Master The Supreme Court held that a co-occupant’s voluntary consent to search is valid even after another co-occupant previously objected, so long as the objector has been lawfully removed. with this comprehensive case brief.
Fernandez v. California clarifies and significantly narrows Georgia v. Randolph’s limit on third‑party consent searches. In Randolph, the Court held that when two co-occupants are physically present and one expressly refuses consent, the police may not enter on the consenting occupant’s say‑so. Fernandez addresses what happens when the objecting occupant is no longer there—specifically, because he has been lawfully arrested and removed.
In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that once the objecting cotenant is absent due to lawful removal (e.g., arrest supported by probable cause), the remaining cotenant’s voluntary consent suffices under United States v. Matlock’s common‑authority doctrine. The ruling effectively confines Randolph to its facts—cases where the objector is physically present and objecting—thereby restoring broad operative force to the third‑party consent exception and giving police clearer guidance in domestic violence and joint-occupancy contexts.
571 U.S. 292 (2014); 134 S. Ct. 1126; 188 L. Ed. 2d 25
Los Angeles police investigating a violent robbery followed a suspect to an apartment building where they heard yelling and sounds of a fight. When officers knocked, Roxanne Rojas opened the door with fresh injuries. As officers asked to conduct a protective sweep, Walter Fernandez appeared and told them they could not enter. Believing Fernandez had assaulted Rojas and was linked to the robbery, officers arrested and removed him based on probable cause for domestic violence and robbery. After securing the scene and about an hour later, detectives returned and obtained Rojas’s written consent to search the apartment. The search uncovered evidence tying Fernandez to the earlier robbery, including gang paraphernalia and incriminating items. Fernandez moved to suppress, arguing that under Georgia v. Randolph his prior objection barred the police from relying on Rojas’s consent. The trial court denied suppression; the California Court of Appeal affirmed, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Does a physically present cotenant’s objection to a warrantless search bar police from later relying on another cotenant’s consent after the objector has been lawfully removed from the premises?
Under the Fourth Amendment, police may conduct a warrantless search with the voluntary consent of a resident who has common authority over the premises (United States v. Matlock). The narrow Randolph exception bars such a search only when a physically present cotenant expressly refuses consent. If the objecting cotenant is not physically present because he has been lawfully removed (e.g., via arrest supported by probable cause), the remaining cotenant’s voluntary consent renders the search reasonable; the earlier objection does not persist, and officers are not required to obtain a warrant instead of relying on consent.
No. When the objecting cotenant has been lawfully removed from the premises, the consent of a remaining cotenant with common authority validates a warrantless search notwithstanding the absent cotenant’s earlier objection.
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito emphasized that Georgia v. Randolph carved a narrow exception to the longstanding Matlock rule that a co-occupant’s voluntary consent suffices. Randolph’s rationale hinged on social expectations when two cotenants are physically present at the threshold and one objects; society would not consider it reasonable to enter over a present occupant’s express refusal. That rationale, the Court explained, does not extend to situations where the objector is absent. Consistent with Matlock, an absent occupant assumes the risk that a co-inhabitant may permit a search. The Court rejected Fernandez’s argument that a prior objection should permanently bar consent searches, finding no constitutional basis for a “continuing objection” rule. The Court further held that officers need not forgo consent and obtain a warrant whenever an objector has been arrested and removed. The proper inquiry is objective: if the removal is lawful—supported by probable cause or otherwise objectively reasonable—the later consent stands. The Court declined to invalidate searches based on alleged police motive to sidestep Randolph, reiterating that Fourth Amendment reasonableness turns on objective facts, not subjective intent. Here, officers had ample probable cause to arrest Fernandez for domestic violence and the robbery, the removal was lawful, and Rojas’s subsequent written consent was voluntary. Because Randolph applies only when the objector is physically present and objecting, it did not bar the search. The Court also noted that any exigency regarding the initial entry to protect a potential victim did not control the later consent search; instead, the later search was justified by Rojas’s independent consent. Justice Thomas concurred separately. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented, arguing that the decision undermines the warrant preference and effectively nullifies Randolph by allowing officers to arrest and remove an objector and then proceed on third-party consent rather than seek a warrant, especially problematic in domestic violence settings.
Fernandez substantially narrows Randolph by limiting its bar on third-party consent searches to scenarios where the objecting cotenant is physically present and objecting at the time of entry. After Fernandez, once officers lawfully remove an objector (e.g., arrest with probable cause), they may rely on the remaining occupant’s voluntary consent without first obtaining a warrant. For law students, the case re-centers Matlock’s common‑authority rule and frames Randolph as a narrow, fact‑sensitive exception. It also illustrates the Court’s commitment to objective reasonableness (rather than police motive) in Fourth Amendment analysis and highlights domestic-violence and shared-occupancy contexts as recurring consent-search fact patterns.
No. Fernandez narrowed Randolph. Randolph still bars entry when two cotenants are physically present and one expressly refuses consent. Fernandez holds that if the objector is absent due to lawful removal, the remaining cotenant’s consent suffices; Randolph’s bar does not persist once the objector is no longer present.
Lawful removal includes an arrest or detention supported by probable cause or other objectively reasonable grounds recognized by law (e.g., lawful detention for officer safety). The Court uses an objective standard; the officer’s subjective motive is irrelevant if the removal itself is lawful.
Not if a remaining co-occupant with common authority voluntarily consents. The Fourth Amendment does not impose a warrant-first requirement in this situation; voluntary third-party consent is an established exception to the warrant requirement.
No. The Supreme Court rejected a “continuing objection” rule. Once the objector is no longer physically present, the remaining cotenant’s voluntary consent can authorize a search, provided the removal of the objector was lawful.
Any resident with common authority over the premises—someone who has mutual use of and joint access to or control over the area to be searched—may consent. Landlords, hotel managers, or guests without such authority generally cannot give valid consent to search private living areas.
It gives officers clearer authority to rely on a victimized cotenant’s consent after lawfully arresting and removing an alleged abuser, without needing to obtain a warrant. The dissent warned, however, about risks of coercion and urged adherence to the warrant preference in such sensitive contexts.
Fernandez v. California restores the primacy of Matlock’s common‑authority consent rule, restricting Randolph to the narrow circumstance where a physically present cotenant actively objects at the threshold. By adopting an objective standard keyed to lawful removal, the Court permits officers to proceed on another occupant’s voluntary consent without a warrant once the objector is no longer there.
For students and practitioners, Fernandez is a blueprint for analyzing cotenant-consent problems: identify physical presence, assess the lawfulness of any removal, and evaluate voluntariness and scope of the consenting occupant’s authority. The case underscores how Fourth Amendment reasonableness turns on objective facts and social expectations, not subjective police motives.