Master Seminal Ninth Circuit decision holding that deliberate ignorance (willful blindness) can satisfy the mens rea of knowledge. with this comprehensive case brief.
United States v. Jewell is the foundational federal appellate case on willful blindness, a doctrine that permits the government to prove the knowledge element of a crime by showing a defendant deliberately avoided learning the truth. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reasoned that one who consciously shields himself from clear indications of criminal facts is as culpable as one who has actual knowledge. The case is frequently invoked to rebut so‑called “ostrich” defenses and to instruct juries that purposeful ignorance can equal knowledge. Although often cited under the caption United States v. Jewell, the case is sometimes referenced as Jewell v. United States. Its influence extends beyond drug prosecutions to fraud, money laundering, and even civil contexts. The court embraced the Model Penal Code’s formulation equating knowledge with awareness of a high probability of a fact’s existence, unless the defendant actually believed the fact did not exist, and it cautioned that the doctrine targets purposeful avoidance rather than mere negligence or recklessness.
United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)
Jewell agreed to drive a car from Mexico into the United States for a cash payment. Upon inspection at the border, agents discovered approximately 110 pounds of marijuana concealed in a secret compartment behind the rear seat. The car’s configuration and other circumstances suggested concealment: the trunk did not open in an ordinary way, and there was a noticeable hidden space accessible from the passenger area. Jewell denied knowing that marijuana was in the vehicle but admitted he was aware of the compartment’s existence and did not inquire further, despite suspicious circumstances and the unusual arrangement for driving a stranger’s car across the border for money. He was charged under federal narcotics statutes requiring that he acted “knowingly,” including importation and possession with intent to distribute. At trial, the judge instructed the jury that it could find the knowledge element satisfied if Jewell deliberately closed his eyes to the presence of contraband—i.e., if he was aware of a high probability of the fact’s existence and purposely avoided learning the truth. Jewell was convicted and appealed, arguing, among other things, that the instruction improperly equated negligence or recklessness with knowledge.
Does deliberate ignorance (willful blindness) satisfy the statutory requirement of “knowledge” for federal drug offenses, and was the jury properly instructed that purposeful avoidance can establish knowledge?
Knowledge may be established by proof of deliberate ignorance. Consistent with Model Penal Code § 2.02(7), when knowledge of a particular fact is an element of an offense, the requirement is met if the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact’s existence and deliberately avoided confirming it, unless he actually believed the fact did not exist. The willful blindness instruction must target conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth and may not permit conviction based on mere negligence or recklessness.
Yes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that a willful blindness instruction was proper and that the jury could find knowledge where the defendant consciously avoided confirming what he recognized as a high probability—that the vehicle contained contraband.
The court reasoned that equating deliberate ignorance with knowledge prevents offenders from insulating themselves by consciously avoiding verification of suspicious facts. The statutory term “knowingly” is satisfied not only by positive, subjective knowledge but also by a culpable mental state in which a person is aware of a high probability of a fact and purposefully avoids learning it. The court adopted the Model Penal Code’s approach to prevent the collapse of knowledge into negligence while addressing culpable ignorance: the instruction requires proof of a conscious purpose to avoid the truth, not mere failure to investigate. On the evidentiary record, Jewell accepted money to ferry a stranger’s car across the border, encountered clear signs of a concealed compartment, and admitted awareness of that compartment yet intentionally refrained from inspection. From those circumstances, a rational jury could infer that he recognized a high probability that drugs were present and purposefully looked the other way. The court emphasized that a proper instruction should include the high‑probability standard and the “unless he actually believed otherwise” caveat to ensure the jury does not convict on negligence or recklessness alone. Applying that framework, the panel concluded the instruction adequately conveyed that deliberate avoidance could establish knowledge and that the evidence sufficed to support the verdict.
Jewell is the leading federal case on willful blindness. It operationalizes the Model Penal Code’s knowledge provision and supplies the template for the “ostrich” instruction used nationwide. The doctrine is now entrenched in criminal prosecutions involving drugs, fraud, money laundering, and other offenses where defendants operate amid obvious red flags. For law students, Jewell illuminates the boundary between knowledge, recklessness, and negligence, and highlights how jury instructions translate abstract mens rea concepts into trial practice. Its reasoning later influenced the Supreme Court’s articulation of willful blindness in Global‑Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. and remains a staple of criminal law and evidence courses.
Under Jewell, the government can prove knowledge by showing the defendant was aware of a high probability of a fact’s existence and deliberately avoided confirming it, unless the defendant actually believed the fact did not exist. The key is purposeful avoidance, not mere carelessness.
Negligence is failure to perceive a substantial risk; recklessness is conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. Willful blindness is more culpable: the defendant suspects the truth (high probability) and intentionally avoids learning it to maintain deniability. Jewell treats that purposeful avoidance as equivalent to knowledge.
It is appropriate when there is evidence that the defendant recognized a high probability of the illegal fact and took deliberate steps to avoid confirming it (e.g., ignoring obvious concealment, refusing to look inside a compartment, or accepting suspicious terms while avoiding inquiry). Courts caution against giving the instruction when the evidence shows only negligence or simple failure to investigate.
Jewell endorsed the Model Penal Code formulation and emphasized two features: awareness of a high probability and a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth, coupled with the caveat that the defendant’s actual belief that the fact did not exist defeats knowledge. Instructions that omit these safeguards risk conflating negligence or recklessness with knowledge.
Yes in substance. In Global‑Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. (2011), the Supreme Court endorsed a two‑pronged willful blindness standard requiring a subjective belief in a high probability of the fact and deliberate actions to avoid learning it, closely tracking Jewell and the Model Penal Code.
United States v. Jewell ensures that criminal liability cannot be evaded through calculated ignorance. By aligning the knowledge requirement with the Model Penal Code’s high‑probability and deliberate‑avoidance framework, the Ninth Circuit provided a principled way to capture culpable blindness without collapsing knowledge into mere negligence. For practitioners and students, Jewell is both a doctrinal anchor and a practical guide. It shapes how prosecutors prove mens rea, how defense counsel challenge overbroad instructions, and how judges calibrate jury charges to distinguish purposeful avoidance from recklessness or carelessness. Its logic pervades modern criminal law and remains essential to understanding knowledge and culpability.