Master U.S. Supreme Court recognized an individual right under the Second Amendment to possess firearms for lawful purposes, especially self-defense in the home, and invalidated D.C.’s handgun ban and functional-inoperability requirement. with this comprehensive case brief.
District of Columbia v. Heller is the modern starting point for Second Amendment jurisprudence. Decided in 2008, the Supreme Court held for the first time that the Second Amendment protects an individual right—unconnected to militia service—to keep and bear arms for traditionally lawful purposes, chief among them self-defense in the home. In doing so, the Court invalidated the District of Columbia’s near-total ban on handguns and its requirement that lawful firearms be kept inoperable within the home.
Heller is doctrinally pivotal for at least three reasons. First, it resolved a longstanding debate over whether the Second Amendment secures a “collective” militia-based right or an “individual” right. Second, it established a textual and historical method for construing the Amendment, treating the prefatory militia clause as announcing a purpose but not limiting the operative individual right. Third, while affirming the right, Heller also emphasized that it is not unlimited, expressly preserving a field for longstanding regulatory measures. Subsequent cases—most notably McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022)—built on Heller’s foundation, extending its reach to the states and refining the methodology for evaluating gun regulations.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
The District of Columbia maintained one of the most restrictive gun control regimes in the nation. The D.C. Code generally prohibited the registration of handguns, made it a crime to possess an unregistered firearm, and required that lawfully owned firearms in the home (such as rifles and shotguns) be kept “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device,” with no exception allowing them to be rendered operable for immediate self-defense. Dick Anthony Heller, a D.C. special police officer authorized to carry a handgun while on duty, applied to register a handgun he wished to keep in his home for self-defense. His application was denied. Heller, along with other plaintiffs, filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the District’s ban and inoperability requirement violated the Second Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint. The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual right and that the District’s restrictions were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, recognizing Heller’s standing, reviewed the constitutionality of the handgun ban and in-home inoperability requirement.
Does the Second Amendment protect an individual right to possess firearms, unconnected with service in a militia, for lawful purposes such as self-defense in the home, and, if so, do the District of Columbia’s handgun ban and requirement that firearms in the home be kept inoperable violate that right?
The Second Amendment’s operative clause—“the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed”—protects an individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation, most notably the right to keep a functional handgun in the home for self-defense. The prefatory clause—“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”—announces a purpose but does not limit or expand the operative protection. While the right is not unlimited and allows for longstanding and presumptively lawful regulatory measures (e.g., prohibitions on possession by felons and the mentally ill, bans on carrying in sensitive places, and conditions on commercial sales), a categorical ban on handguns commonly used for lawful purposes, and a requirement that firearms in the home be inoperable for immediate self-defense, violate the Second Amendment.
Yes. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms for lawful purposes, particularly self-defense within the home. The District of Columbia’s ban on the possession of handguns and its requirement that firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional violate that right. The judgment of the D.C. Circuit was affirmed.
Text and structure: The Court, per Justice Scalia, began with the constitutional text. The phrase “right of the people” appears in the First and Fourth Amendments and unequivocally denotes an individual right. The verbs “keep” and “bear” arms naturally encompass possession and carrying for confrontation, not solely military service. The Court read the operative clause as granting an individual right and treated the militia-prefatory clause as an explanatory preface that does not limit the scope of the operative guarantee. History and tradition: Surveying English antecedents (including the 1689 English Bill of Rights), founding-era state constitutions, and post-ratification commentary, the Court found robust historical support for an individual right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, including self-defense. It emphasized that self-defense was regarded as the “central component” of the right. The Court also drew on 19th-century cases and commentary that distinguished between arms “in common use” for lawful purposes and “dangerous and unusual” weapons that could be regulated or prohibited. Precedent: The Court addressed United States v. Miller (1939), rejecting the view that Miller limited the Second Amendment to militia service. Instead, the Court read Miller as consistent with the “common use” principle—holding that protection does not extend to weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. Application: Handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home and are thus squarely within the core protection of the Second Amendment. A categorical ban on an entire class of firearms commonly used for lawful purposes, coupled with a requirement that even lawfully possessed firearms be kept inoperable at all times, makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for immediate self-defense and therefore violates the Amendment. Limits and scrutiny: The Court rejected rational-basis review and declined to adopt Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach. It did not specify a precise tier of scrutiny but concluded that the challenged provisions would fail under any standard of scrutiny applied to enumerated rights. Importantly, the Court emphasized that the right is not unlimited and identified “longstanding” and “presumptively lawful” regulatory measures, including prohibitions on possession by felons and the mentally ill, restrictions on carrying in sensitive places, and regulations on commercial sales. Dissents: Justice Stevens, joined by three Justices, argued that the Amendment primarily protects a militia-related right and that the District’s laws were permissible. Justice Breyer, in a separate dissent, proposed an interest-balancing test under which the laws would be upheld. The majority rejected both approaches as inconsistent with the text, history, and structure of the Amendment.
Heller is the foundational case recognizing an individual Second Amendment right, reshaping federal constitutional law. It established that governments may not enact categorical bans on firearms commonly chosen for lawful purposes, and they may not render firearms inoperable where self-defense interests are at their zenith—the home. For students, Heller is essential for understanding constitutional interpretation (textualism and originalism), the function of prefatory versus operative clauses, and the interaction between rights and regulatory carve-outs. It set the stage for McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010), which incorporated the right against the states, and influenced New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022), which adopted a text-and-history framework eschewing means-end scrutiny. Heller also introduces key concepts—“common use” and the limits on “dangerous and unusual” weapons—that continue to guide courts evaluating firearm regulations.
No. Heller involved the District of Columbia (a federal enclave) and addressed federal restrictions. Two years later, McDonald v. City of Chicago (2010) incorporated the Second Amendment against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, making Heller’s individual-right holding applicable to state and local governments.
The Court did not adopt a specific tier of scrutiny. It rejected rational-basis review and Justice Breyer’s proposed interest-balancing test, and it concluded that D.C.’s laws would fail under any standard applicable to enumerated rights. After Heller, many lower courts used a two-step framework with intermediate scrutiny; in 2022, Bruen replaced that approach with a text-and-history test focusing on whether a regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.
Heller protects arms “in common use” by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, especially self-defense. Handguns clearly fit that category. The Court contrasted those with “dangerous and unusual” weapons, which fall outside the core protection. The Court did not catalog every weapon, but it cited Miller and suggested that military-grade weapons like M-16s and the like may be excluded.
No. The Court expressly stated that the right is not unlimited and identified presumptively lawful regulations, including prohibitions on possession by felons and the mentally ill, restrictions on carrying in sensitive places (e.g., schools and government buildings), and conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Heller leaves room for regulatory measures consistent with historical tradition.
The Supreme Court struck down the handgun ban and invalidated the in-home inoperability requirement insofar as it prevented immediate self-defense. After Heller, the District amended its firearms laws to allow handgun registration and to permit functional firearms in the home, subject to other regulatory requirements.
District of Columbia v. Heller transformed Second Amendment doctrine by recognizing an individual right to possess firearms, with particular protection for keeping a functional handgun in the home for self-defense. The decision grounded its analysis in text, structure, and history, distinguishing the prefatory militia clause from the operative guarantee and emphasizing the centrality of self-defense to the right.
At the same time, Heller carefully preserved space for firearm regulation by acknowledging longstanding, presumptively lawful restrictions. Its dual message—affirming a robust core right while recognizing historical limits—remains the touchstone for modern firearms litigation and constitutional interpretation, guiding courts and lawmakers in the years since through McDonald and Bruen.