs at law” designates those who would take under the applicable intestacy statute at the testator’s death.
No. The phrase “my heirs at law” is unambiguous and must be given its technical, legal meaning. The intestacy statute identified the testatrix’s aunt as her sole heir at law. Extrinsic evidence of the testatrix’s alleged intent to benefit her cousins was inadmissible. The decree distributing the residue to the cousins was reversed, and the estate was awarded to the aunt.
The court emphasized that the paramount goal in will construction is to ascertain the testatrix’s intent as expressed in the will’s language. Because this will was drafted by an attorney and employed a settled term of art—“heirs at law”—the court presumed the phrase was used in its technical legal sense. Under Massachusetts intestacy law at the time, the testatrix’s aunt, as the nearest kin, was the sole heir at law; first cousins, being more remote collaterals, were excluded. Accordingly, the will’s residuary clause designated a single person—the aunt—to take the entire residue. The court rejected the probate court’s reliance on the scrivener’s testimony that the testatrix wanted her cousins to receive the residue and that he selected the words “heirs at law” to effectuate that desire. While surrounding circumstances may be considered to resolve a latent ambiguity (e.g., where the will describes a beneficiary in a manner fitting multiple persons or where identification of the subject or object of a gift is uncertain), no such ambiguity existed here: “heirs at law” clearly identified the class of takers by reference to the statute. The court refused to admit extrinsic evidence to contradict this unambiguous designation or to reform the will, reiterating the longstanding rule that courts cannot make a new will for the testator by parol proof of a different intended disposition. The phrases “living at my decease” and “share and share alike” did not create uncertainty; they merely described the members of the class as of the time of death and the manner of distribution if more than one heir existed. Because there was only one heir at law, those words did not alter the result. Any mistake by the scrivener could not justify judicial reformation of a duly executed will.
Mahoney v. Grainger is frequently cited for the strict limits on extrinsic evidence in will construction and for the presumption that technical terms in lawyer-drafted instruments carry their technical meaning. It underscores the distinction between resolving latent ambiguities and impermissibly contradicting a clear testamentary disposition. The case also illustrates the practical consequences of choosing terms of art (e.g., “heirs at law”) and the traditional bar on reformation of wills after the testator’s death. For students, it frames the doctrinal baseline against which modern reforms (such as UPC reformation for clear and convincing proof of mistake) are measured and highlights drafting precision as the primary safeguard for testamentary intent.
A patent ambiguity appears on the face of the instrument (e.g., contradictory clauses), while a latent ambiguity arises when applying clear language to external facts (e.g., two people fit a single described beneficiary). The court found no ambiguity—patent or latent—in the phrase “my heirs at law”; it had a settled meaning by reference to the intestacy statute.
When a will is lawyer-drafted, courts presume technical words are used in their technical legal sense. That presumption made it even more inappropriate to treat “heirs at law” as colloquial shorthand for “my cousins” or to admit extrinsic evidence to replace the term’s legal meaning.
Under traditional common law, including Massachusetts at the time, courts do not reform wills to correct alleged drafting mistakes proved by extrinsic evidence. The remedy is to enforce the will as written. Some modern statutes (e.g., UPC § 2-805) permit reformation on clear and convincing evidence of mistake, but that was not the rule applied in Mahoney.
Historically, “heirs at law” relates to those who would inherit real property by intestacy, while “next of kin” pertains to personal property. Many jurisdictions harmonize the two in residuary gifts, but differences can arise depending on statutory schemes and survivorship degrees. In Mahoney’s setting, the controlling principle was degree of kinship under intestacy; the aunt, as nearer kin, would likely still exclude the cousins.
Extrinsic evidence is admissible to identify persons or property described, to explain technical terms or local usage, and to resolve latent ambiguities. It is not admissible to contradict the plain meaning of unambiguous language or to substitute a different beneficiary than the one the will, on its face, designates.
Mahoney v. Grainger anchors the formalist approach to will interpretation: courts enforce the words on the page, especially when they are technical terms of art in a lawyer-drafted instrument, and resist invitations to reshape a testamentary plan through parol evidence of subjective intent. By giving “heirs at law” its statutory meaning, the court favored predictability and administrability over a fact-intensive search for what the testatrix may have told her attorney.
For students and practitioners, the case is a drafting lesson and a doctrinal benchmark. Precision in language is paramount, and reliance on terms of art must be informed by their statutory consequences. Absent an ambiguity recognized in law, extrinsic evidence—even compelling scrivener testimony—cannot override the will’s clear text.