Master Idaho held a car owner vicariously liable under agency where she loaned her car on the express condition that the football coach personally drive it to transport players. with this comprehensive case brief.
Gorton v. Doty is a foundational agency-formation case used in first-year law courses to illustrate how minimal manifestations of consent and control can create a principal–agent relationship. The case addresses whether a car owner who conditions a loan of her vehicle on a particular person driving has assumed a principal’s legal exposure for that person’s negligent operation. By finding an agency relationship on sparse facts, the court highlights how agency can arise without formal contracts, payment, or elaborate control mechanisms.
The case is also valuable because it provokes debate. Many students and commentators view it as stretching the concept of "control" and prefer to characterize the transaction as a mere gratuitous bailment. Comparing the majority’s approach with more modern understandings of agency (e.g., Restatement (Third) of Agency) helps clarify the elements of manifestation, benefit, and control, and the policy stakes in assigning vicarious liability.
57 Idaho 792, 69 P.2d 136 (Supreme Court of Idaho 1937)
Doty, a schoolteacher and automobile owner, learned that the high school football team needed transportation to an away game. She told the team’s coach, Garst, that he could use her car provided that he—and only he—drove it. Garst accepted and drove Doty’s car, carrying players to the game. En route, Garst negligently operated the vehicle, causing an accident in which Gorton, a minor football player, was injured. Gorton (through a guardian) sued both Garst and Doty to recover for negligence, alleging that Garst was acting as Doty’s agent. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff against Doty. Doty appealed, arguing there was no agency, only a gratuitous loan of her car and no right of control over Garst’s driving beyond the permissive condition.
Did an agency relationship exist between Doty (the car owner) and Garst (the football coach) such that Doty is vicariously liable for Garst’s negligent driving when she loaned him her car on the condition that he alone drive it to transport players?
Agency is the fiduciary relationship that results from the manifestation of consent by one person (the principal) that another (the agent) shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and consent by the other so to act. An agency relationship may arise impliedly from conduct and circumstances; it does not require a formal contract, consideration, or extensive day-to-day control. If an agency exists, the principal is vicariously liable for the agent’s torts committed within the scope of the agency.
Yes. An agency relationship existed; Garst acted as Doty’s agent when driving the car pursuant to her condition, and Doty is vicariously liable for his negligence.
The court emphasized that agency can be implied from the parties’ manifestations and surrounding circumstances. Doty expressly conditioned the use of her vehicle on Garst personally driving it. This condition was more than a mere permissive loan; it identified the particular person who was to act and retained a measure of control over how the task would be performed (who would drive), thereby satisfying the control element in agency. Garst accepted the condition and undertook the trip for the common purpose of transporting the school’s players—conduct that the court treated as acting on Doty’s behalf within the scope of the agreed-upon undertaking. The court rejected the argument that the arrangement was merely a gratuitous bailment with no agency, noting that consideration is unnecessary for agency and that control need not be pervasive. While Doty did not direct the details of how Garst would drive, her stipulation that only he could do so was a meaningful limitation on the undertaking and a manifestation that he would act for her in the operation of her car. Because the negligence occurred in the course of carrying out that purpose, vicarious liability attached. A dissent (and many later commentators) would characterize the transaction as a simple loan, reasoning that specifying a driver as a condition of permission does not create the necessary right of control and that the owner derived no benefit. The majority, however, treated the condition as sufficient control and reaffirmed that benefit is not a necessary element of agency. On that basis, the judgment against Doty was affirmed.
Gorton v. Doty is a staple in agency formation because it shows how slight manifestations of consent and control can be enough to establish an agency relationship—and thus vicarious tort liability. It cautions owners and would-be principals that imposing conditions on how a task is carried out (here, who will drive) can imply control and trigger liability. The case is often contrasted with modern formulations (e.g., Restatement (Third) of Agency), which may demand a clearer showing of the principal’s right to control the agent’s actions. As such, the case is both a teaching tool for the elements of agency and a springboard for critiquing the outer limits of vicarious liability.
The court reasoned that by naming the specific driver and tying permission to that condition, Doty manifested a right to control a key aspect of performance—who would operate her car. That stipulation went beyond a mere permissive loan and indicated Garst would act on her behalf under a limitation she imposed, satisfying the minimal control requirement for agency.
Likely yes. Without the condition that Garst personally drive, the arrangement looks like a standard gratuitous bailment—permission to borrow property—without any retained right of control over performance. Many courts would not find agency in that scenario and would not impose vicarious liability on the owner for the borrower’s negligence.
No. Agency can be gratuitous and need not be memorialized in a formal contract. What is required is mutual consent that one person act on behalf of another and subject to the other’s control. The court in Gorton v. Doty emphasized that consideration is not necessary for an agency relationship to arise.
Modern formulations stress the principal’s right to control the manner and means of the agent’s acts. Some contemporary courts and scholars think Gorton stretches the control concept by equating a condition on who may act with control over how the work is performed. Many modern courts might require a clearer right to control operational details to find agency in similar facts.
Generally, no. Ownership alone does not establish agency. Liability typically requires an agency relationship, a statutory basis (such as a permissive-use owner liability statute), or a special relationship (e.g., employer–employee within scope). In Gorton, liability flowed from the court’s finding of agency, not merely from ownership.
The decision reflects a policy of protecting injured third parties by placing loss on the party best positioned to manage risks—the owner who conditions use and can withhold permission, insure, or control terms. Critics argue this expands vicarious liability too far and may chill helpful conduct like lending a vehicle for community activities.
Gorton v. Doty teaches that agency can arise from subtle manifestations of consent and control, even in casual, gratuitous arrangements. By tying vehicle use to a specific driver, the owner created a relationship the court deemed sufficient to impose vicarious liability for negligent driving.
For students, the case crystallizes the elements of agency—manifestation, acting on behalf of another, and control—and invites critical assessment of how much control is enough. It remains a touchstone for exploring the boundaries between mere permission (bailment) and an agency relationship that carries significant liability consequences.