Master The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to state and local racial set-aside programs and struck down Richmond’s 30% minority subcontracting requirement. with this comprehensive case brief.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. is the cornerstone Equal Protection case governing racial set-aside programs in state and local public contracting. The Court held that all racial classifications by state and local governments—whether labeled remedial or benign—are subject to strict scrutiny. In doing so, the Court invalidated Richmond’s ordinance requiring prime contractors to award at least 30% of the value of city construction subcontracts to minority-owned business enterprises (MBEs). Croson recalibrated the law after Fullilove v. Klutznick, emphasizing that unlike Congress, municipalities do not wield independent Section 5 enforcement powers to justify broad racial preferences. The decision set out a demanding framework: a locality must have a strong basis in evidence that it is remedying its own past discrimination (or its role as a passive participant in a discriminatory system), and any race-based remedy must be narrowly tailored—considering race-neutral alternatives, aligning remedial scope with proven injury, and avoiding rigid quotas untethered to the availability of qualified MBEs.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
The City of Richmond, Virginia, enacted an ordinance requiring prime contractors on city construction projects to subcontract at least 30% of the contract value to minority business enterprises (MBEs), defined as firms at least 51% owned and controlled by racial minorities (including Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American, Eskimo, and Aleut persons). The city justified the ordinance with evidence that although roughly half of Richmond’s population was Black, less than 1% of city prime contract dollars had gone to MBEs. The ordinance contained a waiver provision if MBEs were unavailable or the requirement would cause undue hardship. J.A. Croson Company, the sole bidder on a city jail plumbing contract, sought a waiver after failing to secure timely and comparably priced MBE suppliers. The city denied the waiver and ultimately rejected Croson’s bid. Croson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the ordinance, but the Fourth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Does the Equal Protection Clause require strict scrutiny for state and local racial set-aside programs, and did Richmond demonstrate a constitutionally sufficient compelling interest and narrow tailoring to justify its 30% MBE subcontracting requirement?
All racial classifications imposed by state and local governments are subject to strict scrutiny. To survive, the government must demonstrate: (1) a compelling interest, which in the remedial context requires a strong basis in evidence of prior discrimination by the governmental unit itself or of its passive participation in a discriminatory system within its jurisdiction; generalized assertions of societal discrimination and comparisons to overall population demographics are insufficient; and (2) narrow tailoring, which demands a tight fit between means and ends, serious consideration of race-neutral alternatives, flexibility (including meaningful waivers), limited duration, careful selection of beneficiaries closely tied to the identified injury, and a relationship between any numerical target and the actual availability of qualified minority firms. Federal programs may rest on Congress’s unique Section 5 enforcement power (Fullilove), but state and local programs do not share that constitutional latitude.
Yes, strict scrutiny applies to state and local racial set-aside programs. Richmond failed to show a compelling interest supported by a strong basis in evidence and did not narrowly tailor its 30% MBE requirement. The ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, held that all racial classifications by state and local governments trigger strict scrutiny, rejecting any lower level of review for nominally benign classifications. The Court distinguished Fullilove, noting Congress’s unique Section 5 authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend to municipalities, which must justify racial classifications under standard Equal Protection principles. On compelling interest, the record did not show that Richmond had engaged in prior discrimination or that it was a passive participant in a local construction industry marked by proven discrimination. The city relied on generalized societal discrimination and broad disparities between the percentage of minority residents and the percentage of contract dollars awarded to MBEs. The Court emphasized that such comparisons are inadequate because the relevant metric is the availability of qualified minority firms in the local market, not general population figures. The city offered no reliable data on the pool of qualified MBEs, no findings of specific discriminatory barriers (e.g., exclusionary trade networks, bonding practices, or bid procedures), and no identification of actors or practices responsible for any barriers. On narrow tailoring, the 30% quota was not tied to the actual availability of qualified MBEs and thus risked requiring awards beyond the scope of any injury. The plan swept in racial groups with no demonstrated history of discrimination in Richmond’s construction market (e.g., Eskimos and Aleuts), indicating overinclusiveness. While the ordinance contained a waiver process, the city’s denial of Croson’s waiver, despite its good-faith efforts, suggested inflexibility. The city had not seriously considered race-neutral alternatives, such as revising bonding and prequalification requirements, enhancing outreach and training, or enforcing antidiscrimination rules against prime contractors. The Court reiterated that quotas are especially suspect absent precise tailoring to proven discrimination. Because the city failed both prongs of strict scrutiny, the ordinance was unconstitutional. Justice Scalia concurred, emphasizing a presumption against racial classifications absent proven discrimination by the government. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dissented, arguing that the evidence sufficed to justify a remedial program and that the Court’s approach unduly hamstrung local efforts to counter entrenched discrimination.
Croson established that strict scrutiny governs all state and local race-based contracting programs and articulated the modern template for assessing remedial affirmative action outside the federal context. It requires a strong evidentiary foundation—often prompting jurisdictions to conduct detailed disparity studies—and careful, flexible tailoring that prioritizes race-neutral measures. The decision narrowed Fullilove’s reach to Congress and foreshadowed Adarand, which later extended strict scrutiny to federal programs. For law students, Croson is essential to understanding compelling interest analysis (strong basis in evidence), narrow tailoring in remedial contexts, and the limits of quota-like remedies under the Equal Protection Clause.
Fullilove upheld a federal set-aside premised on Congress’s Section 5 enforcement power, which allows broader latitude to remedy nationwide discrimination. Croson limits that reasoning to Congress and holds that state and local governments must satisfy ordinary Equal Protection strict scrutiny—showing a strong, localized evidentiary basis and narrow tailoring—without relying on Section 5 authority.
Evidence typically includes rigorous disparity studies comparing the percentage of qualified, willing, and able minority firms in the relevant market to their utilization in prime and subcontract awards, plus proof of discriminatory barriers (e.g., exclusionary networks, bonding or financing obstacles tied to past discrimination). General population statistics or national patterns, standing alone, are insufficient.
Key features include: linkage between any numerical targets and the availability of qualified MBEs; flexible, meaningful waivers; limited duration tied to the remedial need; careful definition of eligible beneficiaries tied to the injury found; and serious consideration of race-neutral alternatives (bonding reform, outreach, technical assistance, enforcement of antidiscrimination rules) before resorting to race-based preferences.
No. Croson allows remedial racial measures where a locality can show a strong basis in evidence of its own discrimination or of its passive participation in a discriminatory system and can narrowly tailor the remedy. The decision raises the evidentiary and design bar but does not categorically forbid remedial action.
Croson’s core principle—that all governmental racial classifications require strict scrutiny—was extended to federal programs in Adarand. Adarand applied Croson’s demand for a compelling interest supported by strong evidence and narrow tailoring, ensuring uniform strict scrutiny across federal, state, and local affirmative action programs.
Croson reset the constitutional baseline for race-conscious contracting at the state and local level, insisting on strict scrutiny in both name and fact. It requires governments to diagnose specific, proven discrimination within the relevant market and to craft remedies that fit that injury with precision, flexibility, and consideration of race-neutral alternatives. For students and practitioners, the case remains the blueprint for designing and defending public contracting programs: assemble a robust evidentiary record (often through well-constructed disparity studies), tailor beneficiaries and percentages to that record, employ meaningful waivers and time limits, and adopt race-neutral measures wherever effective. Without those elements, racial set-asides will fail under the Equal Protection Clause.