Master A physically present co-occupant’s express refusal bars police from conducting a warrantless consent search, even if another resident consents. with this comprehensive case brief.
Georgia v. Randolph is a cornerstone Fourth Amendment case refining the consent exception to the warrant requirement in the context of shared residences. The Supreme Court confronted a recurring, practical problem: when two co-occupants are present and one consents to a police search while the other expressly refuses, whose choice controls? The Court’s answer draws on “social expectations” and the traditional sanctity of the home to set a clear, albeit narrow, boundary for warrantless searches based on third-party consent.
For law students and practitioners, Randolph matters because it carefully delineates the scope of “common authority” recognized in prior cases like United States v. Matlock and Illinois v. Rodriguez. It articulates a bright-line rule for the physically present, objecting resident while simultaneously preserving exceptions—such as exigent circumstances—and leaving intact police reliance on consent when the objector is absent or lawfully removed. The decision has become a key teaching case on consent doctrine, later refined by Fernandez v. California.
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (U.S. Supreme Court)
After a domestic dispute, Janet Randolph called police to the home she shared with her husband, Scott Randolph, in Americus, Georgia. Janet told officers she had left the home with her child because of marital conflict and alleged that her husband used cocaine. Officers accompanied Janet back to the residence. At the doorway, Scott Randolph appeared and expressly refused to consent to a search. Janet, however, consented and led officers to an upstairs bedroom, where an officer observed a straw with white powder believed to be cocaine residue. Based on this observation, police obtained a search warrant and later seized additional evidence. Scott Randolph was charged with drug offenses and moved to suppress, arguing the initial warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment because he was present and expressly objected. The trial court suppressed the evidence; the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed; and the Georgia Supreme Court reinstated the suppression, holding that a present co-occupant’s refusal trumps another occupant’s consent. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
When two co-occupants are physically present and one expressly refuses consent to search while the other consents, may the police conduct a warrantless search of the shared residence under the Third-Party Consent doctrine?
A warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence, as to a physically present resident who expressly refuses consent, is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and cannot be justified by the consent of another resident. Consent by one occupant suffices when the potential objector is absent (and not absent due to police removal for the purpose of avoiding objection), or where officers reasonably rely on apparent authority, but not when the objector is physically present and objects. Recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances, remain unaffected.
No. When a physically present co-occupant expressly refuses consent, police may not conduct a warrantless search based on another co-occupant’s consent; the search is unreasonable as to the objecting occupant, and evidence must be suppressed as to him.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter, grounded its analysis in Fourth Amendment reasonableness and shared social expectations. In ordinary social custom, a visitor would not enter a home when one resident invites entry but another, standing at the door, says “stay out.” The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home aligns with this expectation: the state may not treat an invitation as sufficient where a co-owner simultaneously and expressly vetoes it. The decision distinguishes two prior consent cases. In United States v. Matlock, the Court allowed third‑party consent where a co‑occupant was absent but possessed common authority over the premises. In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Court sustained a search based on an officer’s reasonable belief that the consenting party had authority. Randolph narrows neither case. Instead, it fixes a limit: when the nonconsenting co-occupant is physically present and expressly refuses, the consenting co-occupant’s permission cannot override that refusal as to the objector. The Court rejected the State’s argument that broad “assumption of risk” principles should control. While each co-occupant assumes a risk that another may consent to a search in his absence, that risk does not extend to circumstances where he is present and clearly objects. Nor was there evidence of exigency. The majority emphasized that officers remain free to act without a warrant where immediate safety or domestic violence concerns demand intervention, or to seek a warrant based on available probable cause. Chief Justice Roberts dissented (joined by Justice Scalia), contending that co-occupant consent should suffice whenever any resident with common authority grants it, emphasizing practicality and the state’s interest in investigating domestic crime. Justice Thomas also dissented. Justice Breyer concurred separately to stress the narrowness of the holding and the continuing vitality of exigent-circumstance and community-caretaking responses. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the search conducted over Scott Randolph’s express refusal was unreasonable as to him. The evidence from the initial entry and the subsequently obtained warrant (as fruit of the poisonous tree) was properly suppressed.
Randolph is a pivotal limitation on the Third-Party Consent doctrine: one occupant’s consent does not trump another’s simultaneous, express refusal when both are physically present. For students, it clarifies how Matlock and Rodriguez operate in everyday policing—consent remains a robust exception when the objector is absent or when apparent authority exists, but the presence-and-objection scenario is different. The case is routinely paired with Fernandez v. California, which later held that once the objection is removed through lawful, objectively reasonable means (e.g., a valid arrest), a co-occupant’s consent can again authorize a search. Randolph also underscores the home’s special status and the Court’s use of social norms to define Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
Matlock allows a search based on one co-occupant’s consent when the other potential objector is absent and the consenting person has common authority. Randolph adds a limit: if the nonconsenting co-occupant is physically present and clearly objects, that objection controls as to him, and the police cannot rely on the other occupant’s consent to conduct a warrantless search.
Under Fernandez v. California (2014), once the objecting occupant is lawfully removed for objectively reasonable reasons (e.g., a valid arrest unrelated to avoiding the objection), a remaining co-occupant’s consent can authorize a search. Randolph’s bar applies only while the objector is physically present and objecting.
Yes. Randolph expressly preserves exigent circumstances. If officers reasonably believe immediate action is necessary—such as to prevent harm, render emergency aid, or address ongoing domestic violence—they may enter without a warrant despite an occupant’s refusal. The case at hand lacked such exigency.
Generally no. Consent must come from someone with actual or apparent common authority over the premises. Children or temporary guests usually lack such authority, and Randolph’s present-and-objecting rule would bar reliance on their consent as to the objecting resident. Officers may still act on apparent authority if it is objectively reasonable (Rodriguez), but Randolph prevents overriding a present occupant’s express refusal.
Randolph frames the search as unreasonable “as to him,” the objecting occupant. Practically, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is typically suppressed in the prosecution of that objector. Whether it is usable against other defendants may turn on standing and personal rights analyses; suppression is not a broad evidentiary sanction for non-objectors who lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.
Randolph is focused on a physically present, contemporaneous objection that officers know about when they seek entry. If the objector is not present, or the objection is not contemporaneous and clear, Matlock and Rodriguez principles may allow reliance on another occupant’s consent—subject to Fernandez if the absence follows a lawful removal.
Georgia v. Randolph draws a critical boundary around consent searches in shared homes: when a resident is physically present and expressly objects, police cannot bypass that refusal by relying on another occupant’s permission. The decision harmonizes Fourth Amendment doctrine with everyday social norms and preserves the core privacy of the home without unduly hobbling legitimate police responses to emergencies.
For students and practitioners, Randolph’s value lies in its clarity and careful cabining. It leaves intact consent searches where the objector is absent or lawfully removed and preserves exigent-circumstances and apparent‑authority doctrines, while insisting that a person at his threshold retains the power to say “no” and make it stick against the state’s warrantless entry.