Master The Supreme Court upheld an Air Force uniform regulation that barred an Orthodox Jewish officer from wearing a yarmulke while on duty, emphasizing judicial deference to military judgments over Free Exercise claims. with this comprehensive case brief.
Goldman v. Weinberger is a foundational Supreme Court case at the intersection of military discipline and religious liberty. Decided in 1986, it addressed whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required the U.S. Air Force to allow an Orthodox Jewish officer to wear a yarmulke while in uniform indoors, notwithstanding a uniform regulation prohibiting headgear in those settings. The Court’s answer—upholding the regulation—underscored the judiciary’s extraordinary deference to professional military judgments about discipline, uniformity, and esprit de corps.
Beyond its immediate holding, Goldman’s significance is amplified by what followed: a swift legislative response by Congress permitting certain religious apparel in the military, and later, the enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) reinstating a statutory compelling-interest/least-restrictive-means test for federal actions, including many within the military. For law students, Goldman illuminates how constitutional standards can be context-sensitive, how the military is treated as a unique constitutional domain, and how separation of powers enables legislative recalibration of rights after judicial decisions.
475 U.S. 503 (U.S. 1986)
Dr. Simcha Goldman, an Orthodox Jewish clinical psychologist serving as an officer in the U.S. Air Force, wore a yarmulke at work as an expression of religious observance. Air Force Regulation 35-10 generally prohibited wearing headgear indoors while in uniform. After Goldman wore his yarmulke while on duty, including when testifying in a military proceeding, his superiors ordered him to comply with the regulation and not wear the head covering indoors. Goldman sought an accommodation based on his religious obligations, but the Air Force denied his request, invoking the importance of uniformity, discipline, and esprit de corps. Goldman sued in federal court, arguing that the regulation, as applied to his religious practice, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The district court granted relief, but the court of appeals reversed, deferring to the Air Force’s judgment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause compels an exception to the uniform regulation for religious apparel.
Does the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause require the U.S. Air Force to accommodate an Orthodox Jewish officer’s wearing of a yarmulke indoors while in uniform, notwithstanding a uniform regulation prohibiting indoor headgear?
In the military context, courts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest. Regulations that impinge on constitutional rights may be sustained if they are reasonably related to the military’s asserted interests in discipline, uniformity, and mission accomplishment; strict scrutiny and least-restrictive-means analysis generally do not apply in this context. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy; Brown v. Glines; Chappell v. Wallace; Orloff v. Willoughby.
No. The Supreme Court held that the Air Force’s prohibition on wearing a yarmulke indoors while in uniform did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. The Court deferred to the Air Force’s judgment that uniformity in dress furthers discipline and esprit de corps and declined to require a religious accommodation.
The Court emphasized that the military is a specialized society separate from civilian life, with a mission that often demands obedience, uniformity, and cohesion. In this setting, judicial review of constitutional claims is highly deferential. The Court accepted the Air Force’s professional judgment that permitting exceptions to uniform standards—even seemingly minor ones—could undermine uniformity and discipline, which are critical to military effectiveness. It was not the Court’s role, the majority explained, to second-guess those judgments or to craft nuanced exceptions to military uniform regulations. Rejecting the approach of strict scrutiny typically associated with Free Exercise claims at the time, the Court reasoned that the unique exigencies of military life justify a more deferential standard that asks whether the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate military interests. Under that standard, the regulation survived because it advanced uniformity and cohesion within the ranks, and the Air Force had a rational basis for concluding that granting religious headgear exceptions could erode adherence to uniform appearance standards. The Court also declined to require the military to adopt less restrictive alternatives, such as permitting small or color-matched yarmulkes, as that would involve judicial micromanagement of military affairs. The dissent would have applied a stricter test, contending that the Air Force failed to show that allowing a modest, unobtrusive religious head covering would materially harm discipline or cohesion. But the majority viewed the institutional context as dispositive: the Constitution allows broader regulation of speech and religious conduct in the armed forces than in civilian life, and the judiciary should not substitute its judgment for that of military decisionmakers.
Goldman is a key precedent on constitutional deference to the military. It teaches that Free Exercise rights are more limited in the armed forces than in civilian life, and that courts generally uphold military regulations if they are reasonably related to asserted interests in discipline and cohesion. The decision also demonstrates the separation-of-powers dynamic: Congress swiftly responded by enacting 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1987), authorizing service members to wear certain neat and conservative religious apparel with the uniform when it does not interfere with military duties. Later, RFRA (1993) restored a statutory compelling-interest/least-restrictive-means test against the federal government, including the military in many contexts, leading the Department of Defense to issue policies affording broader religious accommodations. For law students, Goldman provides a template for analyzing constitutional claims in specialized institutional settings and highlights how statutory law can recalibrate the practical landscape after a constitutional ruling.
Air Force Regulation 35-10, which generally prohibited wearing headgear indoors while in uniform. It was applied to bar Dr. Goldman from wearing his yarmulke during duty inside military facilities.
No. The Court applied a highly deferential standard unique to the military context, sustaining the regulation so long as it was reasonably related to legitimate military interests like discipline and uniformity, rather than requiring a compelling interest pursued through the least restrictive means.
Congress enacted 10 U.S.C. § 774 in 1987, authorizing the wearing of neat and conservative religious apparel with the uniform when it does not interfere with military duties. The Department of Defense later promulgated policies implementing this accommodation.
Goldman’s constitutional holding remains precedent regarding judicial deference to military judgments. However, RFRA imposes a statutory compelling-interest/least-restrictive-means test on the federal government, including many military decisions, which often results in greater protection for religious exercise than Goldman would require as a constitutional matter.
Goldman predates Smith (1990) and did not rely on Smith’s neutral-laws rule. Instead, it turned on military deference. After Smith, the constitutional baseline for Free Exercise narrowed in civilian contexts, but RFRA later expanded statutory protections against the federal government—including the military—beyond what the Constitution alone would guarantee.
The Court accepted the Air Force’s view that uniformity in appearance is integral to discipline and esprit de corps and that allowing individualized exceptions could lead to broader deviations that undermine cohesion. The majority declined to second-guess that professional military judgment.
Goldman v. Weinberger illustrates how constitutional rights can be constrained by the unique demands of military service. Applying a deferential standard, the Supreme Court upheld an Air Force uniform regulation against a Free Exercise challenge, concluding that uniformity and discipline justified the restriction on religious headgear in the workplace.
The case’s legacy extends beyond its holding: Congress and the executive branch reshaped the legal landscape through statute and policy to provide religious accommodations in the armed forces, and RFRA now supplies a rigorous statutory test for federal actions. For students of constitutional law, Goldman is a prime example of the judiciary’s deference to military judgments and of how the political branches can recalibrate rights protections in response to judicial decisions.