Master Supreme Court established the Feres doctrine, barring FTCA suits by servicemembers for injuries “incident to service.” with this comprehensive case brief.
Feres v. United States is the cornerstone case defining the limits of the federal government’s tort liability to members of the armed forces. Interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the Supreme Court held that the United States is not liable for injuries to servicemembers where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service. This judicially created doctrine—the “Feres doctrine”—has shaped military tort law for decades, reaching beyond combat situations to bar claims stemming from medical malpractice, training accidents, and on-base living conditions when tied to military service.
For law students, Feres is essential not only for understanding sovereign immunity and the FTCA’s scope, but also for appreciating how nontextual statutory interpretation, institutional competency, and separation-of-powers concerns—particularly military discipline and national defense—can drive outcomes. The opinion synthesizes multiple considerations: the distinctively federal nature of the military relationship, the lack of a private analogue, the uniformity concerns of applying diverse state tort laws to military affairs, and the existence of alternative compensation schemes for servicemembers.
340 U.S. 135 (1950) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Feres consolidated three FTCA suits brought by or on behalf of active-duty servicemen. In the lead case, Lieutenant Rudolph Feres died when his Army barracks caught fire; his estate alleged that the Army negligently quartered him in a building known to be unsafe due to a defective heating plant and inadequate fire watch procedures. In Jefferson v. United States, an active-duty soldier underwent abdominal surgery at an Army hospital; surgeons negligently left a large towel—marked “Medical Department U.S. Army”—in his stomach, causing serious complications. In the third case (often referred to as Griggs v. United States), the estate of an active-duty serviceman alleged wrongful death caused by negligent medical care provided by Army medical personnel at a military hospital. Each plaintiff sought damages under the FTCA, contending that the United States, if a private person, would be liable for the negligence of its employees. The government urged that the FTCA either did not reach these claims or should not be construed to permit suits arising from the military relationship and the performance of military duties.
Does the Federal Tort Claims Act allow servicemembers (or their estates) to recover from the United States for injuries or deaths caused by government negligence when the injuries arise out of or in the course of activity incident to military service?
Under the Feres doctrine, the United States is not liable under the FTCA for injuries to servicemembers where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service. The relationship between the government and members of the armed forces is “distinctively federal,” there is no true private-person analogue, uniform federal interests would be undermined by applying varying state tort standards, and Congress provided an alternative, comprehensive compensation system for service-connected injuries. Accordingly, claims by servicemembers for service-related injuries are barred, even outside combat and even when framed as medical malpractice.
No. The FTCA does not authorize suits by servicemembers for injuries that arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to military service. All three consolidated claims were not maintainable under the FTCA.
Textual and structural considerations: The Court began with the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for negligent acts of federal employees “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” It concluded that a servicemember’s relationship to the federal sovereign has no true private analogue: no private person commands an army, quarters troops, or regulates the complex incidents of military service. Therefore, the “like circumstances” clause does not comfortably fit military injuries tied to the service relationship. Uniformity and federal character: The Court emphasized that the military relationship is “distinctively federal.” Subjecting military tort liability to the patchwork of state laws where bases happen to be located would create nonuniform duties and standards inconsistent with national defense needs. The FTCA did not signal that Congress intended state law to define the government’s obligations to soldiers. The Court viewed this as a strong reason to interpret the statute not to reach such claims. Alternative compensation and congressional design: Congress had already created a comprehensive, no-fault system of military and veterans’ benefits to address service-connected injuries. The existence of that uniform federal remedial scheme indicated that Congress did not intend the FTCA to overlay fault-based, state-law tort recoveries for the same class of injuries—especially where such litigation could disrupt military administration. In the Court’s view, the benefits system, though not identical to tort damages, reflected the chosen legislative balance. Discipline and separation of powers: Allowing servicemembers’ tort suits would invite judicial second-guessing of military orders, supervision, training, medical judgments within the chain of command, and on-base housing or safety policies. Such intrusions risked undermining military discipline and effectiveness—areas in which courts traditionally accord substantial deference to the political branches. Although the FTCA contains an explicit “combatant activities” exception, the Court read the statute as a whole to avoid pervasive entanglement in military affairs even in noncombat contexts where injuries were incident to service. Distinguishing prior precedent: The Court distinguished Brooks v. United States, which permitted FTCA recovery for soldiers injured by an Army vehicle while on furlough and engaged in a purely civilian activity. Brooks involved injuries not incident to service. By contrast, Feres, Jefferson, and Griggs all arose from conditions or medical care integrally connected to military service.
Feres established a sweeping, judge-made limitation on the FTCA known as the Feres doctrine. It bars most tort suits by active-duty servicemembers for service-related injuries, including peacetime medical malpractice and on-base accidents, based on concerns about federal uniformity, lack of a private analogue, alternative benefits, and military discipline. The doctrine has been extended to bar claims even when the alleged negligence is by civilians if the injury is incident to service (United States v. Johnson), and to preclude derivative indemnity claims (Stencel Aero). It also influenced constitutional tort jurisprudence by counseling against Bivens remedies for service-related injuries (United States v. Stanley). Exceptions exist at the margins (e.g., Brooks for injuries not incident to service; United States v. Brown allowing post-discharge negligence at a VA facility), and Congress has created a limited administrative remedy for active-duty medical malpractice at military facilities (10 U.S.C. § 2733a), but Feres remains the controlling framework for FTCA claims involving servicemembers.
It is a functional, fact-specific standard focusing on whether the injury arose out of the military relationship. Key considerations include duty status (active duty vs. furlough or discharge), location (on-base vs. off-base), the nature of the activity (military mission, training, or benefits of service like on-base housing/medical care), and whether adjudication would intrude on military discipline. Injuries during training, in barracks, or from military medical care to active-duty members are typically incident to service; injuries while on leave performing civilian activities may not be (see Brooks).
Generally no; Feres bars FTCA suits by active-duty servicemembers for malpractice at military facilities because such care is incident to service. However, since 2020 Congress has provided a limited administrative claims process (not an FTCA suit) for active-duty malpractice at Department of Defense facilities under 10 U.S.C. § 2733a. This process allows compensation through the military claims system, not federal court litigation.
Yes, dependents and civilians may bring FTCA claims for their own injuries, subject to the statute’s other requirements. But claims derivative of a servicemember’s barred injury (e.g., indemnity or loss of consortium that would require re-litigating a service-related injury) can be precluded. Courts also consider whether adjudicating the claim would require intrusive review of military decisions, which can lead to dismissal even for non-servicemembers in some contexts.
United States v. Johnson (1987) extended Feres by barring FTCA suits even when the alleged negligence was by civilian employees (e.g., FAA controllers) if the injury to the servicemember was incident to service. United States v. Brown (1954) carved out a limit, allowing a discharged veteran to sue for malpractice at a VA hospital because the negligent act occurred post-discharge and thus was not incident to service.
Both, but predominantly judicial interpretation. The Court acknowledged that the FTCA does not expressly exclude servicemembers’ claims (except for a separate combatant-activities exception), yet inferred from the statute’s structure, the “like circumstances” language, the federal character of the military relationship, and the veterans’ benefits scheme that Congress did not intend tort liability for service-related injuries. This has led to continuing debate and repeated (unsuccessful) calls for statutory reform.
Yes, for service-related injuries. In United States v. Stanley, the Supreme Court relied on Feres rationales to hold that Bivens remedies are unavailable for constitutional claims arising out of activity incident to service, further insulating military decisions from judicial tort-style review.
Feres v. United States announced a durable limitation on the FTCA that reflects the judiciary’s deference to congressional design and military institutional needs. By focusing on the distinctively federal nature of the soldier–sovereign relationship, the lack of a private analogue, uniformity concerns, and existing benefits programs, the Court created the “incident to service” bar that excludes most suits by active-duty servicemembers for service-connected injuries.
For students of torts, federal courts, and national security law, Feres is a crucial study in how statutory purpose, institutional competence, and separation-of-powers considerations can overtake a statute’s broad waiver of immunity. Its reach remains contested, but until Congress says otherwise, the Feres doctrine defines the FTCA’s military exception.