Master Seminal Massachusetts case holding that shareholders in a close corporation owe one another the duty of utmost good faith and loyalty and establishing an equal-opportunity rule for corporate stock repurchases. with this comprehensive case brief.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype is a landmark decision in corporate law that reshaped the fiduciary landscape for closely held corporations. Recognizing that close corporations resemble partnerships more than widely held public companies, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts imposed partner-like fiduciary duties among shareholders—most notably a duty of “utmost good faith and loyalty.” This elevated standard protects minority shareholders from the unique vulnerabilities inherent in the close corporation form, including illiquidity, dependence on the controlling group, and the ease with which corporate machinery can be used to confer private benefits on those in control.
Beyond articulating the duty, the court gave it concrete teeth through the “equal opportunity” rule: when a close corporation uses corporate funds to purchase shares from one shareholder—especially a controlling shareholder—it must offer every other shareholder an equal opportunity to sell a proportionate number of their shares on substantially identical terms. Donahue thus provides both the normative framework and a practical rule of decision for common minority oppression scenarios, making it a foundational case for students studying business associations and corporate governance in the close corporation context.
367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975)
Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc. was a Massachusetts close corporation dominated by members of the Rodd family. The corporation’s board, controlled by the majority faction, authorized the use of corporate funds to purchase a substantial block of shares from a senior member of the controlling family at a premium price. The transaction provided the selling insider with a liquidity and retirement benefit, while depleting corporate assets. Margaret Donahue, a minority shareholder unrelated to the controlling group, requested that she be allowed to sell her shares to the corporation on the same terms as those extended to the insider. The company refused. Donahue sued, alleging that the defendants—both the controlling shareholders and the directors who approved the transaction—breached fiduciary duties by orchestrating a corporate stock repurchase that benefitted the majority while denying the minority an equal opportunity to participate.
Do shareholders and directors in a closely held corporation breach their fiduciary duties by causing the corporation to repurchase shares from a controlling shareholder on favorable terms without offering minority shareholders an equal opportunity to sell their shares on the same terms?
In a close corporation, shareholders (particularly those in control) owe one another fiduciary duties of the utmost good faith and loyalty, akin to the duties partners owe each other. When those in control use corporate mechanisms in a manner that provides a special advantage to themselves or other insiders at corporate expense, their conduct is subject to strict judicial scrutiny for inherent or intrinsic fairness. As applied to corporate stock repurchases in close corporations, this duty requires that if the corporation purchases shares from any shareholder—especially a controlling shareholder—it must offer every other shareholder an equal opportunity to sell a proportionate number of shares on identical terms. The business judgment rule does not insulate self-interested, control-driven transactions from this heightened fiduciary review.
Yes. The controlling shareholders and directors breached their fiduciary duty of utmost good faith and loyalty by causing the corporation to purchase shares from a controlling insider without providing the minority shareholder an equal opportunity to sell her shares on the same terms. The appropriate remedy is either rescission of the insider purchase or extension to the minority of an equal opportunity to sell a ratable portion of her shares at the same price and on the same conditions.
The court began by recognizing the distinctive features of close corporations: few shareholders, no ready market for shares, substantial participation of owners in management, and the vulnerability of minority shareholders to exclusion and opportunism. Because minority investors cannot readily exit and are exposed to majority control over employment, dividends, and liquidity, traditional corporate doctrines are insufficient to protect them. Accordingly, the court analogized close corporations to partnerships and imposed partner-like fiduciary duties among shareholders, drawing on authorities such as Pepper v. Litton to emphasize the obligation of controlling shareholders to act with scrupulous fairness. Applying this standard, the court treated the insider redemption as a self-dealing transaction: corporate assets were used to confer a substantial, individualized benefit on a member of the controlling group. Even if the transaction complied with corporate formalities or statutory authorization for stock repurchases, fiduciary duty principles demanded more. The purchase depleted the corporate treasury and, absent equal treatment, effectively transferred value from the minority to the insider-seller. The business judgment rule did not apply because the decision-makers were interested and stood to benefit. Under the intrinsic fairness test, the only way to render such a transaction fair is to offer all shareholders an equal opportunity to participate on identical terms. Because the minority was denied that opportunity, the fiduciary duty was breached. As a remedy, the court fashioned equitable relief: either unwind the transaction or extend the same terms to the plaintiff for a ratable portion of her shares, thereby restoring parity and protecting minority interests without necessarily forbidding all redemptions.
Donahue is foundational for close corporation law. It establishes that controlling shareholders in close corporations owe each other the duty of utmost good faith and loyalty and that corporate actions conferring special benefits on insiders must meet a strict fairness standard. The decision also articulates a clear, administrable rule for stock repurchases—the equal-opportunity requirement—frequently invoked in minority oppression and freeze-out litigation. In Massachusetts, Donahue set the stage for Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, which added a “legitimate business purpose” balancing framework for employment and operational decisions, and later for Brodie v. Jordan, which refined remedies to restore the status quo ante of the injured minority. For students, Donahue is essential to understanding how fiduciary duties adapt to the realities of closely held firms, how the business judgment rule yields when controllers self-deal, and how courts craft equitable remedies to protect vulnerable minority owners.
A close corporation typically has a small number of shareholders, no public market for its stock, and substantial overlap between ownership and management. These attributes make minority shareholders especially vulnerable: they cannot easily sell their shares, and controllers can withhold dividends, terminate employment, or deny liquidity. Donahue recognizes these features and imposes partner-like fiduciary duties among shareholders to mitigate the risk of minority oppression.
No. The business judgment rule does not shield self-interested transactions orchestrated by controlling shareholders. In such cases, courts apply heightened scrutiny—often described as an intrinsic fairness test—requiring the controllers to demonstrate the transaction’s fairness. Because the repurchase in Donahue benefitted an insider and depleted corporate assets without equal treatment for the minority, the business judgment rule was inapplicable.
When a close corporation uses corporate funds to redeem shares from one shareholder, especially a controller, it must offer every other shareholder an equal opportunity to sell a proportionate number of shares at the same price and on substantially identical terms. This prevents controllers from extracting unique liquidity benefits at the corporation’s expense while minority owners remain locked in.
Although the transaction involved corporate funds, the core harm—denial of equal treatment and resulting dilution of the minority’s relative value—was uniquely inflicted on the minority, supporting a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty owed to the shareholder. The remedy crafted by the court—rescission or an equal-opportunity purchase—restores the minority’s position rather than simply compensating the corporation.
Carefully drafted shareholder agreements or buy–sell arrangements can prescribe redemption policies (e.g., mandatory pro rata redemptions, formula pricing, or cross-purchase mechanisms) that ensure equal treatment. Boards should avoid ad hoc insider redemptions and, if liquidity is provided to one shareholder, extend the same opportunity ratably to all. Documenting legitimate business purposes and considering less harmful alternatives also helps satisfy the heightened fiduciary standard.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype reorients close corporation law around partnership-like fiduciary duties and rigorous fairness review when controllers use corporate power for private advantage. Its equal-opportunity rule for stock repurchases provides a concrete, predictable constraint on insider liquidity events that might otherwise siphon value from minority owners.
For law students, Donahue is a critical starting point for understanding minority oppression doctrine, the limits of the business judgment rule in the closely held context, and the equitable remedies courts deploy to restore parity. It remains a touchstone case, often paired with Wilkes and Brodie, for analyzing how fiduciary obligations scale with control and how corporate law adapts to the realities of illiquid, relationship-driven enterprises.