Master Foundational English case establishing strict liability for non-natural uses that cause escape, later adapted in the U.S. into the abnormally dangerous activities doctrine. with this comprehensive case brief.
Rylands v. Fletcher is the wellspring of modern strict liability in tort. Decided by the House of Lords in 1868, the case holds that one who brings onto land a substance likely to cause harm if it escapes must keep it at his peril and is strictly liable for damage caused by its escape, regardless of negligence. The decision, rooted in principles of nuisance and land use, shifted the focus from fault to the allocation of risk when one engages in hazardous undertakings on land.
In the United States, courts did not import the Rylands rule wholesale. Instead, American tort law recast the doctrine to focus on abnormally dangerous activities as synthesized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 519–520. While Rylands speaks in terms of non-natural use and escape, U.S. courts emphasize the nature and magnitude of the risk, the inability to eliminate it by reasonable care, the activity’s commonness, and its appropriateness to the locale. The result is a narrower, policy-driven form of strict liability that embraces blasting, large-scale storage of hazardous materials, and similar high-risk activities, while rejecting strict liability for ordinary land uses.
Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (H.L. 1868)
Defendant Rylands constructed a reservoir on his land to supply water to his mill. Independent contractors excavated and built the reservoir over old, disused mine shafts and subterranean passages associated with neighboring coal mining operations. These ancient workings, unknown to the defendant and imperfectly addressed by the contractors, created a concealed conduit from the reservoir toward the adjacent mine operated by the plaintiff, Fletcher. When the reservoir was filled, water broke through the old shafts and passages and flooded Fletcher’s mine, causing substantial damage. There was no finding of negligence by Rylands or the contractors in constructing the reservoir; nonetheless, Fletcher sued for the resulting harm. The case proceeded through the Court of Exchequer, the Exchequer Chamber, and ultimately to the House of Lords.
Is a landowner strictly liable, absent negligence, when he brings onto his land a potentially harmful substance for his own purposes and, through its escape, causes damage to a neighbor, particularly where the use is non-natural and the risk materializes?
Classical Rylands rule: A person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril; if he does not, he is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. Defenses include acts of God, the wrongful act of a third party, and the plaintiff’s own default. The rule applies to non-natural (extraordinary) uses of land, not ordinary or natural uses. U.S. adaptation (Restatement approach): Most American jurisdictions limit strict liability to abnormally dangerous activities. An actor is strictly liable for harm resulting from such an activity if the activity: (1) involves a high degree of risk of harm; (2) the harm is likely to be great; (3) the risk cannot be eliminated by reasonable care; (4) the activity is not a matter of common usage; (5) it is inappropriate to the place where it is carried on; and (6) its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. Unlike the English formulation, the U.S. doctrine does not require an “escape” and focuses on activity-characteristics rather than non-natural use of land.
Yes. The House of Lords held Rylands strictly liable for the damage caused by the escape of water from his reservoir into Fletcher’s mine because storing large quantities of water in these circumstances constituted a non-natural use of land, and the water’s escape caused the harm.
The House of Lords reasoned that certain uses of land impose special risks that, even with due care, may cause grave harm if hazardous substances escape. Drawing analogies to nuisance and trespass, the court emphasized a policy of risk allocation: the party who introduces and controls a hazardous agency on land should bear the burden of its inherent risks, rather than placing the loss on an innocent neighbor. The storage of a large reservoir over unknown and latent mine shafts was deemed a non-natural use because it was an extraordinary use that increased danger beyond the ordinary incidents of land occupancy. The absence of negligence did not absolve Rylands, since the rule attaches liability to the escape itself. The court acknowledged limited defenses to avoid unfairness where the causal chain is broken by vis major (act of God), the wrongful act of a stranger, or the plaintiff’s own conduct. In the U.S. evolution, courts were concerned that a broad non-natural use test could chill ordinary development and impose liability for a wide range of useful land uses. American courts and the Restatement reframed the inquiry to focus on abnormally dangerous activities, weighing factors such as the magnitude and unavoidability of risk, appropriateness to place, and commonness. This approach narrows strict liability to paradigmatic hazards like blasting, storage and transport of large quantities of toxic or explosive materials, and certain hazardous emissions. Unlike the English requirement of escape, American decisions often impose strict liability for direct and indirect harms (for example, concussive blasting damage), reflecting a modern understanding of causation and risk distribution in high-hazard activities.
Rylands v. Fletcher is the conceptual ancestor of American strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. For law students, the case illuminates the shift from fault-based negligence to strict liability where policy deems certain risks unacceptable to impose on neighbors, regardless of care. It frames enduring questions: What risks should society internalize to the actor? How do we balance utility against danger, and how does place matter? In U.S. torts, Rylands is indispensable for understanding the Restatement’s six-factor test, the role of locality, why blasting and hazardous storage attract strict liability while ordinary water mains and household uses do not, and how strict liability interacts with nuisance, trespass, and negligence.
No. Rylands is an English decision and is persuasive, not binding. U.S. courts have largely adopted its core policy through the Restatement’s abnormally dangerous activities doctrine. Many jurisdictions cite Rylands as historical support but apply the Restatement factors rather than the English non-natural use and escape framework.
The English rule emphasizes non-natural use of land and the escape of a hazardous substance. The U.S. approach focuses on whether the activity is abnormally dangerous under a multi-factor test and does not require a literal escape. For example, blasting that causes vibration damage across property lines can trigger strict liability in the U.S. even though nothing physically escapes.
Typical examples include blasting and demolition using explosives, storage or transport of large quantities of toxic or explosive chemicals, large-scale impoundment of water in unusual settings, hazardous waste disposal, and aerial pesticide application in circumstances posing high, unavoidable risks. Routine, common land uses and activities, even if they can cause harm, are usually treated under negligence rather than strict liability.
Defenses are limited. A defendant may invoke assumption of risk (knowing and voluntary exposure), comparative fault in some jurisdictions to reduce damages, acts of God or extraordinary natural events, or the unforeseeable wrongful act of a third party that is a superseding cause. Contributory negligence is generally not a complete defense unless it amounts to assumption of risk.
Rylands has roots in private nuisance because it addresses unreasonable interferences arising from land use. However, it imposes liability without requiring proof of fault, unlike negligence. Plaintiffs often plead nuisance, negligence, and strict liability in the alternative. When the activity is deemed abnormally dangerous, strict liability provides recovery even if the defendant exercised reasonable care; nuisance focuses on unreasonable interference; negligence focuses on breach of duty.
Rylands v. Fletcher endures as a foundational case in torts because it articulates a principled reason to place the costs of extraordinary hazards on those who create and benefit from them, rather than on innocent neighbors. The decision reframed the inquiry from proof of fault to risk allocation in contexts where due care cannot neutralize dangers inherent in certain activities.
American courts distilled Rylands into a narrower, policy-sensitive doctrine that imposes strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. Understanding this evolution equips students to analyze modern disputes involving hazardous enterprises, to apply the Restatement factors, and to navigate the interplay among strict liability, negligence, and nuisance in land-use and environmental torts.