This case brief covers Landmark Supreme Court case establishing the disparate impact theory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. is the Supreme Court’s foundational decision recognizing that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reaches beyond intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) to prohibit facially neutral employment practices that disproportionately exclude protected groups and are not demonstrably related to job performance. By articulating the disparate impact doctrine and the employer’s business necessity defense, the Court reframed employment discrimination law around outcomes and job-relatedness rather than motives alone.
For law students, Griggs is indispensable. It supplies the governing framework for evaluating tests, educational prerequisites, and other selection devices; clarifies the interplay between statutory text, legislative purpose, and administrative guidance; and sets the stage for later developments (including Albemarle Paper, Wards Cove, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991). Its core instruction—that employment practices “fair in form, but discriminatory in operation” are unlawful unless justified by business necessity—continues to shape compliance, litigation strategy, and judicial analysis in Title VII cases.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Duke Power Company operated the Dan River Steam Station in North Carolina with five primary departments: Labor, Coal Handling, Operations, Maintenance, and Laboratory. Before Title VII took effect on July 2, 1965, Duke openly discriminated by race, limiting Black employees to the lowest-paid Labor Department and maintaining a dual wage and job structure. When Title VII became effective, Duke ended explicit race-based exclusions but adopted new, facially neutral requirements for hiring and interdepartmental transfers into the higher-paying departments: (1) possession of a high school diploma and (2) achieving specified cutoff scores on two standardized aptitude tests (the Wonderlic Personnel Test and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test). Advancement within the Labor Department beyond entry-level also required a diploma. White employees already working in other departments without diplomas or test credentials were grandfathered and retained their positions; promotions within those departments were not conditioned on meeting the new requirements. The record showed that Black employees passed the tests and possessed diplomas at substantially lower rates than white employees, reflecting the legacy of segregated and unequal schools. Duke did not validate the tests to show they measured skills actually required for the specific jobs. A group of Black employees challenged these practices under Title VII, alleging that the diploma and testing requirements perpetuated past discrimination and had an unlawful disparate impact. The district court and a divided Fourth Circuit largely sided with the employer. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Do high school diploma and standardized testing requirements that are facially neutral but disproportionately exclude Black employees violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when the employer cannot show those requirements are related to job performance and justified by business necessity?
Title VII prohibits employment practices that are neutral in form but discriminatory in operation if they cause a disparate impact on a protected class and are not shown by the employer to be related to job performance and consistent with business necessity. The statute forbids “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment” that operate to freeze the status quo of prior discrimination. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), professionally developed ability tests are not a defense if they are used to discriminate or are not demonstrably job-related; such tests must measure the person for the job, not the person in the abstract. Once a plaintiff shows disparate impact, the employer bears the burden to demonstrate job-relatedness and business necessity for the challenged practice.
Yes. The Court unanimously held that Duke Power’s high school diploma and aptitude test requirements violated Title VII because they had a significant disparate impact on Black employees and were not shown to be related to successful job performance or required by business necessity. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment for the employer and remanded.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, emphasized that Congress enacted Title VII to achieve equality of employment opportunities and to remove barriers that have operated invidiously to disadvantage minority groups. The Court drew a sharp distinction between intent and effect, declaring that “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as built-in headwinds for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” Turning to the statute, the Court read § 703(a) (unlawful employment practices) together with § 703(h) (professionally developed tests) and concluded that § 703(h) does not immunize tests simply because they are professionally developed or facially neutral. Rather, tests must be demonstrably related to job performance and serve a legitimate business necessity. The employer thus shoulders the burden, after a showing of disparate impact, to validate its practices as measuring qualifications actually required by the job. The record undercut Duke’s justification. White employees already in higher departments, many without diplomas or test scores, performed satisfactorily, undermining any claim that the new credentials were necessary to do the work. Duke’s tests were not validated as predictive of performance in the specific jobs at issue; they measured general intelligence or mechanical comprehension in the abstract. Similarly, the high school diploma requirement was not tied to the actual tasks. Both requirements disproportionately excluded Black employees—reflecting the residual effects of segregated schooling—and effectively perpetuated past discrimination by freezing Black workers in the Labor Department. Title VII does not mandate quotas or preferential treatment; it requires that selection criteria bear a manifest relationship to the job. Because Duke failed to make that showing, its policies violated the statute.
Griggs established the disparate impact framework that dominates modern Title VII doctrine: plaintiffs may prevail without proving discriminatory intent if they show a significant adverse effect on a protected group and the employer cannot prove job-relatedness and business necessity. The case anchored the “job-related and consistent with business necessity” standard and clarified that § 703(h) does not shield unvalidated tests. Griggs also shaped later jurisprudence and legislation: Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody elaborated remedies and validation principles; Wards Cove altered burden allocations; and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 effectively restored and codified Griggs’s disparate impact approach, including a clarified burden on employers and recognition of less discriminatory alternatives. For law students, Griggs is a paradigmatic example of purposive statutory interpretation, the role of EEOC guidance, and the centrality of empirical proof and validation in employment selection practices.
Disparate treatment requires proof of intentional discrimination based on a protected characteristic. Disparate impact, recognized in Griggs, addresses facially neutral policies that disproportionately exclude protected groups and are not justified by job-relatedness and business necessity. No discriminatory motive is required for a disparate impact claim; the focus is on outcomes and justification.
No. Griggs permits the use of professionally developed tests and educational criteria if the employer demonstrates they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. Tests must measure skills that predict or are necessary for successful performance in the specific job. Unvalidated or arbitrary requirements that disproportionately exclude protected groups violate Title VII.
The Court held § 703(h) does not automatically insulate tests from Title VII scrutiny. Even professionally developed tests are unlawful if used to discriminate or if they lack a demonstrable relationship to job performance. In short, professional development is not enough; job-relatedness and business necessity are required.
Griggs indicates that once plaintiffs show a significant disparate impact from a specific employment practice, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity. Although later cases and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 refined these allocations and the role of less discriminatory alternatives, Griggs set the foundation that the employer must justify the challenged practice after an impact showing.
The 1991 Act codified disparate impact liability, largely restoring Griggs after Wards Cove’s narrowing. It places on employers the burden of persuasion to show that an employment practice causing disparate impact is job-related and consistent with business necessity, and it authorizes plaintiffs to prevail by proving an equally effective, less discriminatory alternative that the employer refused to adopt.
No. The Court emphasized that Title VII does not require preferential treatment or quotas. It requires that employment decisions be based on criteria demonstrably related to job performance. The remedy is to remove artificial, arbitrary barriers—not to impose numerical outcomes.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. revolutionized employment discrimination law by shifting the inquiry from an employer’s motives to the actual effects and justifications of its selection practices. The Court unequivocally held that Title VII outlaws neutral policies that disproportionately exclude protected groups unless those policies measure qualifications genuinely required for the job and are justified by business necessity.
For students and practitioners, Griggs endures as a touchstone for analyzing tests, credentials, and screening devices. It anchors modern compliance and litigation strategies in validation studies, evidence-based job analysis, and consideration of less exclusionary alternatives, ensuring that equal employment opportunity is measured by real job capability rather than abstract, unnecessary barriers.