Master House of Lords held that foreseeability of damage is a prerequisite for liability in private nuisance and under Rylands v Fletcher, defeating a water supplier’s claim for solvent contamination from a tannery. with this comprehensive case brief.
Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather is a landmark House of Lords decision that reshaped English nuisance law and the scope of the Rylands v Fletcher doctrine. Confronted with groundwater contamination from industrial solvent spills at a tannery, the court rejected a strict-liability path to recovery and instead entrenched foreseeability of damage as a necessary element for liability in both private nuisance and Rylands. The decision explicitly aligned nuisance with negligence principles on remoteness, thereby narrowing the perceived strictness of older authorities and emphasizing fault as a limiting device.
Beyond doctrinal tidying, the case carries profound implications for environmental torts. By requiring foreseeability of the type of harm at the time of the defendant’s activity, the House of Lords limited retrospective liability for historical pollution that was not then appreciated as harmful. The opinion simultaneously clarified the “non-natural use” inquiry under Rylands and confirmed that Rylands is best understood as a particular form of nuisance, not an independent regime of near-strict liability. For law students, the case is essential reading on remoteness, nuisance’s relationship to negligence, and the modern reach of Rylands v Fletcher.
[1994] 2 AC 264 (HL)
Eastern Counties Leather plc (ECL) operated a tannery near Cambridge that, from the 1970s, used perchloroethylene (also called tetrachloroethene or PCE) as a degreasing solvent. PCE was stored and transferred in bulk on-site; small but repeated spills occurred over many years during routine handling. The solvent migrated through the factory floor and underlying strata into a chalk aquifer and traveled approximately 1–2 miles to a borehole owned and operated by Cambridge Water Company (CWC), which supplied potable water to the Cambridge area. In the early 1980s, trace PCE levels were detected in CWC’s borehole. In light of emerging scientific knowledge about PCE’s mobility and health risks and tightening drinking-water standards under European directives, CWC ultimately ceased using the borehole and claimed significant loss. CWC sued ECL in private nuisance and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, arguing that ECL’s storage and use of large quantities of PCE constituted a non-natural use and that the escape caused damage. The trial judge found in favor of CWC on nuisance and Rylands; the Court of Appeal affirmed. ECL appealed to the House of Lords.
Is liability in private nuisance and under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher contingent on the defendant’s reasonable foresight of the type of damage suffered, and if so, was the contamination of a distant water supply by small solvent spills reasonably foreseeable at the time of ECL’s operations?
For private nuisance, the defendant is liable only if the type of damage suffered was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s use of land, assessed at the time of the alleged nuisance. Rylands v Fletcher is a sub-species of nuisance; its liability likewise requires (1) a non-natural (extraordinary) use of land, (2) an escape, and (3) reasonably foreseeable damage of the relevant type. Foreseeability operates as a remoteness control in both nuisance and Rylands, aligning with general negligence principles that defendants are not liable for harm that was not reasonably foreseeable.
Yes, foreseeability of the relevant type of damage is required for liability in both private nuisance and under Rylands v Fletcher. On the facts, the contamination of a public water supply by small, routine PCE spills was not reasonably foreseeable at the material time; therefore, Eastern Counties Leather was not liable.
Lord Goff (for the House) emphasized coherence across tort doctrines: nuisance is not an enclave of strict liability divorced from fault-based controls. Drawing on remoteness principles and modern authorities, the House held that foreseeability of the type of harm functions as a necessary limitation in nuisance. Extending that logic, Rylands v Fletcher should be understood as a particular form of nuisance rather than an independent strict-liability tort. As such, Rylands liability also requires foreseeability of damage of the relevant type; mere proof of escape from a non-natural use does not suffice. Applying these principles, the House accepted that storing substantial quantities of industrial chemicals can constitute a non-natural use—indeed, Lord Goff described it as an almost classic example. There was also an escape: PCE migrated off ECL’s land through the substrata to CWC’s borehole. The claim nevertheless faltered on foreseeability. The court found that, at the time of the spills (in the 1970s and early 1980s), it was not reasonably foreseeable that minor, routine PCE spillages would percolate through chalk, travel well over a mile underground, and render a public water source unfit by reference to later-appreciated health and regulatory standards. The scientific understanding of PCE’s environmental behavior and the regulatory thresholds that later forced closure were not within the contemplation of a reasonable operator during the material period. Because the type of harm was not foreseeable, liability in both nuisance and under Rylands failed. In policy terms, the House cautioned against imposing retrospective liability for newly recognized environmental risks when defendants could not reasonably have guarded against them. The foreseeability requirement ensures that nuisance and Rylands remain consistent with broader tort principles and do not become engines of strict liability for past industrial practices undertaken without knowledge of remote risks.
Cambridge Water reshaped nuisance by cementing foreseeability of damage as a prerequisite to liability and repositioning Rylands v Fletcher as a subset of nuisance rather than a free-standing strict-liability doctrine. The case is frequently cited for three propositions: (1) nuisance includes a remoteness/foreseeability requirement; (2) Rylands requires foreseeability of damage and a non-natural use; and (3) the non-natural use assessment is contextual and sensitive to social utility and risk. For environmental tort litigation, the decision narrows recovery for historical contamination absent proof that the type of harm was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant’s activities, pushing some claims toward statutory/regulatory regimes rather than common-law strict liability.
No. The House of Lords preserved Rylands but reconceptualized it as a sub-species of nuisance. The court added an explicit foreseeability of damage requirement and reiterated the need for a non-natural use and an escape. This makes Rylands more fault-sensitive and less strictly liable than earlier readings suggested.
Foreseeability concerns the type of damage, not the precise chain of events. ECL did not have to foresee the exact route or concentration of PCE. But it must have been reasonably foreseeable that its solvent operations could cause the kind of harm suffered (contamination of a distant potable water source). Given the state of knowledge in the 1970s/early 1980s, the court held that such harm was not reasonably foreseeable.
The court accepted that storing substantial quantities of industrial solvent is ordinarily a non-natural (extraordinary) use, considering the danger posed. However, non-natural use alone does not create liability. The claimant must still show an escape and foreseeable damage of the relevant type.
It makes historical pollution claims harder under common law. Claimants must prove that, at the time of the defendant’s conduct, the type of environmental harm was reasonably foreseeable. If scientific knowledge and regulatory standards had not yet identified the risk, nuisance/Rylands claims may fail, pushing parties toward statutory or regulatory remedies instead.
Cambridge Water aligns nuisance with negligence on remoteness: both require foreseeability of the type of harm. However, nuisance still focuses on unreasonable interferences with land use, while negligence centers on breach of a duty of care. The decision promotes doctrinal coherence without collapsing the two torts.
Possibly. With contemporary knowledge about PCE’s mobility and regulatory limits on drinking water, the type of harm may be reasonably foreseeable, and prudent operators would take stringent precautions. If the harm were foreseeable today, a nuisance or Rylands claim could succeed (subject to proof of escape, causation, and non-natural use), though statutory environmental liability might also apply.
Cambridge Water marks a pivotal moment in the modernization of nuisance. By insisting on foreseeability of damage, the House of Lords brought nuisance and Rylands into harmony with negligence on remoteness and tempered the reach of near-strict liability for industrial activities. The opinion recognizes that tort law must account for evolving scientific knowledge and the limits of what risks can fairly be guarded against at a given time.
For law students, the case is indispensable in understanding nuisance’s elements, the continued (but chastened) role of Rylands v Fletcher, and the interaction between common-law torts and environmental regulation. It underscores that liability turns not only on causal proof and the character of land use, but on whether the type of harm was reasonably foreseeable when the defendant acted.