Master Early English case imposing liability for malicious interference with another’s lawful use of land and trade, even absent possession of wild animals. with this comprehensive case brief.
Keeble v. Hickeringill is a foundational English decision that bridges property and tort law by protecting the productive use of land against intentional, malicious interference. Although the dispute centers on wild ducks, which traditionally are not owned until captured, the court recognized a separate and cognizable interest in the landowner’s lawful business enterprise and the profits derived from it. The opinion thus safeguarded the right to make beneficial use of property from targeted, spiteful disruption by a neighbor. The case is widely taught for its articulation of the distinction between fair competition and malicious interference. It establishes that while a neighbor may lawfully compete and even divert opportunities by legitimate means, he may not act solely to harm another’s livelihood. Keeble therefore underpins modern doctrines of tortious interference and informs the capture rule in property law by clarifying that the absence of title to ferae naturae does not preclude recovery for wrongful disruption of a lawful use of land.
Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1707)
Keeble owned a decoy pond on his land designed to attract and capture wild ducks using decoys, nets, and other contrivances. The operation was a lawful and profitable enterprise conducted entirely on Keeble’s property. Hickeringill, a neighbor, intentionally fired guns near the pond from his own land to frighten the ducks away, without any intent to capture them himself and with the malicious purpose of disrupting Keeble’s business. There was no physical entry onto Keeble’s land, and the ducks, being wild animals, were not yet reduced to possession. Keeble sued in an action on the case, alleging wrongful disturbance of his trade and profitable use of his land.
Does a landowner have a cause of action against a neighbor who, acting maliciously and without competitive purpose, intentionally frightens away wild game to disrupt the landowner’s lawful business conducted on his own land, even though the neighbor never entered the land and the animals were not yet possessed?
A person who maliciously and intentionally interferes with another’s lawful use of land and business, causing loss, commits an actionable wrong, even if the interference is accomplished from the defendant’s own land and the plaintiff has not yet reduced the subject of pursuit (such as wild animals) to possession. Legitimate competition is permitted, but acts done solely to harm the plaintiff’s trade or livelihood are unlawful.
Yes. The court held that Hickeringill’s malicious and intentional disturbance of Keeble’s decoy pond was actionable, and judgment was entered for Keeble.
The court emphasized that the gravamen of the wrong was not ownership of the ducks, which as ferae naturae were not the plaintiff’s property until captured, but the malicious disturbance of Keeble’s lawful trade conducted on his land. English law recognizes actions on the case for intentional interference with a person’s livelihood or profitable use of property. The defendant’s conduct was designed to confer no legitimate advantage upon himself and to produce pure harm to the plaintiff by frightening away the ducks. The court drew a critical distinction between fair competition and malicious harassment. If Hickeringill had set up his own decoy pond and attracted ducks away through superior industry or skill, that would be lawful competition. But firing guns merely to scare the ducks off was an unprivileged, spiteful act that disrupts the plaintiff’s use of his land and business without social utility. Protecting Keeble’s enterprise encourages productive labor and the beneficial use of property while preventing predatory tactics aimed solely at destroying another’s trade. The absence of physical entry or of a property right in the ducks did not defeat the claim because the tort sounded in disturbance of trade and interference with use, not trespass to chattels or conversion.
Keeble v. Hickeringill is pivotal for three reasons. First, it articulates an early common law limit on malicious interference, foreshadowing modern torts such as interference with prospective economic advantage and unfair competition. Second, it complements the capture rule by clarifying that, even without property in wild animals prior to possession, the law protects the process of lawful capture when maliciously disrupted. Third, it illustrates how property law safeguards profitable uses of land against intentional, spite-driven conduct, while preserving space for robust, lawful competition.
No. Wild animals (ferae naturae) are not owned until reduced to possession. The court nonetheless recognized a cause of action because the defendant maliciously interfered with Keeble’s lawful business and use of his land, not because Keeble already owned the ducks.
No. The court expressly distinguished fair competition from malicious interference. Establishing a competing decoy pond is lawful competition. Keeble’s claim succeeded because Hickeringill used a malicious tactic—firing guns to scare the ducks—that had no competitive purpose or benefit.
Because Hickeringill did not physically enter Keeble’s land. The injury arose from intentional, indirect interference with Keeble’s trade and use of his property. Action on the case was the appropriate form to redress consequential harm without direct physical invasion.
It shares features with both. There is an interference with the use of land (suggestive of nuisance), but the court’s emphasis on malicious disruption of trade and the competition–malice distinction aligns it closely with the lineage of economic torts and unfair competition.
It is taught in Property to illuminate the capture rule and protection of productive land use, and in Torts to highlight the boundary between legitimate competition and tortious interference. It also frames policy debates about promoting useful activity while deterring purely spiteful conduct.
Keeble v. Hickeringill stands as an early and enduring statement that property law protects not only title to things but also the profitable, lawful use of land against malicious disruption. By distinguishing legitimate competition from spiteful interference, the case balances economic liberty with a baseline duty not to sabotage another’s livelihood. For students, the case is a bridge between capture doctrine and modern economic torts. It clarifies that the absence of a possessory interest in a resource does not license targeted harassment that undermines productive uses of property, reinforcing a core principle of the common law: lawful enterprise deserves protection from purely malicious acts.